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THE papers on which the following Essay on Mr Mill
is based, were written shortly after the appearance of his
work on Sir W. Hamilton. They were written swiftly
and recklessly for an immediate purpose, and on reading
them as printed, I became aware that certain passages
were conceived in a spirit of something which seemed
like insolence, scarcely to be held becoming in relation
to a man so eminent as Mr Mill. That in the process
of revision and expansion, this original sin has been
eradicated so entirely as might be wished, I cannot ven
ture to be quite confident. But only a blockhead will
imagine that in any little vivacities of expression
I intend
disrespect to Mr Mill, farther than as unable to profess
respect for his reasonings on the topic under discussion.
Tn the little Extravaganza which follows, surely
I need
not formally disclaim an offensive intention to Mr
Carlyle, a man whom I entirely honour, and though
with onlv a modified belief in him as a prophet consideriv PREFACE.
simply our greatest man of letters now living. The
thing was written merely pour rire on the appearance of
the first two volumes of his
&quot;Frederick,&quot; and a few
copies were printed for the amusement of a circle of
friends. As the late conclusion of the work o-ives it D
anew a sort of pertinence, and under the mask of its
wild fooling there are insinuated some morsels of not
unserious criticism, I have thought it nnVht bear re-
*-^ D
production. That Mr Carlyle himself should it ever
come under his eye could see anything but matter of
amusement in it in so far as it may contain any
genuine element of the amusing it would truly sur
prise me to learn. The piece throughout abounds with
glancing allusions which are only likely to be caught by
readers almost critically familiar with nearly the entire
round of Mr Carlyle s writings; but it does not seem
worth while to indicate these even if it could be done
without trouble inasmuch as a very cursory acquaint
ance with Mr Carlyle will quite enable a reader to ap
preciate in a general way such merit as the thing may
be judged to possess.
P. P. A.MR JOHN STUART MILL
ON FREEDOM.
THOUGH Hume, in the opening of his ingenious Essay,
entitled, &quot;Of Liberty and Necessity,&quot; confidently pro
mised his readers,
&quot; at least some decision of a con-
&quot;
troversy&quot; to which, as it &quot;turned merely upon words
&quot; and ambiguous expressions,&quot;
&quot; a few intelligible de-
&quot; iinitions would immediately have put an end
&quot;
any
time for two thousand years previously,
it has not
been found that, since he wrote, unanimity of opinion
exists among thinking men touching the points aforetime
at issue. In our own day the old dispute re-emerges as
frequently as ever before ; and the writer, in the follow
ing; remarks, has at least the excuse, of them afforded bv
O
the fundamental importance and abiding interest of their
subject. It is a subject not for philosophers only, but
which all men professing themselves rational creatures
are seriously concerned to meditate. It is impossible to
think in any sense decisively on moral questions without
instantly led up to it; and for every man not con-2 MR JOHN STUART MILL
tent to be merely a piece of drift-wood on the seas of
thought, borne hither and thither as the accident of the
tides will, some at least provisional solution of the world-
old problem it suggests is positively needed as a sort of
intellectual vade mecum.
The following little Essay on the subject was suggested
by a perusal of the chapter
&quot; On the Freedom of the
&quot;
Will,&quot; in Mr Mill s late book on Hamilton, of the views
set forth in which it is mainly an attempted refutation.
These views are scarce in any respect different from those
which have long been before the world in the chapter
&quot; Of Liberty and Necessity,&quot; as it stands in the succes
sive editions of Mr Mill s &quot;System of
Logic.&quot; But in
asmuch as in seeking to adjust them to the needs of his
polemic against Hamilton, Mr Mill has here found it
necessary to develop considerably the moral side of his
argument, it seems reasonable to suppose he considers
lie has flooded the subject with new and important lights.
As to this, we regret to be unable to agree with him. It
seems to us he has left everything precisely as it was
;
except, indeed, as the confusions which very readily beset
the inquiry appear in his pages rather worse-confounded
than we have ever before chanced to see them. Mr Mill s
chapter on Freedom though in various influential quar
ters we have seen it selected for special laudation is
really the weakest in his book. The peculiarity of Mr
Mill s view is this, that announcing unconditionally the
Necessity of human actions, or if he thinks it makesaV FREEDOM. 3
any difference, as oddly enough he seems to do the Law
of Causation as applied to them, he professes to main
tain intaet a system of Moral doctrine, which, except on
the hypothesis of Freedom, is absolutely without a basis.
It is our purpose to inspect his method of mixing his oil
and water, and to show how little in the result, the dis
sentient fluids, even by a philosophical ingenuity so con
summate as that of Mr Mill, can be coaxed into kindly
interfusion. Within our proposed limits we cannot con
cern ourselves with the
&quot; accumulation of logical swim-
&quot;
bladders&quot; as Mr Carlyle phrases
it in his excruciating
(juiz of Coleridge by means of which Sir W. Hamilton
proposes to cross the metaphysical Jordan to the fair
land of Freedom beyond. Nor is it highly essential wi-
should. It was a good deal Sir William s way to pour
his porter out with a somewhat high hand, and to
pride himself pretty much as we may see a waiter do-
on the seething of scholastic froth which appeared as H
head for the liquor. Quite ingenuously he seems to
have considered that the complete philosophical sound
ness of his tap was in this way guaranteed.
It is a no
tion not much countenanced by Mr Mill, who, with one
puff of scornful breath incontinently blows off from the
discussion a quantity of Doctrines of the Conditioned,
opposite Inconceivable^, Excluded Middles, and what not.
Whether or no, as froth, Mr Mill has effectively made
away with them, the disciples of Sir W. Hamilton may
be left to inquire at their leisure. Our own easy notionill the matter is, that here, as throughout his book, Mr
Mill has stormed the mere outworks of Hamilton s posi
tion with undeniable vigour and success
; as instance, in
his criticism of Hamilton s Necessity, considered as an
Inconceivable, which we should a little dislike to have to
answer. But has the citadel also fallen ? Here, at least,
it seems to us it has not. The Tnconceivables, Middles,
and so forth, being allowed to have fled upon the winds,
we find, as the residuum of Hamilton s doctrine, our old
friend the Moral Imperative decisively announced by
Kant, and as following him, by Coleridge in order to
belief in the validity of which, it is necessary to postulate
Freedom. If, says Sir William, we be not directly con
scious of Freedom, (according to Mr Mill, Sir W. does
not quite know as to this,) we are at least conscious of
Moral Responsibility, in which Freedom, as its ground
is implied, and which Freedom withdrawn can be no
thing but the merest figment. Mr Mill at this kernel of
the dispute alleges in reply, that of Freedom we have no
direct consciousness ; and admitting our feeling of Moral
Responsibility, he undertakes to find for it in his scheme
of Necessity, that sound and satisfactory basis, the possi
bility of which, except on the hypothesis of Freedom, is
by his opponents denied. It is the main object of this
paper to inquire in how far he can be held to prosper in
his attempt to harmonise our practical moral instincts
: with his speculative tenet of Necessity.
And first can any real and important distinction beON FREEDOM.
made out between Mr Mill s Causation ism so call it
and the understood doctrine of Necessity
? Inasmuch
as Mr Mill, both here and in his
&quot;
Logic,&quot; repeatedly in
sists on such a distinction as cardinal, some preliminary
inquiry as regards it seems called for. His is, he says,
a &quot;falsely-called Doctrine of Necessity ;&quot; and he appends
to this a note as follows :
&quot; Both Sir \V. Hamilton and
&quot; Mr Mansel sometimes call it by the fairer name of De-
&quot; terminism. But both of them, when they come to
&quot; close quarters with the doctrine, in general call it
&quot; either Necessity, or less excusably, Fatalism. The
&quot; truth is, that the assailants of the doctrine cannot do
&quot; without the associations engendered by the double
&quot;
meaning of the word Necessity, which in this appli-
&quot; cation signifies only invariability, but in its common
&quot;
employment, compulsion/ Elsewhere we find him
\vritinu-
&quot; If necessity means more than this abstract?
&quot;
possibility of being foreseen ; if it means any myste-
rious compulsion apart from simple invariability ofl
&quot;
sequence,
I deny it as strenuously as any one. 1 o
&quot; enforce this distinction was the principal object ot the
&quot; remarks which Mr Mansel has criticised. If an un-
&quot; essential distinction from Mr Manscl s point of view,
&quot;
it is essential from mine, and of supreme importance
&quot; in a practical aspect.&quot; The only other passage on
which Mr Mill relies for the establishment of this im
portant distinction runs thus
&quot; A volition is a moral
&quot; effect which follows the corresponding moral causes as6 MR JOHN STUART MILL
&quot;
certainly and invariably as physical effects follow their /
&quot;physical cruises. Whether it must do so, I acknow-
&quot;
ledge myself to be entirely ignorant, be the phenome-
&quot; non moral or physical. All I know is that it always
&quot;
does.&quot; fllfl JJu* |
I Mr Mill seems in error in supposing that the argu
ment against his doctrine can only attain an illusory
success, by a sub-insinuation of compulsion in the use
of the term Necessity. All that is really needed for the
perfect validity of that argument is, Necessity negatively
defined as contradictory and exclusive of Freedom ; and
Mr Mill s Causationism is, on his own showing, with
such a scheme of Necessity identical. As to whether
an act not free, can accurately be said to be compelled,
this is an outlying question, the consideration of which
may be postponed ; enough, meantime that acts are only
assumed necessary in the sense of their not being free.
According to Mr Mill, when he sees a stone unattached
fall to the earth, he simply knows it does fall, not that
it must, or does necessarily fall. That stones certainly
and invariably do fall, and that any particular stone
will, under given circumstances, fall, and cannot, unless
a miracle were wrought to prevent it, be rationally
conceived of as doing otherwise, is readily by Mr Mill
admitted ; but, that it must fall, Mr Mill peremptorily
declines to admit. Will he admit the stone powerless
to prevent its fall ? It may reasonably seem he ought to
do so; everywhere else in the universe, denying orON FREEDOM.
more accurately, declining to admit any valid intux-m
rf power, he can scarcely allege
it in the stone,
if the stone be admitted passive and helpless in tht
matter, all as regards
it is admitted that any mortal
need care to contend for as meant by Necessity,
ck-tc-r
minim ; human action/ The defect in man of any poucn
to act otherwise than as he does act, in other phraseology,;
of Freedom is with some show of reason asserted t;-
annihilate him as a moral and responsible agent. For
that which a man is utterly unable to help doing,
it i
held absurd to impute to him either praise or Maim:.
This is, in effect, the moral argument for Free-will, as
a&amp;lt;j;ainst Mr Mill s Causationism ; and plainly
it rest
securely enough on the mere negative assumption of
impotence, as distinct from any positive compulsion,
_
either asserted or implied.
Whether, a&amp;lt;iam, a defect of any power to control it
in the subject whereon the effect is operated, may not
be the logical equivalent of a power of compulsion in
the cause, it may be worth while to inquire.
It may
facilitate the decision of this question to substitute for
the stone and its fall, in which compulsion
is held in
admissible, a case in which it will not, by plain men at
least, be denied. Suppose then, ten big men thewed
like Hercules to clutch hold of a small and weak one,
and per force drag him after them, is there for Mr Mill
in this case, any innst, or inference of Necessity?
li
Mr Mill, like a mere man of common sense, decides to8 MR JOHN STUART MILL
answer Yes, he implicitly throws up his brief; he
admits here a must and a Necessity, which elsewhere,
having made this admission, he will in vain seek to
deny ; for that this and every other conceivable case of
compulsion admit of being generalised under Mr Mill s
law of Causation, defined as simply
&quot; invariable se-
&quot;
quence,&quot; is too obvious to be more than merely suggest
ed. Should Mr Mill on the other hand decide, as in the
case of the stone, to answer as becomes a philosopher of
his school, that he can admit no must in the matter;
that when the weak captive is swept away by his ten
captors, we are not entitled to say, he of necessity goes
with them
; that what we are sure of is, that he does go,
and always will go, but that any power in the ten
muscular giants to compel his going, we have no right
to assume; his deliverance would perhaps be profound,
but we own we should find it puzzling. It is a popular
error, it seems, to suppose compulsion in any case made
out. It is, however, an error in which Mr Mill himself
so far shares, that in any such case of apparent com
pulsion as that given, he would admit the subject of
the outrage annihilated for the time being as a morally
responsible agent. Of this, there can be no doubt, for
we shall find him writing thus,
&quot; Yes if he could not
&quot;
help acting as he did that is, if his will could not
&quot; have helped it
; if he was under physical constraint,&quot; in
which case Mr Mill, in common with the mass of men
not philosophers, concedes &quot;exemption&quot; from blameON FREEDOM. 9
and just penalty. Causation, therefore, in such an
instance of it as that specified, admittedly involves, it
not a must, Necessity, or compulsion, some such equi
valent or analogue of these Mr Mill may give
it a
name at his leisure as serves to obliterate Responsibility,
and nullify moral judgments. And, if in one case ot
Causation, this nameless equivalent of compulsion
is
present, we may fairly ask Mr Mill to show ground of
its exclusion in others. Unless Mr Mill is prepared to
announce one doctrine of Causation for gentlemen
under constraint, and another for gentlemen at large,
stones and the like inanimate bodies, he must needs
confess his distinction between the doctrines of Causa
tion and Necessity, in relation to the moral problem, a
trivial and merely verbal one.
And in truth, though Mr Mill, as we saw, very much
insists on this distinction, as it may seem to suit the
exigency of his argument,
it might almost appear that,
apart from this, he does not habitually define it to him
self with any great rigour or precision. Thus, we shall
find him writing of &quot;people not being punished for
&quot; what they were compelled to do,&quot; and this not by
physical violence, but under urgency of some such
motive as a fear of instant death. Nay, more ; we shall
find him identifying this moral compulsion with com
pulsion by physical constraint, in so far as to admit or
assert that in neither case
&quot; could the will of the man
&quot; have helped&quot; his action. Mr Mill thus explicitly ad-IO
raits as involved in the idea of Causation, physical alike
and moral, the very compulsion, against the alleged
surreptitious implication of which by his opponents, in
calling his a doctrine of Necessity, we have seen his
repeated protest. It is open, of course, to Mr Mill to
say, that he uses here the word
&quot;
compelled,&quot; merely m a loose and popular way, and really means some
thing quite different; but people so trained as Mr Mill,
to accuracy in the use of terms, will seldom in philo
sophical discussion, say things which they do not mean,
except when their meaning is to themselves a little
indistinct. Mr Mill would scarcely here have used the
word compelled, unless he had been wont more or less
when its relation to his argument ceased to be before
his mind to associate the ideas of compulsion and
Causal sequence, in some such way as to neutralise his
distinction between the doctrines of Causation and
Necessity. Nevertheless, supposing the distinction valid,
we shall, in all that follows, use the convenient words,
Necessary, Necessity, &c., simply as implying the
absence of Freedom, which Mr Mill in his Causationism
maintains, and not as in any case including the element
of positive compulsion he denies in it.
Following Mr Mill in his attempt to resolve the diffi
culties which beset this question, by representing them
as originated and maintained by the use of inappropriate
terms, Mr Bain (see
&quot; The Emotions and the Will,&quot; p.
544,) not only censures as &quot;obnoxious&quot; in this relationON FREEDOM. 1 1
the word
&quot;





&quot; One answer,&quot; he writes,
&quot; to be made to
&quot; the advocates of Free-will, is, I conceive, the utter
&quot;
inappropriateness of the name, or notion, to express
&quot; the phenomenon in question. We may produce any
&quot; amount of mystery, incomprehensibility, insolubility,
&quot;
transcendentalism, by insisting on keeping up a
&quot;
phraseology, or a theoretical representation that is
&quot;
unadapted to the facts. I can imagine some votary of
&quot; the notion that polar force (as in the magnet)
is the
&quot;
type and essence of all the powers of nature, finding
&quot; the difficulty of bringing gravity under it, and there-
&quot; fore declaring the case of gravity an insoluble problem.
/In like manner, I believe that to demand that our
volitions shall be stated as either free or not free, is
&quot; to mystify and embroil the real case, and to superadd
&quot; factitious difficulties to a problem not in its own na-
&quot; ture insolubky Under a certain motive, as hunger,
&quot; I act in a certain way, taking the food that is before
&quot;
me, eoing where I shall be fed, or performing some
&quot; other preliminary condition. The sequence
is simple
&quot;and clear when so expressed jy^ring in the idea of
&quot;
Freedom, and there is instantly a chaos, imbroglio,
&quot; or jumble. What is to be said therefore, is that this
&quot; idea ous;ht never to have come into the theoretical
&quot;
explanation of the Will, and ought now to be sum-
&quot;
marily expelled. The term Ability
is innocent, and
&quot; has intelligible meanings, but the term Liberty (or O O ^12 MR JOHN STUART MILL
&quot;
Freedom) is brought in by main force into a pheno-
&quot; menon to which it is altogether incommensurable^
Its introduction, Mr Bain proceeds to censure as
&quot; the
&quot; conversion of metaphor into scientific
language,&quot; and
then concludes of it thus
&quot; We understand the diflfer-
&quot; ence between slavery and free citizenship, between a
&quot;
censorship and a free press, and between despotism in
&quot;
any shape and the liberty of the subject; but, if any
&quot; one asks whether the course of a volition in a man
&quot; or an animal is a case of despotism or a case of free-
&quot; dom, I answer that the terms have no relation what-
&quot; soever to the subject. The question put into some
&quot; one s mouth by Carlyle, Is virtue then a gas
? is
&quot; not too ridiculous a parody upon the
foregoing.&quot;
Of all this, what is to be said ? Simply that there is
nothing whatever in it. The use of the word Freedom
in regard of the Will is indeed metaphorical ; but the
metaphor employed is so close and apposite that Mr
Bain s is probably the only mind that ever saw in it a
possible source of confusion. Let us ask any one using the*
term what he means by Free-will, and we are at a loss to
j
know how he could define it except as a power or ability
in man at any moment, to act otherwise than as he does
act. If we
&quot;
summarily expel,&quot; as Mr Bain desires, the
term
&quot;





chaos, imbroglio, or jumble,&quot; and sub
stitute for it the term
&quot;
Ability,&quot; which, it seems, is
&quot; innocent and
intelligible,&quot; the argument in every iotaON FREEDOM. 13
of it remains precisely as it \vas. If there be no Freedom
in man, no al Hity in him, that is, (it would require some-
little ingenuity to explain the term save thus,) to act
otherwise than as he does act, his inalllitij to do so
must be held to be as utter and absolute as the inability
to act at all of a man tied tight with cart ropes and
flunsr on the ground. How then is he in reason to be
held criminal in not having acted otherwise, any more
than the man in bonds for not having acted at all, sup
posing him under an obligation to act, tifrce? Do the
bonds of the one man in any sense more rigorously
determine his inaction, than the causal motive determines
the action of the other man, and incapacitates him from
actino- otherwise ? Surely it will not so be held by either
CD *
Mr Mill or Mr Bain. The inability of a man to actt
in anything except as he does act, is then as complete;
as if in his act he were compelled. The antithesis be
tween physical constraint and freedom may thus be
logically identified with that between Causal urgency of
motive and an ability in man to act otherwise than as he
does act. It is a metaphor as used
; but the only minds
in which it ever yet led to any confusion worth speaking
of arc the minds of the philosophers, who, following
Hume, the originator of this whole line of argument,
have thought that by extruding it as a metaphor they
got rid of any of the difficulties which are really essential
to the subject. Moreover, till a case of physical constraint
or compulsion be produced, which is not also a case ot14 MR JOHN STUART MILL
Causation defined as &quot;invariable sequence/ there are
tolerable grounds for elevating it from the rank of a
mere metaphor to that of an illustrative instance. But,
as we said above Necessity being objected to by Mr
Mill as implying compulsion that we should not so
use the term, but merely as implying the negation of
Freedom so now the term Freedom being by Mr
Bain objected to we shall never in what follows use it
except in his severely &quot;innocent&quot; sense of an
&quot;
Ability&quot; m man to act otherwise than as he does act. By
Necessity we shall be bound to mean throughout simply
Causation, or constant and unconditional sequence ; by
Freedom an Ability in man as stated. And it is our
hope it will be seen that, by these concessions to oppo
nents, the force such as it ever may have been of the
moral argument in favour of said Freedom or Ability is




direct consciousness of Freedom/ asserted by-
Hamilton, as Mr Mill alleges,




by many maintained with
&quot;a confidence far greater than
his,&quot; Mr Mill
distinctly
denies. As this supposed doubt and hesitation in
Hamilton is inferred by Mr Mill from certain slight
apparent discrepancies in his statements given at differ
ent times, it seems more or less pertinent to note that
Mr Mill, in his own statements of the matter, is by no





writing&quot; The metaphysical theory ofON FREEDOM. 15
&quot; Free-will (for the practical feeling of
it common in n
&quot;
greater or less degree to all mankind, is no way incon-
&quot; sistent with the contrary theory,) was invented,&quot; Sec.,
and ao-ain
&quot; We shall imd that this feeling of being
&quot; able to modify our own character, If ice icisli, is itself the
&quot;
feeling of moralfreedom ire are conscious
&amp;lt;&amp;gt;J.&quot; It will,
we hope, be found proved at a later stage of the discus
sion, that this of our
&quot;
being able to modify our own
&quot;
character, if we icish,&quot; is a use of words without mean
ing, unless some admission of Freedom be implied in it ;
and even were it not so proved, the latter clause of the
sentence retains its full significance. We are thus
entitled to say that Mr Mill had at one time a con
sciousness of Freedom ; now he assures us he has
it not. The explanation of this is probably to be
found in such passages of his later book as the follow-
j n
&amp;lt;r All agree with him (Hamilton) in the position
&quot; that a real fact of consciousness cannot be doubted
&quot; or denied.&quot;
&quot;
Consciousness, it w ill probably be said,
&quot;
is the best evidence ; and so it would be, if we were
&quot;
always certain what is consciousness,&quot; and quota
tions miirht at will be accumulated to the like effect, that
a datum of consciousness, if genuine, must be held a de
liverance of truth. Whilst a practical feeling or con
sciousness was held by Mr Mill UN-authoritative, as
&quot;no way inconsistent with a contrary theory,&quot; Mr Mill
had a consciousness of Freedom ; now that a closer eon-
tact with Hamilton has forced on him the authority of16 MR JOHN STUART MILL
consciousness, the denial of which would leave Science
itself without a basis, we find that his consciousness of
Freedom has departed. Might it not almost seem to
have departed in the interest of &quot;the contrary theory?&quot;
Be this as it may, Mr Mill, without any of the doubt
and hesitation ascribed to Hamilton some modicum of
which might not have been amiss on his own part, the
state of the case considered is here found
&quot;
rejecting as
&quot;a figment&quot; the consciousness of Freedom, which else
where he frankly admits; and though his statement of
the matter cannot, perhaps, on its own ground, conclu
sively be shown to be erroneous, it does not seem a
hopeless task somewhat to reduce its force as against the
advocate of Free-will doctrine. &quot;But this conviction,&quot;
writes Mr Mill, &quot;whether termed consciousness or only
&quot;
belief, that our will is free what is it ? Of what are we
&quot; convinced ? I am told that whether I decide to do or to
&quot;
abstain, I feel that I could have decided the other way.
&quot;
I ask my consciousness what I do feel, and I find indeed
&quot; that I feel (or am convinced) that I could have chosen
&quot; the other course, if I had preferred it (sic) ; but not
&quot; that I could have chosen one course while I preferred
&quot; another/ Of this it seems enough to say that, as Mr
Mill proceeds to define what he means by preference, as
the final award, elective act, or choice of the mind on a
view of the whole circumstances, the distinction which
he here makes is a distinction without a difference. The
advocate of Freedom has only to reply as it is plainlyON FREEDOM. 17
competent for him to do that this final award of the
inind, elective act, choice, or if Mr Mill pleases pref
erence, which is scarce, except nominally, to be distin
guished from the external act in which it issues, is the:
very thing over which he is conscious of a free exercise
of power. Feeling he has amiss preferred to do, he now
also feels he ought to have preferred to abstain, as he
further feels that he could have done. Clearly Mr Mill
makes no way whatever here ; let us follow him a little
further.
&quot; Take any alternative, say to murder or not to
&quot; murder. I am told that if I elect to murder, I am con-
scious that I could have elected to abstain
; but am I
&quot; conscious that I could have abstained, if my aversion to
&quot; the crime, and my dread of its consequences, had been
&quot; weaker than the temptation
? If I elect to abstain, in
&quot; what sense am I conscious that I could have elected to
&quot; commit the crime ? Only if I had desired to commit it
&quot; with a desire stronger than my horror of murder, not
&quot; with one less strong.&quot; Now, had all our &quot;desires and It
&quot;
aversions&quot; (motives) been passions using the word in its /
primary and accurate sense* such as the blind, inevitable!
animal rage of thirst or of hunger, or the physical shrink
ing from a red-hot iron of one whose flesh has been
sometime seared with it, Mr Mill s reasoningf here would
* As here,
&quot; An Agent over-ruled by a blind impulse is a contra
diction in terms ; for then he is not an Agent at all, but a mere Patient.
&quot;
DR SAMUEL CLARKE.
t That after all, it is reasoning, and reasoning a little out of place,
will presently fall to be noted.
Bhave been stronger than any chain cable. But that the
tact is far otherwise, Mr Mill himself will perhaps not
dream of denying. The great mass of our desires and
aversions are as truly and efficiently acts in which the
will is immanent and by consequence free acts, in so
far as the will may be free as the external acts in which
! they issue. Even within the range of animal appetite,
this might perhaps in a degree be made obvious. The
&quot;desire to commit murder,&quot; again, is as accurately a
moral act, as is the murder itself which comes of it.
Moral &quot;desires and aversions,&quot; more particularly, are
indeed motives, but they are also and antecedently in
the order of logic acts, as the rage of a hungry man for
food cannot be. If this distinction in the least be valid,
very obviously, in his neglect of it, Mr Mill s fabric of
reasoning goes to pieces like a child s card castle. For,
if motives be also acts
; and free acts as provisionally
tor the purpose of the argument we are plainly entitled
to assume them the resulting acts are accurately to be
termed free, however inevitably determined by their
determinations. Include, from this point of view, in
the consciousness of Freedom, not simply the act, but
the act with its motive, considered as one complex phe
nomenon, and the reply to Mr Mill seems sufficient.
Of course it is simply as such it is offered,jiot the least
as a rationale of Freedom, which remains an utter mys
tery as before. For the motive, considered as an act,
must depend on some previous motive, by which it inON FREEDOM. i 9
turn was determined
; and so through a regressive series,
in which Freedom fleets for ever one step back from us,
and is never to be caught and detained. But it may be
that the distinction indicated between mere blind animal
impulse, and other &quot;desires and aversions/ Mr Mill
would decline to admit. It would be pleasant to be
assured that he would, inasmuch as in virtue of his doing
so, we should be spared a good many further pages of
more or less perplexed discussion. As thus Nobody not
idiotic would censure a man for hunger, or consider him
morally responsible for the amount or urgency of the
appetite ; so that plainly, if we include all other desires
and aversions under a common law with it, there is an
end of our Moral Responsibility. Surely it will not be
alleged that though the appetite itself must be held
blameless, its lawless indulgence as by theft, let us say
is not so. For the restraining desires and aversions
(motives) are by the hypothesis included under the same
blind law of irresponsibility ; and we are no more ans
werable for their deficiency as check, than for the excess
of the appetite as impulse. Obviously, therefore, then-
can be no more a Moral Responsibility in man, than we
surmise it in a balance on which weights tilt each other
up and down. Morally, he is just such a dead, irre
sponsible balance, on which some deity or devil, experi
menting in corpore vdi, weighs motives of desire and
aversion. And precisely this inference from his doctrine
it is, which, as pressed upon him by the advocates of20
Freedom, the whole subsequent argument of Mr Mill is
a hopeless struggle to evade.
Again, to quote Mr Mill, &quot;When we think of our-
&quot; selves hypothetically as having acted otherwise than we
&quot;
did, we always suppose a difference in the antecedents ;
&quot; we picture ourselves as having known something that
&quot; we did not know, or not known something that we did
&quot;
know, which is a difference in the external motives, or as
&quot;
having desired something or disliked something, more or
&quot; less than we did, which is a difference in the internal
&quot;
motives.&quot; Setting aside here the so-called
&quot; external
&quot;motives&quot; which are not in accuracy motives, but
merely* external indeterminate novel conditions of mo
tive, to import which into the discussion is only by so
much to embarrass it in order to deprive Mr Mill s
argument of all force, we have only to repeat of the
&quot; internal motives/ that besides being motives, they are
acts, of which we feel we might have determined the
differences indicated. &quot;When we think of ourselves
&quot;
hypothetically as having acted otherwise than we did,&quot;
we do indeed &quot;suppose a difference in the antecedents;&quot;
but along with the new antecedents given in thought,
there is given a conviction, that it was in our power to
have generated them in act, and thus to have determined
the result differently.
*
&quot;A motive is a desire or aversion&quot; page 519 an &quot;external mo-
&quot;tive&quot; is thus plainly an inaccurate synonym of the object of desire,
or external condition of motive.ON FREEDOM. 21
Previous to choosing one of two courses of conduct, O
\ve seem unquestionably to have a consciousness or con
viction that it is in our po\ver to choose either ; in the
intimate moment of act, this consciousness of needs dis
appears, but only to reinstate itself afterwards in a sense
that it \vas in our power to have acted otherwise. And
if this be not an authentic consciousness of Freedom, we
see not in what terms it would be possible to define such
a consciousness.
&quot;&amp;gt; tv^,.^^ t
We have thus in consciousness two distinct testi
monies to our Freedom : the testimony anterior to act,
and that which follows it. Plainly, in the constant
correlation of these in the ratification of the conviction
as it first shows itself by its subsequent reappearance of
the re-emergent conviction by that which has preceded
it lies the force of the affirmative assertion ; and no
negative which does not conclusively resolve both can be O *
held as of weight against either. Mr Mill s attempted
reduction of the consciousness of Freedom, in regard of
acts which are past, our readers are so far in a posi
tion to estimate ; to enable them to estimate likewise
the success of his attempt to reduce our consciousness
of Freedom in acts contingent and meditated, let us
quote the sum of his wisdom on the subject, as conveyed
in the following passage
:
&quot; To be conscious of Freedom must mean to be cou-
&quot; scions before I have decided, that I am able to decide
&quot; either way. Exception may be taken in limine to the22 MR JOHN STUART MILL
&quot; use of the word consciousness in such an application.
&quot; Consciousness tells me what I do or feel. But what I
&quot; am able to do is not a subject of consciousness. Con-
&quot; sciousness is not prophetic ; we are conscious of what
&quot;
is, not of what will or can be. We never know that we
&quot; are able to do a thing except from having done it, or
&quot;
something equal or similar to it. We should not know
&quot; that we are capable of action at all if we had never
&quot;
acted. Having acted, we know, as far as that experience
&quot;
reaches, how we are able to act; and this knowledge,
&quot; when it has become familiar, is often confounded with,
&quot; and called by, the name of consciousness. But it does
&quot; not derive any increase of authority from being mis-
&quot; named
; its truth is not supreme over, but depends on,
&quot;
experience. If our so-called consciousness is not borne
&quot; out by experience, it is a delusion. It has no title to
&quot; credence but as an interpretation of experience; and if
&quot;
it is a false interpretation, it must give way.&quot;
One is grieved to find a man like Mr Mill so beneath
himself as here he must be held to be.
&quot; Consciousness
&quot;
tells me what I do or feel. But what I am able to do
&quot;
is not a subject of consciousness.&quot; Perhaps it is not;
but what I feel I am able to do is surely a subject of
consciousness
; certain it is at least, it was at one time
by Mr Mill himself so considered vide &quot;System of
&quot;
Logic,&quot; as before quoted &quot;The practical feeling of
&quot; Free-will common in a greater or less degree to all man-
&quot;
kind.&quot; &quot;Thefeeling ofmoral Freedom we are consciousON FREEDOM. 23
&quot;
of.&quot; And as Mr Mill himself now interprets this feel
ing of Freedom of which he was at one time conscious,
it &quot;must have meant&quot; a being &quot;conscious before he
&quot; had decided that he was able to decide either way.&quot; Yet
the next instant we are told that
&quot; what I am able to do
&quot;
is not a subject of consciousness.&quot; Mr Mill is here in
the sort of confusion which he would probably have-
been a little severe upon had he met with it in Sir \V.
Hamilton. As to
&quot; consciousness is not prophetic ; we
&quot; are conscious of what is, not of what will or can be,&quot; it
seems enough to say that if we are conscious of a free
force of volition continuously inherent in us, we are
conscious of what is. And this is perhaps the best way
of putting it; for it seems that we must not speak of
being conscious of a free ability to act, or indeed of any
such ability. According to Mr Mill, we know that we
are able to act, but have no consciousness of being able,
though how this should be, unless knowledge
is denied
as a mode of consciousness, Mr Mill has omitted to
explain. In brief, this feeling or consciousness of being
able of two ways to decide in either, which Mr Mill
aforetime admitted, he does not, and cannot now deny.
But as consciousness is now authoritative, as then it was
not so decisively seen to be, he denies it as a conscious
ness; and merely that his





such, a source of
&quot;
delusion,&quot;
&quot; If our so-called con-
&quot; sciousness (of being able to decide either way ) is not24
&quot; borne out by experience, it is a delusion. It has no
&quot;
title to credence but as an interpretation of experience ;
&quot; and if it is a false interpretation, it must give way.&quot;
From this we must infer Mr Mill to mean that the fact!
of a man s acting in one way is a satisfactory contradic- 1
tion by experience, of his previous consciousness or con- \
viction, that of two ways, he had power to choose either,
j
But it is plainly nothing of the kind; such a conscious
ness as that in question experience can neither confirm
.
nor invalidate. What experience assures us of is that
the man did act so ; as to whether he could or could not
have acted otherwise, experience can tell us nothing.
Would Mr Mill bethink him of his own principles? Of
the fall of a stone Mr Mill will say, All that I know
is that it does fall, not that it must. By what right does
he now imply such a must in the action of the man, as
entitles him with absolute dogmatism to say that he
could not have acted otherwise, that experience has
shown that he could not? It is sufficiently obvious
that, from
&quot;experience,&quot; beyond what the man does,
Mr Mill can know nothing of the matter. Wherefore,
what he really means must be held to be, that everything
which conflicts with his private little theories, is without
further necessity of proof to that effect, discredited as
mere &quot;delusion.&quot;
But after all, a question of consciousness is a question
of fact, not of argument, and must be decided by the
simple appeal to consciousness. The only real questionON FREEDOM. 25
in the matter is to whose consciousness the appeal
is to
be made? And the answer to this must plainly be,
To the general consciousness of the race, philosophers*
ii ilh rigour excepted. The necessity of this exclusion isf
obvious; inasmuch as we may be sure no philosopher
will ever find anything in his consciousness which would
prejudice a pet theory, a philosopher
is no more to he-
trusted in such a matter than a thief is to be trusted in
a witness-box as evidence in his own favour. Even had




proof.&quot; It is not that the philosopher will lie
like the thief, in wilful misreport of his consciousness;
but by the very conditions of the case, unless he be one
of a thousand, he is incapable of an accurate observation
and candid notation of its contents. Unawares, he cannot
help looking at his consciousness through the coloured
medium of his theory. It is as if by a series of abstruse
reasonings a man who had never seen snow should con
vince himself it must needs be a oreen substance, and O
then obstinately refuse to look at it except through a
pair of green spectacles. Obviously it would be difficult
to convince such a man of his error; the rather as of
course he would be capable of solemnly asserting
it was
merely a calumny of the unconverted to say he wore
spectacles at all. And that Mr Mill, who, any time
these twenty years, rather piques himself on the success
with which he has argued freedom out of the world, is noic
incapable of regarding his consciousness, in so far as it26 MR JOHN STUART MILL
is said to testify of it, except through causational spec




&quot; am told that if I elect to murder, I am conscious that I
&quot; could have elected to abstain. But am I conscious that/ rJ,
&quot; I could have abstained if mi/ aversion to the crime andl ^^
r t7Ji.
&quot;
my dread of its consequences had been weaker than the
&quot;temptation?&quot; A query which is really equivalent to
this Am I then to admit in consciousness the thing
which I see, if admitted, to convict me of an unsound
process of reasoning? Mr Mill s deliverance is not so.
properly a denial of freedom in consciousness, as a synJ J




dispute altogether that we are conscious of being able to
&quot; act in opposition to the strongest present desire or aver-
&quot;
sion.&quot; We may reasonably resent this intrusion into
the simple question of consciousness, of the writer s
theory of action as inevitably in every case determined
by a balance of the motives of desire and aversion. The
consciousness of freedom asserted is simply our convic
tion, previous to act, of our being able at will to choose
either of two courses of conduct; and subsequent to our
choice of one course, of a power in us to have chosen the
other. Whether such a consciousness exists is one ques-,
tion, and it seems an eminently simple one; it asksi /
merely a yea or a nay, on a candid self-interrogation.
It is another question, and also a very simple one,)
whether such a consciousness can in logic give goodp
account of itself. The first is a question for plain men
;ON FREEDOM. 27
the other a question for philosophers; and in either case
there is great unanimity in the answer. Plain men make
no doubt about their freedom of choice
; and philoso
phers (fools excepted) are equally at one as to their entire
inability to explain it; the stoutest asserter of Freedom,
\\ho says proudly with Tennyson,
&quot; Our wills are ours,&quot;
addino- with him in humility,
&quot; We know not hoii .&quot; *
o - *
&quot; How, therefore,&quot; says Hamilton, for instance, &quot;moral
&quot;
liberty is possible in man or God we are utterly unable
&quot;
speculatively to understand.&quot; The questions, kept apart,
are simple ; but considerable embarrassment arises when
confounding the distinct points of view of the plain man
and the philosopher, a reasoncr like Mr Mill persists in
answering the one question in terms suggested by the other.
When Mr Mill disputes our &quot;consciousness of being able
&quot; to act in opposition to the strongest present desire or
&quot;
aversion,&quot; he seems to dispute a mode of consciousness
which is scarcely that asserted; inasmuch as neither_be-i
fore nor after act, of the relative strength of our desires!
_and. aversions, _is_ there any clear measure in cpnscious-
jiess. Speculatively,
it is evident that the act cannot but
follow the strongest desire; but this merely speculative-
point of knowledge
is no part of our original conscious
ness, and is rigorously to be kept distinct from it. The
question in its proper simplicity
is this Have we, or
have we not, the relative strength of the desires being
*
&quot;Our wills are ours, we know not how ;
Our wills are ours, to make them thine.&quot;/// Memoriam.MR JOHN STUART MILL
undetermined in consciousness a feeling or conviction
that of two courses of conduct we are free at will to
choose either; and afterward, that having chosen one,
we could at will have chosen the other? Assuming, as
of course we must, that in any two given philosophers
the facts of consciousness are the same, if in a matter so
simple as this, one of them answers yes, while the other
puts in a negative, it can only be because one of the two
palters with his consciousness, whilst professing a candid
interrogation of it
; and which of the two it isthat does
so, cannot be considered doubtful if the appeal is to the
general consciousness. Let us put to Mr Mill a case,
and it may be well to make it one of those &quot;frivolous&quot;
cases, in such dubieties recommended by Adam Smith,
on the ground that &quot;in them the judgments of mankind
&quot;
are less apt to be perverted by their systems.&quot; The
question shall not be whether Mr Mill is to murder or
not to murder, but one much less momentous. It is
premised that within the space of a minute, let us say, Mr Mill is to put his finger to his nose; the alternative
in act proposed to him is whether he will elect to put it
to the right side of his nose or the left the instance is
a somewhat too homely one, yet the better on that
account. Would Mr Mill, without bringing any of his
logical great guns to bear upon it, tell us simply in this
case of his consciousness ? That though the motives are
e refined to an almost inappreciable point of subtlety and evanescence, they are present under as utter a rigourON FREEDOM. 29
of law as if they were obvious and urgent ; and further,
that Mr Mill, however we suppose him to act, could
only have acted otherwise, in virtue of a change in the
antecedents, involving a change m prior antecedents, so
that, the right side of his nose being touched, the whole-
previous order of the universe must have been altered to
enable him to touch its left side these arc of course
obvious deductions from the law of universal Causation,
but they have nothing to do with consciousness. Sweep
ing his mind quite clear of them, if such a thing at all
be possible, would Mr Mill report to us of that in its
simplicity
? Is not he conscious of being able to touch
at will either the right side of his nose or the left? Hav
ing touched, let us say, the left side, is not he conscious he
could have touched the right had he so willed it, and con
scious that he could have so willed, chosen, or preferred ?
If Mr Mill admits himself so conscious, lie admits all
that is desired of him, for precisely such a consciousness
(
it is, that all unsophisticated men acknowledge, and
would think it ridiculous to denv, throughout the whole
- o
domain of voluntary action. Should Mr Mill, on the
other hand, deny that he is so conscious, we venture to
assert with some confidence, that his consciousness con
tradicts that of every man not a Necessitarian philoso
pher ; and further, that it is not his veritable conscious
ness, but a fraudulent substitute palmed oft upon him by
the
&quot;system&quot; to which he is wedded. Farther, as there
cannot be a doubt we have a consciousness of some kind,30 MR JOHN STUART MILL
in regard of our actions, if it be not a consciousness of
Freedom, it must needs be a consciousness of Necessity.
And will the assertion of such a consciousness find favour
with any mortal except perhaps here and there a zealot
of the doctrine, only capable of looking at the matter
through some mist of his reasoned preconceptions ?
But though Mr Mill, in denying for himself all con
sciousness of being able to act otherwise than as he does
act, is at issue with the mass of unsophisticated man
kind, he is at one with them in admitting in certain
cases, a consciousness that he ought to have acted other
wise, and involved in this, a sharp sense of shame and self-
condemnation in not having done so. In other words,
he admits as a fact of consciousness moral obligation
and Responsibility. Let us proceed to inquire whether
to the consciousness he admits, we can rationally attri
bute validity, divorced from the consciousness he denies
whether this ought to have acted otherwise, with its
accompanying sanctions cf shame and self-reproach
can, apart from a power to have acted otherwise, be
admitted as anything but dream and illusion ? whether
blame can in reason be attributed to acts, the agents
being helpless to avoid them ? But before entering on
this central part of the discussion, it may be well to say
something of a passage which Mr Mill, in proceeding
to treat of it, interpolates with the label Important.
&quot; Another fact which it is of importance to keep in
&quot;
view, is, that the highest and strongest sense of theON FREEDOM. 31
&quot; worth of goodness and the odiousness of its opposite,
is
&quot;
perfectly compatible with even the most exaggerated
&quot; form of Fatalism. Suppose that there were two pecu-
&quot;
liar breeds of human beings one of them so constituted
&quot; from the beginning, that however educated or treated,
&quot;
nothing could prevent them from always feeling and
&quot;
acting so as to be a blessing to all whom they ap-
&quot;
preached; another, of such original perversion of nature
&quot; that neither education nor punishment could inspire
&quot; them with a feeling of duty or prevent them from being
&quot; active in evil-doing. Neither of these races of human
&quot; creatures would have free-will ; yet the former would
&quot; be honoured as demigods while the latter would be re-
&quot;
garded and treated as noxious beasts
; not punished,
&quot;
perhaps, since punishment would have no eflect on
&quot;
them, and it might be thought wrong to indulge the
&quot; mere instinct of vengeance ; but kept carefully at a
&quot;
distance, and killed like other dangerous creatures, when
&quot; there was no other convenient way of being rid of them.
&quot; We thus see that even under the utmost possible exag-
&quot;
geration of the doctrine of Necessity, the distinction
&quot; between moral good and evil in conduct would not only
subsist, but would stand out in a more marked manner
&quot; than now when the good and the wicked, however
&quot;
unlike, are still regarded as of one common nature.&quot;
Except that from &quot;the highest and strongest
sense&quot;
of moral distinctions there can be no valid inference of
their reality, inasmuch as the sense may be an illusory32 MR JOHN STUART MILL
one, and in the scheme of Necessity must be so, as we
hope to be able to prove &quot;these considerations&quot; arc




and would, if acquiesced in, go some way to make
further argument on Mr Mill s part unnecessary; but
he must positively be asked to re-consider them. Mr
Mill here either writes something to which we have
difficulty in attributing a meaning, or he would not
hesitate to speak of an immoral toad, tiger, or rattle
snake; in which case, we should not be surprised to
hear him, in virtue of his presumed partiality for mutton,
proceed to expatiate with enthusiasm on the sublime
moral excellence of sheep. Already in the contrasted
demeanour of the tiger and of the sheep, the one of
which would kill and eat Mr Mill without scruple if
only a chance were given it, whilst the other placidly
submits to be killed, in order that by Mr Mill it may be
eaten, the
&quot; distinction between good and evil in con -
&quot;
duct,&quot; as conducive to benefit or injury, is illustrated in
a manner which Mr Mill must hitherto have found not
less &quot;marked&quot; than agreeable. But has &quot;the distinc-
&quot; tion between moral good and evil in conduct&quot; been
any way thus illustrated? Scarcely, we should say,
unless tigers and sheep are to be elevated to the dignity
of moral agents. And unless Mr Mill s two supposed
&quot;peculiar breeds of human
beings,&quot; beneficent and
malign respectively, are conceived of as moral agents, how
ever their supposed actions might illustrate in a novelON FREEDOM. 33




tion between good and evil in
conduct,&quot; the distinction
between &quot;moral good and evil in conduct&quot; would no
more be set forth by them than it now is by the actions
of tigers in contrast with those of sheep. Mr Mill then
must be presumed to consider if his argument is to be
worth anything that his contrasted
&quot;
peculiar breeds&quot;
are moral agents. But how can he possibly do so?
Any one wishing to give an exact definition of a homi
cidal maniac, could not do better than adopt verbatim
Mr Mill s account of his malign &quot;peculiar breed;&quot; and
of course, in admitting that the members of it
&quot; would
&quot; be regarded and treated as noxious beasts,&quot; he
explicitly
abolishes their moral agency, except in so far as that of
tigers and rattlesnakes may be moral; the which, if Mr
Mill seriously considers it, he is like to have a monopoly
of his opinion. As to the other
&quot;breed,&quot; though it suits
Mr Mill to assume that they would be
&quot; honoured as de-
&quot;migods,&quot; it seems quite as likely, we think, they would
be merely despised as idiots. Acting from a blind, irra
tional, undiscrim mating impulse of benevolence, they
would simply be amiable maniacs; and as such they
would be certain to be regarded; their philanthropy,
like other philanthropies we have heard of, would
speedily be seen to be a nuisance, as disturbing the
moral order, of which it could be no part, and a check
might have to be put upon it. We venture to think it
probable that Mr Mill s
&quot;demigods
&quot; would be looked34 MR JOHN STUART MILL
upon as fit only for the mad-house. It is certain that
no more than the other
&quot;
breed,&quot; who
&quot; would be re-
&quot;garded and treated as noxious beasts,&quot; could they be
looked upon as in any sense moral agents.
How then, on Mr Mill s hypothesis, would
&quot; the dis-
&quot; tinction between moral good and evil in conduct not
&quot;
only continue to subsist, but stand out in a more marked
&quot;
manner,&quot; Sec. ? Over the area covered by the hypo
thesis, the distinction would be plainly obliterated in the
obliteration of all moral agency whatever. Outside of
that area, of course, the distinction would
&quot; continue to
&quot;subsist&quot; as before it did; and it might even in this
sense be &quot;more strongly marked
&quot;
%
that the evil actions
of creatures in all else so resembling ourselves would be
likely to be specially impressive, on obvious principles of
association. Thus it is that the murder of his mother
by a maniac would shock us inexpressibly more than it
the old lady had been carried off and eaten by a tiger,
though morally the man would be no more culpable
than the brute. So much we may admit, but it makes
nothing for Mr Mill. The special thing to be enforced
&quot; as against him is, that over the area of his hypothesis
moral agency
is obliterated. If we desire him, as we
surely may, to extend that hypothesis, so as to include the
whole human species, what then ? A
&quot; murder grim and
&quot;
orcat,&quot; in which the human demons give speedy account
of the
&quot;
demigods,&quot; by their nature as defined, incapable
of injuring even their enemies, and proceed to
&quot; chaw up&quot;ON FREEDOM. ^
each other; the world is at once a huge Bedlam on our
hands, and moral agency or agent nowhere in it sur
vives. Mr Mill s argument pushed to its conclusion is
thus as neat and complete a specimen of argumentative
suicide as perhaps could be readily adduced unless,
Jiuleed, as we said, tigers, toads, and maniacs, are to
be dignified as moral agents.
&quot;
It is of importance to
&quot;
keep in view that the highest and strongest sense of the
&quot; worth of goodness, &c., is perfectly compatible with even
&quot;the most exaggerated form of Fatalism !&quot; Who doubts
that it is so compatible as regards their own good and
evil, in minds presumed outside of the fatal circle?
Certainly no advocate of the doctrine of the Freedom
of the Will. But surely, if a Fatalistic hypothesis is to
be worth anything as illustrating moral distinctions, it
must be u-itliin the fatal round of it that such distinc
tions must be proved to emerge; and within the round
of Mr Mill s hypothesis, they would plainly have no
place; for whatever the distinctions between the acts
of creatures to whom no moral agency is attributed,
moral distinctions they could hardly be.
This unfortunate passage is virtually an attempt on
Mr Mill s part to turn to account of his argument his
favourite doctrine of Utility, as determining the moral
qualities of actions
; in which light it may perhaps bear
to be a little further scrutinised. The Utilitarianism
here by implication set forth is really so extravagant
a form of the doctrine, that we can scarcely think36 MR JOHN STUART MILL
Mr Mill would seriously undertake to maintain it
against criticism. That Morality and Utility are, within
their common area, coincident, is on all hands admitted;
and though a whole school of thinkers refuse to admit
that therefore Utility is the ultimate ground of Morality,
Mr Mill can undoubtedly, as against them, make out a
very strong and plausible case in favour of that opinion.
But surely Mr Mill himself does not so understand the
relations between Utility and Morality, as to consider
the ideas co-extensive. Holding that good moral actions
not only subserve utility, but are only good because they
subserve it, does he also hold that all utilities are moral ?
Not so, of course; otherwise, to use Adam Smith s
illustration, a chest of drawers must be an object of his
moral approval, in as strict a sense as Howard the phil
anthropist. Actions then it is that are moral, and the
actions not, we should suppose, of all creatures, but of
some, and with full decisiveness the actions of human
creatures only. That in certain of the domesticated
animals, some emergence of what might seem a moral
nature may be noted, is too obvious to be denied ; and
Coleridge, who could not be happy without some mill
stone of a mystery to peer into, says somewhere he finds
in the dog a deep one, in virtue of that dawning of a
human conscience which he plainly apprehends in the
brute. But in our necessary ignorance of brute psycho
logy, which we can only, as across a gulf, guess atON FREEDOM. 37
from external signs, the analogical interpretation of
these being plainly of the most precarious character,
we must for ever he at a loss to determine how far what
seems a germ of morality in the brute, is really so in
such a. sense as fulfils the human definition, and how
far it may be merely of the nature of an automatic
simulation of it. Wherefore, to the actions of men only
can we decisively attribute moral qualities, and these we
are supposed to discriminate as good or evil, approvable
or condemnable, according not necessarily, as we see
them to conduce, a misapprehension of the utilitarian
doctrine which vitiates very much of the argument
directed against it even by intelligent critics, but as
they may belong to the classes, which on a wide induc
tion have leeu found to conduce to human welfare or
its opposite. Hut in strictness, it is of agents that we
morally approve or disapprove, not of actions; or only
of actions as they seem to illustrate a moral quality in
the agents. Moral acts presuppose moral agents; to
say that there can be moral acts without moral agents,
is only a shade less glaringly absurd, and not any whit
less really so, than to say that acts can take place without
agents. Thus it is, that to the act of a maniac, bearing
precisely the same relation to utility as that of a sane
man, we attribute no moral quality whatever. To con
stitute an act moral, it must apart from its tendency to
subserve utility or the reverse be done morally; that i*,3 8 MR JOHN STUART MILL
in fulfilment or outrage of a known la\v of duty or oblt-
o-ation;* and as the maniac is amenable to no law ot
O
any kind save that of causational necessity, we absolve
both him and his act from all stigma of moral blame.
Mr Mill, however, would distinguish between him and
his act, absolving the agent, yet classifying his act as
immoral. Obviously so ; for as we said, the homicidal
maniac corresponds most exactly in definition with the
* That there is nothing here which conflicts with Mr Mill s Utilitari
anism, though something perhaps which does with those coarser state
ments of the doctrine which Mr Mill implicitly repudiates, may be seen
in these snatches from his little volume on the subject
:
&quot; So far as to
external sanctions. The internal sanction of duty, whatever our stan-
&quot; dard of duty may be, is one and the same, a feeling in our own mind ;
&quot; a pain more or less intense attendant on violation of duty, which, in
&quot;
properly constituted moral natures, rises in the more serious cases into
shrinking from it as an impossibility. This feeling, when disinterested,
&quot;and connecting itself with the pure idea of duty, is the essence of Con-
&quot;
science.&quot; Again, &quot;The ultimate sanction of all morality (external
&quot; motives apart) being a subjective feeling in our minds, I see nothing
&quot;
embarrassing to those whose standard is utility, in the question, what is
&quot; the sanction of that particular standard ? We may answer the same
&quot; as of all other moral standards the conscientious feelings ofmankind.
&quot;
Elsewhere in his Essay on Bentham we find him sharply noting as a
defect, &quot;the absence of recognition, in any of his writings, of the exist-
&quot; ence of Conscience as a thing distinct from philanthropy, from affection
&quot;
for God or man, and from self-interest in this world or the next.&quot;
Whether in these and similar passages Mr Mill does not implicitly
sub-insert for his Doctrine of Utility the ultimate moral basis, its need
of which is denied, may perhaps admit of question. He must be held
to admit in them, self-interest wholly apart into some remoter form of
which the straitest sect of Utilitarians make no scruple of reducing our
feeling of duty an obligation of duty or Conscience, a moral obligation,
to promote utility. Were we to ask Mr Mill whence this obligation?ON FREEDOM. 39
imaginary
&quot; breed of human
being?,&quot; by nature malefi
cent, whose supposed actions would, according to Mr
Mill, illustrate in a very marked manner &quot;the distinc-
&quot;tion between moral good and evil in conduct.&quot; This
arbitrary disjunction of the agent and his act, as if the
one could be talked of as moral without inference of
morality in the other, Brown, in his Lectures, with
almost weary iteration, comments upon, as more than
we confess we are curious to know how precisely he would answer.
To allege Utility itself as the ground of the obligation to pursue it
would be surely to run round like a mill-horse in rather a vicious circle.
It seems to us we must therefore assume as basis of the doctrine ti
natural bond between man and man, leading us to pursue Utility de
fined as the happiness of individuals and of the race. That the root of
the matter is here was seen sharply by Hume, who accordingly smuggles
in a note to this effect,
&quot; It is needless to push our researches so far as
&quot; to ask why we have humanity or a fellow-feeling with others? It is
sufficient that this is experienced to be a principle in human nature.
&quot; We must stop somewhere in our examination,
&quot; &c. Hume, like others,
stops where it is convenient for him to stop ; but the further inquiry
seems pertinent, whether this primary principle in human nature be not
in human nature self-guaranteed as a moral principle 1 If it be so, as
perhaps there are fair grounds for maintaining, Morality is a primitive
fact of human nature, and no mere growth of experience, however in its
after development experience may modify its details. The fundamental
objection to Utilitarianism, or the Doctrine of Social Expediencies, is
that it assumes Society, which, except as a product of primitive moral
forces, might have found it not easy to constitute itself. In the very
idea of Society, the idea of Morality is involved ; in the social affections
and impulses in man, there is furnished the moral germ, out of which his
subsequent Moralities are developed. But people are wont in these
times to speak and write loosely of &quot;development,&quot; as if no living germ
were needed for it ; as if in the notion of a growth we did not pre-sup-
pose something to grow.40
anything else having tended to confuse the whole theory
of Morals.* To this disjunction, however, Mr Mill
stands fully committed not only in this passage by in
ference, but distinctly as thus, in his work on Utilitari
anism,
&quot; Utilitarian moralists have gone beyond all
&quot; others
&quot;
(and that Mr Mill goes along with them to the
full is clear from the context)
&quot;in affirming that the
&quot;motive has nothing to do with the morality of the
&quot;action, though much with the worth of the
agent.&quot;
Wherefore, as by the &quot;worth of the agent&quot; Mr Mill
cannot possibly mean anything but his moral worth, he
holds that a moral act can take place without a moral
agent, and is directly at issue with Brown. He is also
at issue with a greater than Brown, to wit, David Hume.
He it was who first, so far as we know, reduced to scien
tific system the scattered facts, which, taken together,
*
&quot;An action, though we often speak of it abstractly, is not, and
&quot; cannot be, anything which exists independently of the agent. What
the agent is, as an object of our approbation or disapprobation, that his
action is ; for his action is himself
acting.&quot;
&quot; Much of the confusion
has arisen from the abuse of one very simple abstraction, that by
which we consider an action as stripped of circumstances peculiar to an
individual agent, and forming, as it were, something of itself, which




is no small progress in Ethics, as in Physics, to have learned to distin-
&quot;
guish accurately abstractions from realities, to know that an action is
&quot;
only another name for an agent in certain circumstances&quot; and pas
sages to the like effect occur every few pages. Of course in the mere
matter of statement, objection may be taken to the dictum that &quot;an
. action is only another name for an agent ;
&quot;
but the essential meaning
of Brown here is not thereby impugned.ON FREEDOM. 41
approve the moral Doctrine of Utility; and as an expo
sition of the subject in detail, the treatise in which he
did so has not since perhaps been quite equalled. His
opinion, as that of an advocate of Mr Mill s doctrine, is
plainly, in this particular, of somewhat more weight as O
against Mr Mill, than that of Brown, its express oppo
nent
-, and thus distinctly it is given: &quot;Actions are
&quot;olyects of our moral sentiment., so far onhj as they are
&quot;
indications of the internal character, passions, and affee-
&quot;tions; it is impossible that they can give rise either to
&quot;
praise or blame where they proceed not from these prin-
&quot;ciples.&quot; And this is certainly the view of the matter
which has hitherto commended itself to the common
sense ofmankind. That it \\ ill yet a while continue to do so
seems on the whole likely. If it be really necessary that,
in order to believe in the Doctrine of Utility, we must
iirst believe that motives have nothing to do with the
morality of actions, and that moral acts can take place
without moral agents, however clearly it may approve
itself to the minds of a few philosophic illiiminati, the
mass of men, till the day of doom, will have none of it.
That this disjunction of the morality of the a&amp;lt;rent and
that of his act is essential to Utilitarianism, as tauoht at
least by Mr Mill, is by no means clear to us; but to his
present argument it Is essential. The moral qualities of
agents, it is implied, are no measure of those of actions,
which must be estimated as moral simply as they sub
serve utility; and the action retains its moral quality,4?
even when the agent
is an irresponsible maniac. But
having gone so far, can \ve avoid going a little further ?
Having extended our conception of Morality so as to
include the acts of homicidal maniacs in definition
identical with one of Mr Mill s &quot;peculiar breeds,&quot; from
whose supposed actions he illustrates Morality anew
we cannot logically stop there ; we must needs go on
as Mr Mill seems in this passage to make no scruple of
doing to include in it the act of the man-eating tiger,
of the cobra which stings the man who treads on it, of
the toad which creeps into our arbour and squats there,
of the bug which disturbs our rest o nights when we go
into a London lodging. To any one who should gravely
propound such a scheme to us, we might feel inclined to
reply by holding forth with corresponding gravity on the
morality of a pair of breeches. Inasmuch as the breeches,
though useful, are certainly not active, as the bug most
uncomfortably is, our irony would be unphilosophic, we
know, in its neglect of an important distinction, but we
almost think we should venture it.
The following from Mr Bain s
&quot; Emotions and the
&quot;
Will,&quot; before glanced at, may be quoted as having here
a certain pertinence see page 564.
&quot;
Every animal
&quot; that pursues an end, following up one object, and avoid-
&quot; ino- another, comes under the designation of moral. O
&quot; The tiger chasing and devouring his prey, any creature
&quot; that lives by selecting its food, is a moral
agent.&quot; Mr
Bain seems here directly at issue with our argument&amp;lt;9A
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pursued above, and in harmony with that of Mr Mill
;
but \ve cannot suppose him to be really so. He is re




&quot; Moral Philosophy,&quot; which
&quot;
is on one supposition
&quot;confined to Ethics, or Duty, and on the other comprc-
&quot;
bends, if not the whole of the human mind, at least the
&quot;whole of the Emotions and Active Powers;&quot; and in
relation to this ambiguity he goes on to say
&quot; In the
&quot;
large sense I am a moral asrent when I act at the insti- O i^_.
&quot;
gation of my own feelings, pleasurable or painful, and
&quot; the contrary when I am overpowered by force. It is
&quot;the distinction between mind and the forces of the
&quot;physical world, such as gravity, heat, magnetism, cc.;
&quot; and also between the voluntary and involuntary activities
&quot; of the animal system. It would be well if the same word
&quot;were not indiscriminately applied to two significations
&quot;of such different compass; for there can be little doubt
&quot;that perplexity and confusion of idea have been main-
&quot; tained thereby. Still nothing can be better established
&quot; than the recognition of both significations, and we arc
&quot; bound to note the circumstance that the moral which
&quot;at one time coincides with the ethical, at other times
&quot;




plexity and confusion of idea&quot; exists here on Mr Bain s
part
is evident on a comparison of the last sentence with
his previous one.
&quot;
Every act that follows upon the
&quot;
prompting of a painful or pleasurable state, or the asso
ciations of one or other, is a voluntary act, and is44 MR JOHN STUART MILL
&quot;all that is meant, or can le meant by moral
agency.&quot;
Yet just before we have seen that &quot;the moral at one
&quot; time coincides with the ethical
&quot; wherefore a volun
tary act is not
&quot;
all that can be meant by moral agency,&quot;
which term 7720^ be used to indicate acts which have in




and in truth cannot with any accuracy be used other
wise. Except as in
&quot; Moral Philosophy,&quot; and such
phrases as
&quot; moral causation,&quot;




is distinguished from the
&quot;
physical,&quot; Mr
Bain has here, if we mistake not, invented the confusion
he complains of. We are aware of no authority for his





tary ;&quot; nor would any weight of authority justify a
writer in continuing to so use it. In voluntary agent
voluntary action our meaning is sufficiently expressed ;
why run the risk of embarrassing it by intruding as a
synonym the word
&quot;
moral,&quot; already in a twofold sense
appropriated
? To speak of the tiger as a
&quot; moral agent
&quot;





the bug which also &quot;selects its food,&quot; as some of us
know to our discomfort, as also on that ground a
&quot;
moraj
&quot;agent,&quot; is a hideous abuse of language, which Mr Bain







would probably admit that when the
&quot; moral distinctions
&quot; of actions&quot; are in question, we must needs mean actions
distinguished from merely voluntary ones by the additionaV FREEDOM. 45
of an ethical quality of right or wn&amp;gt;n&amp;lt;r as it may be, and
so much admitted, our argument does not any wav
suffer from his whim of speaking of a ti&amp;lt;rer as in that
restricted sense a
&quot; moral atrent.&quot; The writer must
express his regret that in the preparation of his little
Essay, he had not the advantage of being acquainted
with Mr Bain s very interesting and valuable treatise,
which has only come under his notice as these sheets
are in course of being printed.
And now of Moral Responsibility, and this latest
attempt of Mr Mill to harmonise it, as an admitted
datum of Consciousness, with his scheme of Causation-
ism, as exclusive of human Freedom, defined an Ability
in man to act otherwise than as he does act.
&quot;
What,&quot;
asks Mr Mill, &quot;is meant by Moral Responsibility?
&quot;
Responsibility means Punishment. When we are said
&quot;
to have the feeling of being morally responsible for our
&quot;
actions, the idea of being punished for them is upper-
&quot;most in the speaker
s mind.&quot; When Mr Mill, having
asked in the first sentence
&quot; what is meant by moral




&quot; and goes on in the third
to speak of our
&quot;
feeling of being morally responsible,&quot;
nobody could at first sight interpret him otherwise than
as speaking of Moral Responsibility throughout. But
in the light of the distinction he makes a little farther
on between
&quot; the belief that we shall be made account-
&quot;
able, and the belief that we ought so to be,&quot; the last of46 MR JOHN STUART MILL
which only it is which
&quot; can he deemed to require or
presuppose the Free-will hypothesis,&quot; there seems ground
to suspect that by Responsibility, as used in the second
sentence, he means Responsibility simple, as distin
guished from the Moral Responsibility indicated in the
first and third.* But surely, if this be so, Mr Mill in
this all important point of definition, is guilty of no
little slovenliness. For, of course, he must very well
know as himself frequently so using the word that
when without qualification, we speak of Responsibility,
it is Moral Responsibility we expect to be understood to
mean. Wherefore, from this in the first sentence he
was clearly bound to formally distinguish
it in the second,
and again to distinguish in the third by
&quot; when we are
&quot; said on the other hand&quot; or some such equivalent of
contrast. The truth might almost seem to be, that
indicating the distinction between the simple Responsi
bility and the moral one, he was content with a most
confused indication of it, as feeling in some semi-con
scious way that it would not in the least suit him to
* This of course must be Mr Mill s meaning.
&amp;lt;; What is meant by
&quot; Moral Responsibility? Responsibility means Punishment. When we
* are said to have the feeling of being morally responsible for our actions,
&quot; the idea ofbeingpunished fat them is uppermost in the speaker s mind.&quot;
But the idea of punishment being uppermost, implies of course some
correlative idea as undermost in the mind of said speaker. Being
&quot;
morally responsible&quot; includes therefore something more than is given
in the Responsibility which merely &quot;means punishment.&quot; Let this
distinction by Mr Mill himself however loosely indicated be carefully
kept in view.ON FREEDOM. 47
elaborate it into clearness. As the distinction, so simple
as it seems, is really one of quite cardinal importance tor
the argument, let us do for it in a cursory way what it
did not suit Mr Mill to do. Any Imperative which
has force to make itself effective will constitute a Respon
sibility in the subject of it
; only a Moral Imperative can
constitute a Moral Responsibility. To illustrate in an
easy way in the case of a tyrannical schoolboy, who
says to a little fellow not Ills fay for over hhn then-
ij O
would be some semblance at least of right
&quot; Go to mv O
&quot;
bed, you young hound! and warm it for me, till I come,
&quot;or if you don t, I ll thrash the life out of
you,&quot; an
Imperative is announced by the big fellow, and it con
stitutes a Responsibility in the little one, inasmuch as he
knows, if he refuses, he will be made to answer for his
conduct. This, as a mere appeal to fear, is the simple
or Irule imperative as distinguished from the human or
Moral Imperative, whose appeal
is to our moral judo-
ments of merit and demerit in conduct. If, instead of
telling him to warm his bed for him, the big fellow had
said to the little
&quot; Go rob me Farmer Hodge s orchard, O
&quot;and bring me hither the
apples,&quot; the little fellow would
have found himself the subject of the Brute and tin-
Moral Imperatives in conflict, and would have had to
elect which of them to obey. Again, there are mixed
Imperatives, in which the two elements may coinhere in
proportions indefinitely variable. Such are the authority
exercised by a parent over a child, and that of the Law48 MR JOHN STUART MILL
prohibitive of crime on penalty. With the first of these
we are not here directly concerned. As to the Law, in
so far as its appeal
is to fear simplicitcr,
it is important
to note it as merely a form of the lower or Brute Im
perative ; and though in most minds this more or less
connects itself with some form of the higher or Moral
one, the essential distinction between them is not thereby
affected. A caitiff who refrains from murder solely be
cause he dreads being hanged for it, is the mere slave of
the Brute imperative ; he, on the other hand, to whom
&quot;Thou shalt not kill&quot; comes as a clear mandate of his
moral nature, is indeed, in virtue of the accompanying
threat, also a subject of the lower Imperative, but more
or less he is made free of its jurisdiction by the life within
him of the higher one. Now, the clear distinction be
tween these, which is untouched by the fact that they
may efficiently coexist in proportions varying in various
minds, Mr Mill has seen fit to indicate only to confound it.
In his preliminary definitions it is slurred; and through
out the subsequent discussion it is never steadily kept
in view, the word responsibility, (or accountability, as it
may be,) being used indifferently to imply the simple or
the moral one, so that which of the two is really meant
it is sometimes not easy to know. And in thus playing
fast and loose with the distinction, Mr Mill has in one
sense done wisely, inasmuch as he could not have clearly
and consistently exhibited it without exhibiting along
with it the inconsequence of his whole argument. For,ON FREEDOM. 49
standing pledged as he does to constitute for us on the
principle of Necessity the Moral Imperative, in order to
maintain the validity of which it is that his opponents
postulate Freedom, he constitutes for us in that argu
ment only the simple or Brute Imperative, our social
right to exercise which is inferred from the efficacy of
fear simpliciter as a motive. This we proceed to show.
&quot;It is
not,&quot; writes Mr Mill, &quot;the belief that we shall
&quot; be made accountable for our actions, which can be
&quot; deemed to require or presuppose the Free-will hypothe-
&quot;
sis
; it is the belief that we ought so to be ; that we are
&quot;justly accoitntailc ; that guilt deserves punishment. It
&quot;






Justice; the legitimacy of retribution or punishment.&quot;
Mr Mill, having thus stated the &quot;main issue&quot; and the
&quot;
real question,&quot; it seemed reasonable to suppose that ac





given in our moral consciousness, he proposed to show that,
in their own nature, said ideas did not of needs presup
pose the hypothesis of Freedom, but that an adequate basis
could be found for them in the rival scheme of Necessity.
This, however, is only in part the case. In the course
of the discussion, Mr Mill says that he &quot;can find no
&quot;
argument to
justify&quot; punishment inflicted on the prin
ciple of &quot;a natural affinity between the ideas of guilt and
&quot;
punishment, which makes it intrinsically fitting that50 MR JOHN STUART MILL
&quot; wherever there has been guilt, pain should be inflicted
&quot;




a &quot;justly accountable&quot; in the sense that &quot;guilt deserves
&quot;
punishment,&quot;
&quot; the real question
&quot; one of
&quot; Justice
&quot; the legitimacy of retribution,&quot; it might seem that the
idea of Retribution being thus explicitly discarded, that
of Justice, by Mr Mill himself given as its moral equiva
lent, must needs be dissipated along with it, so that there
is no longer before us any question whatever. But with
Justice Mr Mill is indisposed to part company. Reserv
ing formal remark on this disjunction in the process of
his argument of ideas in its premises identified, let us see
how Mr Mill succeeds in his attempt to substantiate the
idea of Justice.
&quot;The real question
is one of Justice, the legitimacy
&quot; of retribution or punishment. On the theory of Neces-
&quot;
sity, we are told, man cannot help acting as he does ;
&quot; and it cannot be just that he should be punished for
&quot; what he cannot help. Not if the expectation of
&quot;punishment enables him to help it, and is. the only
&quot; means by which he can be enabled to help
it ? To say
&quot; that he cannot help it, is true or false according to the
&quot;
qualification with which the assertion is accompanied.
Supposing him to be of a vicious disposition, he can-
not help doing the criminal act, if he is allowed to
* believe that he will be able to commit it unpunished.
&quot;
If, on the contrary, the impression is strong on his
&quot; mind that a heavy punishment will follow, he can,ON FREEDOM. 5 i
&quot; and in most cases docs, help it. There are two ends
&quot;
which, on the Necessitarian theory, are sufficient to
&quot;justify punishment; the benefit of the offender him-
&quot;
self, and the protection of others.&quot;
All which is most lucid and exact, but with
&quot; the
&quot; real question of Justice,&quot; whereof Mr Mill supposes
himself to be discoursing, has literally nothing whatever
to do. The Justice of which Mr Mill stands pledged
to treat is Moral Justice, in its severe regard of the
past, inflicting punishment as deserved; and for this
Mr Mill, as he proceeds, quietly substitutes a simple
expediency as respects the future.* The feat of logi
cal legerdemain is facilitated by an ambiguity in terms.
There is Justice as above defined; there is the justice
of a remark or an anticipation ; we speak of a just
(as a fit or expedient) arrangement; and we consider
we justify an action when we prove it negatively per
missible. Any one may see at a glance that in the
passage quoted, Mr Alill s reasoning succeeds in at all
* We, of course, cannot be unaware that in this reference to expedi
ency we may be held to be running our head inadvertently against Mr
Mill s Utilitarian theory of Morals ; but that Mr Mill in his own person
cannot object to the distinction made here, will be evident from these
snatches from his work on the subject &quot;This seems the real turning
-
&quot;
point between morality and simple expediency&quot; &quot;The distinction be-
&quot; tween the feeling of right and wrong and that of ordinary expediency,
&quot;
and more explicitly
&quot; Is then the difference between the Just and
&quot; the Expedient a merely imaginary distinction ? By no means. The ex
position we have given of the nature and origin of the sentiment reco^-
&quot; nises a real distinction.&quot;connecting itself with &quot;the real question&quot; solely by a
disgraceful jumble of such various meanings of the
word. Mr Mill, when asked whether it be just, i.e.,
deserved* in the sense in which
&quot;
guilt deserves punish-
ment&quot; that a man should be punished for what he
could not help in the past, considers he replies in the
affirmative, when he says it is expedient to punish him,
as we flog an uncleanly cur to improve
its manners in
the future. Of the following instance of the confusion
what is to be said ?
&quot; Free-will or no free-will, it \sjust
&quot; to punish men for this purpose, (of protection,) exactly
&quot; as it is just to put a wild beast to death for the same
&quot;
purpose.&quot; This only, that these same wild beasts to
which Mr Mill seems partial, have been known in the
rage of hunger to make away with a philosopher; and
farther, that the man who should speak of a shot tiger,
as having &quot;justly met its doom,&quot; exactly in the sense
of the words as applied by him to a human miscreant,
would simply prove he had either some twist in his
moral perceptions, or was grossly ignorant of language.
Again what of this? &quot;To punish a man for his own
&quot;
srood, provided the inflicter has any proper
title to con-
&quot; stitute himself a judge,
is no more unjust than to ad-
*
&quot;It is universally considered just that each person should obtain
&quot;that (whether good or evil) which he deserves ; and unjust that he
&quot;should obtain a good, or be made to undergo an evil which he does
&quot;not deserve. This is perhaps the clearest and most emphatic form in
&quot;which the idea of Justice is conceived by the general
mind.&quot; Vidt
Mitts &quot;Utilitarianism,&quot; page 65.ON FREEDOM. 53
&quot; minister medicine !&quot; Has the giving of medicine to
a patient any relation whatever to Justice ? Clearly
not unless, indeed, the patient has paid a fee for it,
in which case the doctor would doubtless be unjust,
if
he fraudulently refused to fulfil his part of the bargain.
Otherwise, however it might be proper and humane to
administer medicine, improper and inhuman not to
administer it, to speak of its being given or withheld
as either just or unjust,
is merely to pass an outrage on
the accepted meaning of terms. It is easy for a man
at this rate allowed him, to prove whatever he pleases.
If, in using the word white, he means in one sentence
white, blue perhaps in the next, and green as it may
chance in a third, naturally he puzzles you a little, some
what as Mrs Quickly did FalstafT you
&quot; know not
&quot; where to have him.&quot;
&quot; In the present case,&quot; writes Mr
Mill a little previously,
&quot;there is more than a verbal
&quot;
fallacy, but verbal fallacies also contribute their
part.&quot;
Undoubtedly they do; verbal fallacies contribute, in
point of fact, the main part of Mr Mill s argument.
&quot;Not if the expectation of punishment enables him
&quot; to help it,&quot; Sec. This clause has, indeed, a correspond
ence with
&quot; the belief that we shall be made accountable
&quot; for our actions,&quot; by Mr Mill himself, as we saw, set
aside as irrelevant to the discussion
; its relation to the




accountable,&quot; and the fact
&quot; that guilt deserves punish-
&quot;
ment&quot; is by no means quite so obvious. Of the simple54 MR JOHN STUART MILL
or Brute Imperative, justifiably (permissibly) announced
by society for its own ends, an instance is here admitted ;
but of the Moral Imperative there is as yet no hint ;
and the only Justice involved is a consideration of social
expediency, which justifies (or makes permissible) our
announcement of the Imperative of fear; a considera
tion in no respect of principle to be distinguished from
that which is the ground of our flogging a cur to teach
it to respect the carpet. The cur alike and the man




pose him to be of vicious disposition,&quot; and so on. In
nothing of all this have we got beyond the first rude
motive of fear, as we may find it urgent on occasion in
the basest of the lower animals. Of the higher, or Moral
Imperative, the keenest partisan of Mr Mill will seek in
vain for a trace throughout his entire discussion, saving
as he seems at times to imply that out of the primitive
element of the Brute Imperative, it is possible psycho
logically to grow the Moral one; a point which will
afterwards turn up for consideration.
Further
&quot; There are two ends which, on the Neces-
&quot; sitarian theory, are sufficient to justify punishment;
&quot; the benefit of the offender himself, and the protection
&quot; of others.&quot; That it may be justifiable to punish a
man for his own good, as we conceive it, even though
he should not deserve punishment, is perhaps with limita
tions to be admitted. limitations which we should ex
pect Mr Mill, of all men, as the author of the nobleON FREEDOM. 55
Tractate
&quot; On Liberty,&quot; to recognise very sharply. But
solely in virtue of the man s deserving the punishment
can we accurately call it just. To justify any course of
conduct, punitive or other, is, as we have before said, to
prove it negatively permissible to prove
it not in any-
flagrant sense unjust ; it may also, of course, be to prove
it positively proper,
its propriety having been called in
question. But countless things are proper, and even
obligatory, the obligation to which is not one of Justice;
countless things are not unjust, to speak of which as, just
could be only to incur ridicule. But wherefore labour a
matter, Mr Mill s fallacy in regard of which is obvious in
his own illustration, already in the casual way glanced at ?
&quot; To punish him for his own good
is no more unjust than
&quot; to administer medicine.
3 To administer medicine to a
patient
is not unjust ; also it is not unjust to shave one s-
self of a morning. Yet the question of fee in the
former case apart the relation to positive Justice is, in
the two cases, identical ; it is in both a purely negative
relation no relation at all. Here, as throughout the
discussion, it is the whim of Mr Mill to disport himself
some miles from
&quot; the real question,&quot; as we have seen it
by himself indicated. Again, as to punishment which
has for its end
&quot; the protection of others,&quot; it seems plain
that, justly or even justifiably pace Mr Mill, there is
between the two a slight distinction we could not in
flict it on a man who had in no sense deserved punish
ment. On occasion of a murder, for instance, the real56 MR JOHN STUART MILL
culprit being vo?i inventus, we could scarcely clutch hold
of a rough at random and hang him for it. For protec
tive purposes the public presumed ignorant of the little
deceit practised on it the innocent rough would be ex
cellent; yet Justice for those behind the scenes would
surely receive in his dying struggles no very sublime
illustration. Clearly, as it seems to us, for no social
end to be served by it, could we justly inflict punish
ment, save in virtue of that evil desert in the subject of
it, which constitutes the punishment in some sort a
retributive one. Touching this evil desert it is, that,
according to Mr Mill,
&quot; the main issue is joined between
&quot; the two opinions.&quot; But nowhere does Mr Mill join
issue on it ; he evades it here and throughout. Of
&quot;
punishment as a precaution taken by Society in self-
&quot;
defence&quot; here is accurately the sum of what Mr Mill
has to say.
&quot;To make this just, the only condition
&quot;
required is, that the end which society is attempting
&quot; to enforce by punishment should be a just one. Used
&quot; as a means of aggression by society on the just rights
&quot; of the individual, punishment is unjust. Used to pro-
&quot; tcct the just rights of others against unjust aggression
&quot;
by the offender, it is just. If it is possible to have just
&quot;
rights, it cannot be unjust to defend them.&quot; Readers
must be left to find their way as they can in this jungle
of justs and unjusts; we must really decline to enter it
with them. Yet, timidly treading its outskirts, let us
just glance at the last sentence. It is possible, we sup-ON FREEDOM. 57
pose, to have
&quot;just rights;&quot; but a master of English
like Mr Mill would, \ve think, be unlikely to use such a
phrase, unless under the mask of a tautology he wished
to insinuate a sophism. Did ever any one hear of un
just rights, or of just wrongs? Farther, the rights
being admitted just rights, not unjust ones, we are told
&quot;
it cannot be unjust to defend them.&quot; And of course
it cannot, if justice be consulted in the means employed
to defend them. But it is possible to defend them un
justly. As instance already given, we might defend
them most effectively by hanging innocent people, or
poor unhappy maniacs. But to such a display of social
&quot;vigour&quot; Mr Mill would almost certainly decline to
give the sanction of his great name. Consequently,
what he must be held here to mean is, not that our
&quot;ji^st rights&quot; such of our rights, that is, as do not
chance to be wrongs
&quot;
it cannot be unjust to defend
&quot;
by any means that may lie to our hand; but that it
cannot be unjust in us to defend them justly. The
tautology in the first clause of the sentence is thus, it
seems, of no avail for Mr Mill s purpose, except in
virtue of a suppressed tautology in the second, too
flagrant to be put upon paper. Surely further remark
is here unnecessary ; the more so, that, as in the previ
ous case, Mr Mill s own concluding illustration, already
en passant commented on, sufficiently defines his posi
tion.
&quot; Free-will or no free-will, it is just to punish for
&quot;
protection exactly as it is just to put a wild beast to53
&quot; death for the same
object.&quot; In this identification, in
so far forth, of the man and the wild beast, there is a
ground, of course, for the announcement of the Brute
Imperative; but we had thought it was the Moral
Imperative which Mr Mill was engaged in elucidating
for us.
When we said above that the consideration of desert
was throughout evaded by Mr Mill, we were not rigor
ously accurate. It is touched lightly in one passage,
which must be quoted, otherwise we should be liable to
the suspicion of wilful unfairness to Mr Mill.
&quot; Now the primitive consciousness we are said to
&quot; have that we are accountable for our actions, and that,
&quot;
if we violate the rule of right, we shall deserve punish-
&quot;
ment, I contend is nothing else than our knowledge
&quot; that punishment will be just ; that by such conduct
&quot; we shall place ourselves in the position, in which our
&quot;
fellow-creatures, or the Deity, or both, will naturally,
&quot; and mayjustly, inflict punishment upon
us.&quot;
Now, what does Mr Mill mean by Justice, Just, &c. ?
We don t ask what in the course of his discussion he
means for this is a metaphysical inquiry of quite too
subtle and complex a kind but what is he bound to
mean by the words as by himself defined in his premises?
&quot; The real question
is one of Justice; the legitimacy of
&quot;
Retribution.&quot;
&quot; The belief that we are justly account-
&quot;
able; that guilt deserves punishment. It is here that
&quot; the main issue is joined between the two opinions.&quot;ON FREEDOM. 59
Just punishment
is certainly here deserved punishment.
Also in the note at page 52 \vc have elsewhere seen Mr
Mill shut himself up to this meaning of the word; and
if another note to the like effect he needed for behoof
of desert and Retribution, the reader has it below.*
Wherefore, if anywhere in his discussion Mr Mill is
found using the word just, except as including the idea
of desert, unless in doing so he defines the precise shade
of difference in the new meaning intended, he is to be
held utterly inexcusable, as condescending to use for our
bewilderment the stalest trick of the sophist. Holding
Mr Mill, then, strictly to his own definitions of the word
Just, what in effect do we here find him writing?
&quot;The
&quot; consciousness we are said to have that we shall deserve
&quot;
punishment,
I contend, is nothing more than our
&quot;
knowledge that punishment will be deserved ; that our
&quot;
fellow-creatures, Sec., may deservedly inflict punish-
&quot; ment on us.&quot; No great need to contend here
;
the most contentious opponent Mr Mill is likely to
encounter will scarcely care to dispute with him as to a
deserved punishment being a deserved one. And now,
does or docs not Mr Mill in his argument maintain that
*
&quot;
Retribution, or evil for evil, becomes closely connected with the
&quot; sentiment of Justice, and is universally included in the idea,&quot; (p. 89.)
&quot; The principle, therefore, of giving to each what they Jt scn c, that is,
&quot;good for good, evil for evil, is not only included within the idea of
&quot;
Justice, as we have denned it, but is a proper object of that intensity
&quot; of sentiment which places the Just, in human estimation, above the
&quot;
simply Expedient,&quot; (p. 90.) Mr Mill s
&quot; Utilitarianism.60 MR JOHN STUART MILL
&quot;guilt deserves punishment?&quot; We profess that after
reading Mr Mill repeatedly with our best care, we do
not in the least know ; and it is even our notion, it
might puzzle himself very much to say whether he does
or not. The following dilemma is proposed to him, in
terms of his own initial statement of the dispute, If
guilt does not deserve punishment, what becomes of his
argument for Moral accountability, as distinguished from
the accountability simple, which merely &quot;means punish-
&quot;
ment,&quot; or the beino;





it is nowhere; in the &quot;issue joined between the two
&quot;
opinions,&quot; the one of which holds that, Freedom apart,
Moral Responsibility is without a basis
; the other, that
without Freedom, it is still logically to be substantiated,
the latter, or Mr Mill s opinion, has experienced igno
minious rout, and no longer holds the field. On the
other hand, if a man thoroughly does deserve punish
ment, might he not in eqmiij be punished, simply and
finally on that ground, apart from those ulterior ends
&quot; the benefit of the offender himself, and the protection
&quot; of others
&quot;
by which alone punishment, according to
Mr Mill, can &quot;on the Necessitarian theory be
justified?&quot;
And if not, in what intelligible sense can he be said to
deserve punishment? Such are the hopeless difficulties
in which unless language is to be emptied of meaning
in his favour Mr Mill has here contrived to enmesh
himself.
Tedious as it is to track Mr Mill through all hisON FREEDOM. 6r
doublings, and oppressive as the reader may be begin
ning to find this part of the subject, it seems necessary
to proceed with it a little. To quote Mr Mill further,
&quot; If any one thinks there is justice in the infliction of
&quot;
purposeless suffering; that there is a natural affinity
&quot; between the two ideas of guilt and punishment, which
&quot; makes it intrinsically fitting that wherever there has
&quot; been guilt, pain should be inflicted by way of retribu-
&quot; tion
; I confess that I can find no argument to justify
&quot;
punishment inflicted on this principle. As a legiti-
&quot; mate satisfaction to feelings of indignation and resent- ^ O
&quot;
ment, which are on the whole salutary, and worthy of
&quot;
cultivation, I can in certain cases admit it
; but here it
&quot;
is still a means to an end. The merely retributive
&quot; view of punishment derives no justification from the
&quot; doctrine I
support.&quot;
&quot;The merely retributive view of punishment.&quot; But
does not in this word merely if it be taken to mean
anything Mr Mill virtually concede a retributive ele
ment at least in punishment; an evil desert in the cul
prit, failing of which, not even as &quot;a means to an end&quot;
could we justly visit him with punishment? Is not
something of the kind implied too in describing as
&quot;legitimate&quot; the &quot;satisfaction to feelings of indigna-
&quot;
tion&quot; conveyed in the infliction of punishment? and
could the satisfaction be held
&quot;legitimate,&quot; such punish
ment being supposed undeserved? Unless by his guilt
a man deserves punishment, could we justly for our own62 MR JOPIN STUART MILL
ends inflict it ? And if guilt be admitted to deserve
punishment,
is not this equivalent to an admission of
the &quot;natural affinity between the ideas of guilt and
&quot;
punishment,&quot; above by Mr Mill denied ? At the
same time, while we contend that the idea of punish
ment as in any accurate sense just,
is that of punishment
deserved, and as such, in some strict sense, retributive,
&quot;merely retributive punishment&quot; we should perhaps not
venture to inflict, except in the indulgence of personal
passion, or strong sympathy with such in others. Other
wise, no more than Mr Mill can we
&quot; find argument to
&quot;justify
it.&quot; Even when clearly convinced of its justice,
we might yet shrink from it as unjustifiable^ on the




suffering.&quot; Mr Mill s point of
view here is that of every Christian Moralist. The
&quot;
vengeance is mine, I will
repay,&quot; peremptorily forbids
the infliction of punishment, even in equity due, when
there is not a concurrence of social ends to be served by
it, with that evil desert of the offender, which constitutes
the punishment a just one.
Finally, Mr Mill thus rids himself of the subject of
Justice, in a passage which, whatever his previous suc
cess in it may be, he plainly holds to clinch his argu
ment, (p. 512.)
&quot;
I ask any one who thinks that the
&quot;justice of punishment
is not sufficiently vindicated by
&quot;
its being for the protection of just rights, how he recon-
&quot;
ciles his sense of justice to the punishment of crimesON FREEDOM. 63
&quot;committed in obedience to a perverted conscience?
&quot; Ravaillac and Balthasar Gerard did not regard them-
Cj
&quot;
selves as criminals but as heroic martyrs. It they were
&quot;justly put to death, the justice of punishment has no-
&quot;
thing to do with the state of mind of the offender,
&quot; further than as this may affect the efficacy of punish-
ment as a means to its end. If that is not a justifica-
&quot;
tion, there is no justification. All other imaginary




Apart from Mr Mill s habitual confusion of the differ
ent shades of meaning of the word Just, and its deriva
tives, Justice, Justify, cc., there seems nothing here
which to an antagonist of Mr Mill needs present the
smallest difficulty. As to
&quot; crimes committed in obe-
&quot; dience to a perverted conscience,&quot; it seems sufficient
to say that we consider them justly (or deservedly) pun
ished as so committed; we hold the felon responsible for
his crime, if not immediately perhaps, yet mediately as
culpable in the perversion of his conscience which led to
it, in so far as this may fairly be surmised to have
emerged under the conditions of sanity. Of assassins
who
&quot;
regard themselves not as criminals but as heroic
&quot;
martyrs,&quot; we may boldly say that could we have
positive assurance that their outrage of the obligation
to respect life was solely an act of self-sacrifice to what
they considered a higher and more sacred one, however,
on obvious grounds of general expediency, we might64 MR JOHN STUART MILL
acquiesce in the doom awarded them, the Justice of it
as deserved or due to their deed, considered in itself, and
as an isolated act, we should very peremptorily deny.
Justifiable we should call it in the general, not just in
the particular instance. Take the stock case of Brutus
his purity of motive unimpeached who, inasmuch as
he did not love Caesar less, but Rome more, struck
through his own heart at the murderer of his country s
freedom of Charlotte Corday, who smote the monster
Marat! To deeds like these except that &quot;the God-
&quot; like stroke
&quot; of Brutus seems a little perhaps too God
like humanity throbs for evermore approval. What
of such cases? Was Charlotte Corday &quot;justly put to
&quot;
death,&quot; in the sense that she deserved her doom ? Mr
Mill will not say so. Justifiably, however, from the
legal point of view, she was, if to the ruffianly faction
then dominant it be proper to ascribe legality. Gener
ally, in such cases, while we may doubt if it be morally
just (deserved) that the particular hero should suffer for
what may really have been an act of sublime virtue, his
punishment may yet seem justifiable to us, on the ground
that such whimsical heroes are inconvenient, inasmuch
as no society could afford to grow a succession of them.
A dubious point of Justice dubious, because the true
motive of the act must always remain obscure may
here be allowed to be over-ridden by a plain and po
tent mandate of expediency. Further, a judicial and
punitive system can only deal on general rules laidav FREEDOM. 65
down, with overt act, and can take no account what
ever of the motives and
&quot; state of mind of the offender/&quot;
But, has Justice, therefore, as Mr Mill alleges,
&quot;
nothing
to do with the state of mind of the offender?&quot; Thai,
it is not so, is obvious from the one exception to these?
general rules, which in every humane judicial system i-




is most carefully taken into account ; and if it be not
on a ground of Justice that it is so, on what ground i-
it? Mr Mill will find it hard to explain. His saving-
clause, &quot;further than as this (his state of mind) mav
&quot;
atlect the efficacy of punishment as a means to JN
&quot;
end,&quot; is here of course of no avail. For how should
the state of mind of the maniac, as unamenable to
motive, any way affect the efficacy of our hano-ino- him ^ *3
lor murder, as a means to deter others from murder?
Not surely for anything
it will make in Mr Mill&quot;&amp;gt;
tavour by directing the sympathies of the public agai/^f
the law and in favour of its victim for what is to IK:
assigned as the ground of this supposed public sympathy
and abhorrence? Plainly nothing but a sense of the
brutal injustice of hanging a man,
&quot; the state of whose
&quot; mind
&quot;
fatally determined him to crime. Yet unques
tionably, rotating on the rope as an example, he would
be as edifying as the most perfect sanity could make him ;
and were expediency only considered, to be rid of the
pernicious confusions in which we are of late involved,
we should begin to hang madmen to-morrow. But the
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sense of Justice to the poor wretches, as not after all
deserving to be hanged, which at first procured their
exemption from the rope, will probably be strong enough
to perpetuate it, even against a very strong plea of social
utility as outraged. That &quot;the Justice of Punishment
&quot; has nothing to do with the state of mind of the
&quot;
offender,&quot; is a dictum which Mr Mill may profitably
revise, in the light of this significant exception. If in
other cases we take no account of
&quot; the state of mind of
&quot; the offender,&quot; it is because we are utterly incapable of
doing so with any approach to scientific accuracy, and
because criminal legislation can only proceed on a general
rule of particular penalties attached to particular acts.
But not unfrequently
it may happen that to a punish
ment which is justified under the general rule, we can
with difficulty reconcile ourselves as just in the individual
instance. And this, because though legally we cannot,
unavoidably as men we do, regard the
&quot; state of mind
&quot; of the offender&quot; as determining the character of his
crime, and more or less affecting our estimate of the
amount of punishment due to it, or in the special case,
just.
But all this time has Mr Mill been so juggling with
Justice without some dim sense of what he is doing?
Not so; in the midst of his dexterous legerdemain, a
sudden suspicion seems to emerge in his mind that all is
not quite as it should be, and his attempt to escape from
the entangfement in which he finds himself, is, in theON FREEDOM. 67
mode of it, even more lamentable than was the entannU -
ment itself. After reducing, as we have seen,
&quot; the
&quot;
primitive consciousness we are said to frave that we art
&quot;
accountable, and that if we violate the rule of right
&quot; we shall deserve punishment/ to &quot;nothing else than
&quot; our knowledge that punishment will be
just,&quot; by which




&quot;will naturally and may justly fol-
&quot;
low&quot; are of course the terms used, a little qualm seems
to strike him, and he says,
&quot;
By using the \\ordjustly,
&quot;
I am not assuming in the explanation the thing I pro-
&quot;
fess to explain. As before observed, I am entitled to
&quot;
postulate t/ie reality) and the knowledge and feeling of
&quot; moral distinctions. These, it is both evident meta-
&quot;
physically, and notorious historically, are independent
&quot;
of any theory concerning the will&quot; Mad we, in this
connexion, met with the above on the page of an un
known writer, we should have held it to indicate the
most radical philosophic incompetence. Philosophers
would have easy times of it if we allowed them quietly
to postulate the very things they undertake to prove.
If Mr Mill s present chapter be not in its main scope an
attempt, on the hypothesis of Necessity, to prove
&quot; the
&quot;
reality of moral distinctions,&quot; as involved in human
Responsibility, failing of which man cannot be a moral
creature, of whose acts such distinctions are predicable,
we will, with any sauce or none, eat his entire discussion.
That on the scheme of unconditional Necessity, as in-68 MR JOHN STUART MILL
eluding human actions, moral qualities can no longer,
except fictitiously, be attributed to them ; and that thus
&quot; moral distinctions,&quot; however practically accepted, must
needs be illusory, not m/Z what if not this is the ob
jection urged by the advocates of Freedom against Mr
Mill s doctrine? Could Mr Mill himself state the
objection, save implicitly in these terms ? Except by
ingeniously wis-stating it, he could not; yet in answer
to the objection, he considers himself
&quot; entitled to pos-
&quot; tulate the reality of moral distinctions.&quot; We venture
to question his title to do so.
&quot; As I have before
&quot;
observed, I am entitled,&quot; he says ; but even in this he
is mistaken ; nothing that he has before observed
amounts to any claim to be so entitled. The reference
in his
&quot; before observed
&quot; can only be to two passages.
The one is that important one already quoted, in which,
seeking to make sun-clear to us the &quot;distinction between D
&quot; moral good and evil in conduct,&quot; he considered he
succeeded in doing so by abolishing all moral agency ;
the other is a passage in which he says, that for the pre
sent argument,
it is no matter what
&quot; criterion of moral
&quot;
distinctions,&quot; utilitarian or otherwise, is assumed. In
the first of these, he asserts that &quot;the highest and strong-
&quot;
est seme of the worth of goodness, and the odiousness
&quot; of its opposite,
is compatible with even the most exag-
&quot;
gerated form of Fatalism ;
&quot;




is sufficient if we lelieve there is a difference between
riffht and wrong.&quot; The
&quot;
feeling (sense) of moralO.V FREEDOM. 69
distinctions&quot; and &quot;the knowledge&quot; of them it he
C2
chooses to call it a knowledge, rushing into those con
fusions of knowledge and belief of which he elsewhere
convicts Sir W. Hamilton he has thus, in his previous
observations, entitled himself to postulate. And these
he is welcome to postulate ; but the reality of moral dis
tinctions is quite another affair. That, in the scheme of
the Necessitarian, moral feelings and beliefs since no
body questions their existence may logically be assumed
as involved in the all-including Necessity, we are frankly
ready to admit; we shall further admit as involved in it
the conviction in the mind of Mr Mill that between a
belief and the validity of a belief, as vouching the reality
of the thing believed, there is no distinction whatever;
but this last part of the Necessity seems for Mr Mill an
unhappy one. We had thought a mere belief could prove
nothing beyond itself ; that even if it were one of Sir W.
Hamilton s
&quot; natural beliefs,&quot; it was scarce even therein
proved Natural. Now, it seems, nous avons change tout
cela, and beliefs arc to be put in the witness-box as evi
dence to their own character. Whether does Mr Mill,
from the belief in moral distinctions, find so sure an
inference of their reality as seems to entitle him to pos
tulate it, or has he of that reality an absolute intellectual
intuition? We should be curious indeed to be informed.
It seems to us that to clutch at it in the latter way
would be quite as consonant with his general scheme of
thought as to try to arrive at it in the other. In one;o MR JOHN STUART MILL
sense, however let him reach it in what way he pleases
Mr Mill does wisely and well to postulate the reality
of moral distinctions, as without something of this sur
reptitiously implied in the words just, justly, &c., when
in truth their meaning as used excludes it, he is really
without an argument. In another sense, he cannot be
held to do quite so well, inasmuch as the trick is quite
too transparent; so that, for any but the dullest reader,
his dexterous manipulation of terms is vain as the art
of the thimble-rigger when the dupes have discovered
his mystery. As to the
&quot; evident metaphysically that
&quot; the reality of moral distinctions is independent ot
&quot;
any theory concerning the will,&quot; what is to us meta
physically evident in the matter, is that precisely this it
is, which Mr Mill is engaged in trying to prove, not, as
we think, with highly-distinguished
success. Suppose,
again,
it were &quot;notorious historically&quot; as to a certain
extent it is that the
&quot;
knowledge (belief) and feeling of
&quot; moral distinctions are independent of any theory,&quot;
what is this to Mr Mill s purpose
? It is also, we sup
pose,
&quot;notorious historically&quot; that the extreme specula
tive idealist, who regards the external world as an illusion
merely, does not therefore endanger his supersubtle brain
by plunging his head against walls. He practically be
lieves in the wall as having a most serious external exist
ence, though speculatively he admits it as nothing but
an idea of his own absurd mind. And as against Mr
Mill it is contended that in the scheme of Necessity,ON FREEDOM. 71
consistently developed, our moral belief is precisely in ana
logous case
; however practically urgent, it must specu-
latively be volatilised into a lying illusion of life; the
&quot; moral Imperative&quot; can only be recognised as a men
dacious one, but not the less it may remain an efficient
Imperative.
When Mr Mill, having defined &quot;the real question as
&quot; one of Justice the legitimacy of Retribution or Pun-
&quot;
ishment,&quot; proceeds from his premiss of Necessity
with what success we have seen to substantiate the
idea of Justice by proving the legitimacy of Punishment,
either he has stated the question in terms of most serious
inaccuracy, or he must be held to be proving, along with
this, the legitimacy of Retribution ; for if in hisformula
&quot;Retribution or Punishment&quot; the words be not
used as interchangeable,
it can only be because Mr Mill
is an indifferent writer of Knglish. But the sole Punish
ment his reasoning legitimates,
is Punishment reforma
tory and deterrent
; and of Retributive Punishment we
hear nothing except towards the close of this part of the
discussion, when Mr Mill in an easy way informs us he
&quot; can find no argument to justify
it.&quot; Not the less,
however, in terms of his own statement, he stood bound
to find argument to justify it; and till we came with
some surprise on his disclaimer, we confess we had
thought he was trying to do so, though he did not seem
much to succeed. The disclaimer, when it comes, is
well 5 but meantime, for careless readers who are72 MR JOHN STUART MILL
greatly, we fear, in the majority Mr Mill s unques
tionable success in legitimating punishment, interpolated
as motive, has seemed to involve its legitimacy when in
flicted as also Retribution : and even when the disclaimer
is tendered, they mayn t, perhaps, appreciate
its full force
as confounding the whole previous argument. We would
not for the world hint such a thing of Mr Mill ; but in
a writer presumed capable of it, we might almost have
been disposed to suspect here a little dishonesty of artifice.
Moreover, as we before noted, had Mr Mill applied to
the subject, as defined in his own words, the least ot his
usual rigour,
&quot;
Retribution,&quot; being thrown overboard,
&quot;
Justice&quot; alike and &quot;Punishment&quot; should have been
cast out along with it, and instantly
&quot;the real question&quot;
would have been no longer question at all to tax Mr
Mill s ingenuity.
Of artifice or subterfuge of any kind we hold Mr Mill
incapable ; but throughout he has been led by the exi
gencies of an attempt, in its very nature now and for
ever a hopeless one, into something perilously like it.
Recurring to his definition of Moral Responsibility
&quot; when we are said to have the feeling of being morally
&quot;
responsible for our actions, the idea of leing punished
&quot; for them is uppermost in the speaker
s mind&quot; it is
obvious to remark, as before noted, that





idea as undermost in the mind of said speaker. Yet, in
the discussion which follows, this undermost, plainly ini-ON FREEDOM. 73
plied, finds no recognition whatever. The uppermost




punishment,&quot; which defines the simple Responsibility,
is made to do duty throughout as if it had defined the
moral one. In this way Mr Mill s argument succeeds
beautifully. &quot;Responsibility means punishment ;&quot;-
and Mr Mill, finding
it easy to exhibit a pretty
little
schema of thought, justifying, on the principle of neces
sitated action by motive, the infliction of punishment us
a motive, of course he proves his case ; Necessity and
Responsibility are no longer incompatible, as they were
held to be; Mr Mill has prospered to a wish in the mix
ing of his oil and water. Hut if, on the other hand,
&quot;
Responsibility means Punishment,&quot; which suggests the
simple Imperative,
is inadequate to suggest the Moral
one, it may very well be that though the fluids have
been bv Mr Mill most vigorously shaken together, their O J ^
interfusion is semblant only, and may presently be proved
to be so, by the obstinate re-emergence of the oil. And
precisely this is the case. If Moral Responsibility means
not Punishment siwpliciler, but Punishment in some
sense retributive ; and if, with &quot;the idea of being pun-
&quot; ished uppermost
&quot;
since Mr Mill will have it so
beneath and bound up with this idea is the sense ot
btmgjustly punished, of deserving to be punished, Mi-
Mill s whole argument collapses. And that such is the
accurate statement of the case that our feelings of good
desert in a good deed, of evil desert in an evil one, are74 MR JOHN STUART MILL
of the intimate essence of Moral Responsibility, no sane
creature will deny, save here and there, perhaps, a philo
sopher. Mr Mill himself will scarce deny it; for did
not we find him remark that &quot;not the belief that we shall
be made accountable, but the belief that we ought so
&quot; to be, that we are justly accountable, that guilt de-
&quot; serves punishment, can be deemed to require or pre-
&quot;




is the Responsibility, by Mr Mill himself given as the
fact of consciousness, to furnish a rational basis of which
his adversaries &quot;deem it needful to presuppose Freedom
;&quot;
and this, by consequence,
it plainly was, which the rigour
of the debate required Mr Mill to constitute for us, under
his prescribed conditions of Necessity. His utter failure
to do so, to the extent of having in the end to admit
after trying to bubble us with a discourse on Punishment
Reformatory and Deterrent, quite futile and beside the
&quot; real question
&quot;that &quot;for any natural affinity between
&quot; the two ideas of guilt and punishment he can find no
&quot;
argument,&quot;
is perhaps the severest misfortune which
ever befell a logician of Mr Mill s admitted eminence.
Sensible, it might almost seem, of some little awk
wardness in the admission to which he is led, that the
retributive view of punishment
&quot;derives no justification
&quot; from the doctrine I support,&quot; Mr Mill, by way of
effecting a diversion and carrying the war into the camp
of the enemy, adds immediately
&quot; But it derives quite
&quot; as little from the Free-will doctrine. Suppose
it trueON FREEDOM. 75
that the will of a malefactor when he committed an
&quot; offence was free, or in other icords, that he acted badly
&quot; not because he was of a bad disposition, but for no
&quot; reason in particular,
it is not easy to deduce from this
&quot; the conclusion that it is just to punish him. That his
&quot; acts u ere beyond the command of motives might be a
&quot;
good reason for keeping out of his way or placing him
&quot; under bodily restraint ; but no reason for inflicting
&quot;
pain upon him when that pain, by supposition, could
&quot; not operate as a deterring
motive.&quot; Surely these words
in italics convey a serious misrepresentation of the Free
will doctrine, as stated by any intelligent supporter of
it
; nor, unless Mr Mill can produce from some such ad
mittedly competent supporter of it a dictum that to act
in freedom, and to act without a motive, and
&quot; for no rca-
&quot; son in particular,&quot; that is, from the mere wild irrational
caprice of a maniac, are terms in meaning identical, will
it be easy for us to acquit him of seeking a cheap victory
with his readers, by the easy method of substituting for
the opinion to be discredited a questionable figment of
his own. No advocate of Freedom has ever yet said
that men act badly not because they are of bad disposi
tion, butyor no reason in particular; idiocy of this kind
is too palpable to be promulgated except as the wisdom
f an opponent. Under stress of a hopeless argument
which sought to make liberty comprehensible, foolish
things may have been written; Reid, in particular, is, in
nearly all his remarks on the subject of motive, incom-
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petent ; and when contending, as he does, that it is
possible for the will to act without a motive he asks
casually in this relation
&quot; Is there no such thing as
&quot;
wilfulness, caprice, or obstinacy among mankind ?
&quot; he
really seems, in some helpless way, to glance in the direc
tion of Mr Mill s
&quot; for no reason in particular
;&quot; but his
lapse will scarcely avail for Mr Mill, who, in citing these
words of Reid, appends to them with express approval,
Sir W. Hamilton s brief and contemptuous dismissal ot
them. After this, it needed some coolness on Mr Mill s
part, in an argument originating as against Hamilton,
to interpolate as accepted Free-will doctrine, a somewhat
audacious caricature of Reid s rejected suggestion of ca
price. Moreover, not only is Mr Mill s definition of
freedom in itself objectionable, as conveyed in irrational
terms, and attributing to his opponents an opinion
which to a man they would repudiate as fatuous,* but
the use he proceeds to make of it lies open to still more
serious objection. It might almost seem that this pas
sage, which identifies freedom of action with action
undetermined by motive, and done
&quot; for no reason in
*
Many men will say that at any given time they feel themselves free
to eat or not to eat ; but will any man say that when he does eat, he
eats not because he is hungry, but &quot;for no reason in particular?&quot;
Mainly there is no such blockhead. In the cases again in which hunger
is not the reason of his eating, a man knows he has some other reason,
failing which he would not eat. 7/&amp;lt;w, if this reason is sufficient to
make him eat, he should yet have been free not to eat, no competent
person professes his ability to explain.ON FREEDOM. 77
&quot;
particular,&quot; was mainly written by Mr Mill to give
occasion for the Note he appends to it, as follows :
&quot; Several of Sir W. Hamilton s admissions are strong
&quot; aro-uments against the alleged self-evident connexion o o o
&quot; between Free-will and accountability. We have found
&quot; him affirming that a volition not determined by mo-
&quot; lives would, if conceived, be conceived as morally
&quot;
worthless; that the free acts of an indifferent are
&quot;
morally and rationally as worthless as the pre-ordained
&quot;
passions of a determined will
; and that it is impos-
&quot;
sible to see how a cause undetermined by any motive
&quot; can be a rational, moral, and accountable cause. li
&quot;
all this be so, there can be no intuitive perception of a
&quot;
necessary connexion between free-will and morality
;
&quot;
it would appear, on the contrary, that we are naturally





In the whole ransie of philosophical controversy, we
should be surprised if there could be tound an instance
of orreater unfairness than this strange passage involves.
In the sense of the theory free! What theory, may we
ask, and u lwse ? The theory, of course, of motiveless
volition and action &quot;for no reason in particular.&quot; And
whose theory of Freedom is this ? Hamilton s, one would
naturally suppose, if, as against Hamilton, any weight,
or indeed meaning, is to be attributed to Mr Mill s re
marks. But how stands the matter? Plainly, in these
passages quoted, Hamilton, who has previously (p. 498)78
been exhibited, as showing, that if the will be acted on
by motives,
&quot; we can never in thought escape determina-
&quot; tion and Necessity,&quot;
is now, on the other hand, en
forcing, that a will which should act without motives,
would,
&quot;
if conceived,&quot; be conceived of as something
other than the reasonable and moral will, with which
only his argument concerns itself as worth contending
for as a Will at all. Free-will, before proved inconceiv
able on the hypothesis of motive, is now, on the nega
tion of that hypothesis, shown to be conceivable if at
all_as merely itself a negation. Hamilton is here, in
fact, according to his special whim of elaborating the
argument, negatively presenting Freedom as one of his
two famous opposed Inconceivable*, in terms nearly
identical with those used by Leibnitz in his curious con
troversy with Dr Clarke,&quot; A mere Will, without any
&quot;
Motive, is a Fiction ; not only contrary to God s per-
&quot;
fections, but also, chimerical and contradictory
; incou-
&quot; sistent with the Definition oj the Will, and sufficiently
&quot; confuted in my Theodicaea.&quot; Similarly Hamilton,
&quot;
Nay, were we even to think as true, what we cannot
&quot; think as possible,
still the doctrine of a motiveless voli-
&quot; tion would be only casualism ; and the free acts of an
&quot;
indifferent,&quot; &c., as by Mr Mill quoted. The theory
of free volition, as motiveless, and &quot;for no reason in
&quot;
particular/
is thus plainly enough not Hamilton s,
who throughout admits, and even proclaims, that of
Freedom, human or divine, no positive logical theoryON FREEDOM. 79
can be substantiated,
&quot;
How, therefore, I repeat, moral
&quot;
Liberty in God or man is possible, we are utterly un-
&quot; able speculatively to understand.&quot; Whose, then, is
this theory of free volition, as &quot;beyond the command of
&quot;
motives, and for no reason in particular?&quot; It seems
to originate with Mr Mill, who, finding his antagonist
without a theorv of Freedom, is kind enough to furnish
- O
him with one gratis. Yet in a manner he takes pay
ment for it; confidently parading in the text this paltry
figment of his own, as the approved doctrine of Freedom,




by Hamilton the very passages in
which that figment is shattered, and turns these so-called
admissions against his genuine doctrine of
&quot; the neces-
&quot;
sary connexion between Free-will and Morality,&quot; by
reviving the demolished figment.
&quot; It would
appear,&quot;
he says, (from these admissions,)
&quot; that we are naturally
&quot; unable to recognise an act as moral, // it is in the sense
&quot; of the theory, free;
&quot; but it is the very purpose of said
admissions to explode the theory, as unthinkable, con
tradictory, and absurd
; wherefore, Mr Mill s important
if having no virtue whatever in it, his whole Note
collapses wretchedly, leaving
&quot; the necessary connexion
&quot; between Free-will and Morality
&quot;
precisely as it was
before. Mr Mill, having otherwise not much satisfac- * O




perhaps half uneasily feeling as much, the surreptitious
character of his attack upon
it here, is to be looked at8o MR JOHN STUART MILL
a little leniently. It is the more strange to find Mr
Mill here writing as he does, that a little before we have
found him writing
&quot; The inconceivability of the Frcc-
&quot; will doctrine is maintained by our author (Hamilton)
&quot; not only on the general ground just stated, (of its in-
&quot;
volving an absolute commencement,) but on the
&quot; further and special ground that the will is determined
&quot;
by
motives.&quot; After this to attribute to Hamilton,




&quot; no reason in particular
&quot; seems a little to stretch the
licence of controversy. Doubtless, it is held by Hamil
ton that Free-will, though inconceivable, as involving
the impossible notion of
&quot; an absolute commencement&quot;
of a cause which is not itself an effect is yet, on his
principle of the Excluded-Middle, to be believed. But
it is only as an Inconceivable he claims our belief in it,
not as an impossible
&quot;absolute commencement,&quot; as Mr
Mill seems to suppose;* and out of the abyss of the
*How, while with emphasis asserting the determination of the will
by motives, could Hamilton also intend to assert &quot;an absolute com-
&quot;mencement&quot; as the mode under which Freedom, though &quot;inconceiv-
&quot;able,&quot; was yet to be believed? This would have been to rush with
his eyes open on the staring contradictory of a thing at once caused and
uncaused. That Hamilton has not done this is evident from his own
words candidly interpreted&quot; Were we even to think us true (to believe)
&quot; what we cannot think as possible,&quot; which seem fairly to imply, that to
insist on our belief in Freedom under this impossible or unthinkable
mode is no part of his doctrine. Free-will he shows to be inconceiv
able, first, on the motiveless hypothesis, as involving an unthinkable
&quot;absolute commencement;&quot; and again, on the special ground of thea\* FREEDOM. 8 1
Inconceivable to which he consigned it, had he further
elaborated the rough outline of the argument, which is
all that we have from his hand he would no douhr
have sought to educe its possible reconcilement with the
plain and undeniable fact, by himself, as we saw, in
sisted on, that &quot;the will is determined by motives.&quot;
To represent him in any case, as denying this, and bv
implication maintaining that men act badly, not because
they are of bad disposition, but
&quot; for no reason in par
ticular,&quot; is to impute to him gratuitous absurdity.
But to impute gratuitous absurdities to an opponent-
more especially if he happens to be a dead opponent is
sometimes the safest way of trying to confute him.
fact, by no sane man to be denied, &quot;that the will is determined by
&quot;motives.&quot; Plainly, it is under this last known and admitted modi ,




nets are determined by motives, (caused) and
yet arc to be believed in as in some utterly &quot;inconceivable&quot; nanm-i
fnv. That this is really the doctrine which Hamilton, in the last resort,
would have held himself bound to maintain, is made plain by the fol
lowing passage: &quot;This philosophy brings us back from the aberr.i-
&quot;tions of modern theology to the truth and simplicity of the more
&quot;ancient Church. It is here shown&quot; (proposed to be shown) &quot;to be as
&quot;irrational as irreligious, on the grottmi of Intin-.in iinJcrslanJn,^ to
&quot;deny either, on the one hand, the foreknowledge, predestination and
&quot;free grace of God, or on the other hand, the Free-will of man ; thai
&quot;we should believe both, and both in unison, though unable to com
prehend cither, even
apart.&quot; Substituting here for the theological
terms Foreknowledge and Predestination, their philosophical equiva
lents of Causational sequence or Necessity, we find that, taking this
with Freedom, we must
&quot;
believe both, and both in unison/ on
grounds c.r/;v7-logical. Yet these, oddly enough, are our old friends the
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It must be held curious, that, whilst giving us an
elaborate theory, from the point of view which suits his
case, of Punishment as an external institution, Mr Mill
has ignored almost utterly throughout what it specially
behoved him to explain that primary type of punish
ment which is given in the inner phenomena of con
science. When we find Mr Mill writing as we have
seen When we are said to have the feeling of being
&quot;
morally responsible
for our actions, the idea of being
&quot;
punished
for them is uppermost
in the speaker
s mind,&quot; it
cannot but occur to us, that if by
&quot;
punished&quot; he means
externally punished, he lays a somewhat undue emphasis
on what is really, in terms of his own statement, the in
essential side of the phenomenon,
&quot; the belief that we shall
&quot; be made accountable,&quot; which nobody
&quot; can deem to
&quot;
require or presuppose the Free-will hypothesis.&quot; Doubt-
two opposed Inconceivable*, to belief in one of which we found our
selves before shut up by the logical
&quot;Law of the Excluded Middle.
We are inclined, as before hinted, to agree with Mr Mill in thinking
that Hamilton s reconstruction of the argument in the light of his
Philosophy of the Conditioned,&quot; has really done it no great sen-ice ;
but it was not right to represent him as, in order to maintain freedom,
denying motives and causes. In the light of the rest of his remarks,
the one casual expression from which there might seem an inference of
his doing so, &quot;the inconceivability of an absolute commencement, on
&quot; the/^/ of which commencement the doctrine of liberty proceeds,&quot;
must be held a mere inadvertancy of expression. By fact here Hamilton
means, and can only mean, a notional fact, as distinct from a fact of
existence; a notion which, even in trying to &quot;think it as true,&quot; we
&quot;cannot think as possible,&quot; yet the only notion of freedom competent
to us when we seek to evolve it in the//wr of thought.ON FREEDOM. ^




is not only uppermost as a motive de
terring them from crime, but is even the sole deterring
motive; but probably when even a very average specimen
of the raee speaks of being morally Responsible for his
actions, it is not
&quot; the idea of being punished for them
&quot;
that is uppermost in his mind, but the idea of doinir
wrong, and incurring, to adopt Mr Mill s words elsewhere
quoted,
&amp;lt;&amp;lt;the pain more or less intense attendant on the
&quot; violation of
duty.&quot; Punished or not for sin as externally
we may be, u-ithin we cannot escape punishment ; the
shame which haunts us for a conscious meanness, the
remorse winch dogs us for a crime from these \\v should
vainly seek to flee, though from every other form of




of punishment, the intimate sense of desert in act, Mr
Mill would perhaps not seek to deny ; neither with the
smallest hope of success could he attempt to deny it
retributive. That whilst retributive, it is also motive, is
at once frankly admitted
; but how does it succeed in
becoming motive except by its first experienced efficiency
as retribution ? We should be curious to know lum
Mr Mill would deal with this primary type; and yet,
strictly, we are not very curious, inasmuch as, from
glimpses here given, we can accurately predict how he
would. Not being able to deny it as a fact of
consciousness, he would deny it as a prh/ii/ire fact,
and undertake implicitly to reduce it for us by tx-84 MR JOHN STUART MILL
hibiting
it as a synthesis of previous understood ele
ments.
Mr Mill has not at all seen fit to labour this part of
his subject; and the few hints he has dropped
in rela
tion to it, may be very briefly disposed
of.
&quot; It is well
&quot; worth consideration,&quot; he says, (p. 508,)
&quot; whether the
&quot;
practical expectation of being thus called to account
&quot; has not a great deal to do with the internal feeling of
&quot;
being accountable ; a feeling assuredly which is seldom
&quot; found in any strength in the absence of that practical
&quot;
expectation.&quot; Of this it seems enough to say that,
admitting not only that the expectation of being called
to account has everything to do with our feeling
of:
being accountable, as in truth the very ground of the
feeling, but that it has
&quot; a great deal to do
&quot; with our
sense of being morally accountable; this does not amount
to an identification of the simple imperative and the
moral one. These, as we before explained, may effi
ciently co-exist, and as intervolved in the same mind,
have a very
&quot;
great deal to do
&quot; with each other ; the
higher imperative, in itself perhaps apt to be sluggish,
being urged into healthful activity by a sting of sugges
tion from time to time applied by the lower one ; but
not the less they must be held to be principles in their
nature distinct, till it is shown that the higher can be
exhibited as a mere derivative and development of the
lower. This Mr Mill with perfect assurance asserts it
can, but he is shy of trying to prove
it. &quot;No cne,&quot; heav FREEDOM. 85
\\ritcs,
&quot; who understands the power of the principle
&quot; of association, can doubt its sufficiency to create out
&quot; of these elements (of anticipated punishment) the
&quot; whole of the feeling of which we are conscious. To
&quot; rebut this view of the case would require positive evi-
&quot; deuce
; as, for example, if it could be proved that the
&quot;
feeling of accountability precedes, in the order of de-
&quot;
velopment, all experience of punishment. No such
&quot; evidence has been produced or is producible. O \vinir
&quot; to the limited accessibility to observation of the mental
&quot;
processes of infancy, direct proof can as little be pro-
&quot; duced on the other side
; but if there be any validitv
&quot;
in Sir \V. Hamilton s Law of Parcimony, we ought
&quot; not to assume any mental phenomenon as an ultimate
&quot; fact which can be accounted for by other known pro-
&quot;
perties of our mental nature.&quot; Certainly we ought
not; but can the moral idea be thus accounted for? and
does Mr Mill imagine his dogmatic
&quot; no one who under-
&quot; stands can doubt
&quot;
is to be received in settlement of
such a question
? }Vc presume to doubt very much, at
the risk of being held not to understand: and our pre
sumption may seem less in the matter than otherwise it
might have done, when it is found that all Mr Mill has
to say towards dispelling doubt is as afterwards, (p. 513.)
&quot; From our earliest childhood the ideas of doing n rou^
&quot; and of punishment are presented to our mind together,
&quot; and the intense character of the impressions causes
&quot; the associations between them to attain the highest86 MR JOHN STUART MILL
&quot;
degree of closeness and intimacy. The only ideas pre-
&quot; sented have been those of
u&amp;gt;rong and punishment, and
&quot; an inseparable association has been created between
&quot; these directly without the help of any intervening
&quot; idea. This is quite enough to make the spontaneous
&quot;
feelings of mankind regard punishment and a wrong-
&quot; doer as naturally fitted to each other,&quot; a passage
amusing in the effrontery with which a writer engaged
in the genesis of the moral idea assumes it in the very
phraseology he employs. In his use of the word wrong
here with its moral associations, Mr Mill deliberately begs
the whole question. Let us inquire what is really given
in the child s experience. There is given a particular
course of conduct punishment as its invariable result;
and the mere word wrong, which by degrees it appro
priates to that course of conduct, just as the word black
it appropriates to denote black objects. But no more
than the word black, would the word wrong, as denot
ing said course of conduct connote for the child a moral
attribute ; all it could connote for it would be the pun
ishment, invariably annexed. And association, were it
thrice over
&quot;
inseparable/ could not generate from the
elements of experience a moral element which in expe
rience it did not Jind. What association would no
doubt be able to generate would be an instinctive and
inevitable expectation of punishment, as in the very
nature of things attached to the particular conduct ;
but the sense of desert in the conduct, and of punish-ON FREEDOM. 87
mcnt as justly attached to it, might
still perhaps remain
to be accounted for. That Mr Mill can account for
such a sense, on his principle of experience and insepar
able association, may or may not be ; what is certain in
the matter is, that here he has not done so, except for
unwary readers, by assuming
it in the terms employed ;
and in this way
it would be easy to account for almost
anything on almost any principle. This feeling of good
or evil desert, Mr Mill would not perhaps explain by
saying
it is taught us, (though there are hints here which
look in that unhappy direction ;) for, supposing he did
so, not to mention that the possibility of teaching im





to the idea communicated,
the (juis ipsos custodes would instantly suggest as per
tinent the query Who taught the teacher? how did
the idea originate? But in truth, for our present pur
pose,
it is not worth a pin s head of pains to inquire
whether or no Mr Mill could succeed with his genesis
of the Moral idea
; for supposing him to have succeeded,
what then ? He would only have accounted for Morality
as an illusion, by showing us how it became so
; he would
simply have constructed the illusion for us. And, in
doing this, Mr Mill would scarce perhaps be capable of
considering he had proved
it to be a Reality ; though as
to this there may be some doubt, in the light of certain
of his previous remarks, (vide pp. 67-69.) That, on the
hypothesis of Necessity, Morality cannot be proved so,and can only be speculatively admitted as at best a neces
sary illusion, a very little trouble will make abundantly
obvious.
In his attempt, on the principle of Necessity, to legiti
mate the Justice of punishment, we found Mr Mill writ
ing as follows :
&quot;
Supposing him to be of a vicious
&quot;
disposition, he cannot help doing the criminal act if
&quot; he is allowed to believe that he will be able to commit
&quot;
it unpunished. If, on the contrary, the impression
&quot;
is strong in his mind that a heavy punishment will
&quot;
follow, he can, and in most cases does, help
it.&quot; It is
not a little significant that here Mr Mill, in putting two
cases whiph are beside the real inquiry, omits to consider
a third, which is obvious, pressing, and pertinent to it.
&quot; In most cases does help
it.&quot; Let us take one of the
very numerous remaining cases, in which, despite the
punishment known to be imminent, he does not help
it.
The question in this case occurs Could he have helped
it, or could he not ? That he could have helped it, the
antecedents being supposed constant, Mr Mill will
scarcely allege, as to do so would be to admit Freedom.
Consequently, Mr Mill must needs elect the alternative
that, do what he would, (an unmeaning phrase,) he could
not have helped
it. The farther question then emerges
Can we, in Moral Justice, proceed to hang him, let
us say, for the crime he could in no sense help? Mr
Mill s reply that, on the whole, suppose a man murders
his grandfather,
it will be proper to tie him up for it, toON FREEDOM. 89
protect his grandmother who survives, is an audacious
shirking of this question, to which common sense and
humanity alike (as in the case of maniacs before glanced
at) give unhesitating answer in the negative. If the
man could not help his action (as Mr Mill must needs
admit, or accept the alternative of Freedom.) could
rigorously not help it, any more than a stone unattached
can help falling to the earth, (and will any man with a
head more capable than that of a pin pretend, in the
all-including, unconditional Necessity he announces,
modifications, and degrees of stringency?) all the philo
sophers who ever bothered the pia inafcr of perplexed
mankind might be frankly challenged to produce a
ground of moral iltnne against the man, which would
not, by parity of reason, sullice to convict the stone if
by chance it had brained a navvy. With precisely as
much jiitl/ce (or. the ,vr//.vc ot the thm&amp;lt;i we say nothing)
might you arrest the stone, put
it in the dock, try it,
condemn it, and finally, cartintr it to the scene of its
misdemeanour, hang
it as a lesson to the rest of the
quarry to respect the brains of navvies, as so proceed
asrainst the man. Solely bv postulating in the man
*
&amp;lt; . . \ CT
some quality not in the stone, which transcends the
necessity common to both,* can we conceive of his act
*
Observe, no intelligent advocate of Freedom feels called upon, in
making his assertion of it, therein to deny Necessity, lie believes
/
&amp;lt;V//, each on its appropriate evidence ; and in his admitted inability to
reconcile them in his belief, he sees only one more proof of what already90 MR JOHN STUART MILL
as crime, and not simply as Fate or misfortune. And
what transcends Necessity must be Freedom. We should
scarce have thought it possible that any man worth
one s while to reply to would propound as the difference
between man and stone which legitimates moral judg
ment of the one and not of the other, the inherence
of a will in the man
; if ex hypothesi, that will must
itself be held to act
&quot; Not willingly, but tangled in the fold
Of dire Necessity, whose law
&quot;
determines its minutest decision. But we find to
our grief and consternation, in Mr John Stuart
Mill, such a man. From a passage already inci
dentally glanced at, there seems little doubt that, in
the last resort, it is thus Mr Mill would seek to escape
from the difficulty. At p. 514 we find him thus writ
ing : Yes
; if he really
* could not help acting as he
&quot;
did; that is, if his will could not have helped it; if
&quot; he was under physical constraint, or under the action
is proved an hundredfold the limitation of his logical faculty. That
it was to some such issue as this that Hamilton would have conducted
his argument, had lie consistently or perhaps inconsistently developed
it_Mr Mill will no doubt prefer the latter phrase, there is evidence
in the passage at page 81 quoted. As it is, all that we have from him
on the subject is a quantity of disjecta membra hints, notes, fragments,
written at different times, on which it is difficult to ground a conclusive
criticism. Curiously enough, Hamilton fragmentary always is no
where more fragmentary than on this topic of Freedom, to which he
attributed such importance.ON FREEDOM. 91
&quot; of such a violent motive, that no fear of punishment
&quot; could have any effect; which, if capable of being as-
&quot;
certained, is a just ground of exemption, and is the
&quot; reason \vhy, by the laws of most countries, people are
&quot; not punished for what they were compelled to do by
&quot; immediate danger of death.&quot;* A passage this which
seems for Mr Mill an unhappy one. For how, on his
principles, is it possible to maintain a valid distinction
between the exceptional cases given as incapacitating the
will, and thus claiming of right &quot;exemption&quot; from
moral judgments, and other cases for which no such
plea of exemption is urged? In a case of physical con
straint, the ii lll of the man is in abeyance to the pres
sure of a physical causation
; in a case of such over-
* It is but fair to quote Mr Mill s clause introductory of this pas
sage
: &quot;That a person holding what is called the Necessitarian
&quot;
doctrine, should on that account fed that it would be unjust to
&quot;
punish him for his wrong actions, seems to me the veriest of chimeras.
&quot;Yes, if he
really,&quot; &c. Questionless, if said person should reason
out the subject as loosely and irresolutely as Mr Mill does, and while
maintaining that he was utterly without power to act otherwise than
as he did act, any more than may reside in a stone to help.falling
to the ground, should also continue to maintain that he was yet cul
pable in not having done so, of course it would be a chimera. JJut
otherwise it might hot really be so much so as it seems to Mr Mill.
Touching this and related topics, something may be said in the sequel.
Meantime, it is enough for our argument to show, that if we suppose
the man to reason rigorously, and to have rid himself of what lie could
only regard as the moral superstitions in which he aforetime was edu
cated, he could not logically look upon himself as guilty in his action,
and so a subject of punishment accurately to be called just or deserved ;
and this is above sufficiently shown.92 MR JOHN STUART MILL
mastering motive as no fear of punishment can counter
vail, the will of the man is in abeyance to that of a.
moral causation; and in either case, Mr Mill holds that,
inasmuch as
&quot;his,//
1 /// could not have helped it,&quot; ex
emption from blame must be accorded. What then of
a case in which the motive, though somewhat less abso
lutely tyrannous, was yet of violence sufficient to deter
mine the man to crime? Is there here no rigour of
moral causation ? And if in this case, not less than
in the other, the causal necessity is admitted, on what
ground
is the right of the man denied to the &quot;exemp-
&quot;
tion&quot; granted his fellow ? Could his will in this case
&quot; have helped
it?&quot; in any case, in which the motive
was the sufficient reason of the act? Mr Mill must
here be supposed to imply as much, though he could
only explicitly maintain it by a plunge into fatal incon
sequence. For in no case could
&quot; the will of the man
&quot;have
helped&quot; his act, except by being determined dif
ferently ; and if it could not determine itself differ
ently, how its different determination could be come at
except through that
&quot; difference in the antecedents&quot;
which Mr Mill himself has taught us to exclude, he
will find it hard to explain. How, farther, are we to
distinguish between a case in which
&quot; no fear of punish-
&quot; ment could have any effect,&quot; and one in which the
fear of punishment had no effect? If it had no effect,
how could it have had any ? Solely by being a stronger
fear, in relation to the antagonist impulse, to supposeOX FREEDOM. 93
it which, is once more to suppose a change in the ante
cedents, with a revolution, as involved in this, of the
whole previous order of the world. Mr Mill seems here
in his argument somewhat in the hapless case of the
philosophical gentleman in the Tempest,
&quot; the latter end
&quot; of whose commonwealth forgets the beginning.&quot;
Briefly, if Mr Mill, to the exclusion of Freedom, includes
human actions under the law of Univeral Causation, \\e
are at least entitled to insist on his steadily conceiving it
Universal. If Physical Causation incapacitates the Will,
must not Moral Causation incapacitate? and li not, what
is the rational ground of the distinction ? Farther, if in
special cases, as Mr Mill admits, Moral Causation inca
pacitates, must it not incapacitate in all? and if not, how
not ? Freedom apart, could in am/ case the
&quot;
icil! of a
&quot; man have helped&quot; his doinir as he did, any more than
his falling to the earth, if he found himself flung forth
of window? Mr Mill cannot say so except in manifest
outrage of his own principles. The formula of &quot;his
&quot;
/// // could not have helped it,&quot; which he exclusively
announces as ground of &quot;exemption
&quot; from moral judg
ments, in cases of physical constraint and tyrannous ex
tremity of motive, must needs, on these principles, be
extended to all outlying human actions, \\ith the like
inference of &quot;exemption.&quot; Mr Mills
&quot;yes
if he really
&quot; could not help acting as he did; that is, if his re///
&quot; could not have helped
it
; if he was under physical con-
&quot;
straint,&quot; on the extension of its second clause, which94 MR JOHN STUART MILL
his own previous reasoning to a change of antecedents
necessitates, amounts in point of fact then to this that
in any given case, the man
&quot;
really could not help
&quot;
acting
as he did, any more than if he had been under physical
constraint
; ho\v then, any more than in that case, he is
to be held a fit subject of Home, we may ask Mr Mill
to demonstrate, and give him his own time to it.
When he has succeeded in doing so, we shall admit his
title to be found writing as follows :
&quot; If the desire of right and aversion to wrong have
&quot;
yielded to a small temptation, we judge them to be
&quot;
weak, and our disapprobation is strong. If the temp-
&quot; tation to which they have yielded is so great that even
&quot;
strong feelings of virtue might have succumbed to it,
&quot; our moral reprobation is less intense. If, again, the
&quot; moral desires and aversions have prevailed, but not
&quot; over a very strong force, we hold that the action was
&quot;
good, but that there was little merit in it; and our
&quot; estimate of the merit rises in exact proportion to the
&quot;
greatness of the obstacle which the moral feeling
&quot;
proved strong to overcome.&quot;
Meantime, it is sufficiently clear that the phrases
merit or demerit, moral approbation or reprobation, can
except as, so to speak, stolen, have no place in Mr
Mill s vocabulary. For how should a desire or aversion
as failing in the hour of temptation, incur his moral
censure as weak, if, being, as it is, the last link in a
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it stronger, by supposing a change in the scries of these
sequences? To alter the whole world from the begin
ning
is surely the sort of teat, for his culpable nesrlect to
perform which it seems odd to arraign a poor sinner.
Further, in the matter of temptations yielded to, or
resisted, why should he apportion his moral approval or
the reverse, according to the strength or weakness of the
temptation? Is not the weakest temptation which re
sults in act, as strictly as the very strongest, the suffi
cient reason of the act, and in so far forth the excuse of
it? Two temptations, a strong and a weak respectively,
having induced act, does Mr .Mill really suppose in the
strong temptation any compulsory poiccr to induce its
act, which did not also reside in the weak one? And
why talk of strength or weakness of temptation
? These
phrases have only meaning in relation to the strength
of antagonist impulses, a strength severely predeter
mined like that of the temptation itself. The question
of the result can plainly no more be a moral one, than
if it simply concerned the tiltm&amp;lt;r of weights on a balance.
1 J O O
It is impossible a writer should enmesh himself in a net
of more fatal inconsistencies.
Recurring to Mr Mill s &quot;Yes if he reallv could O
&quot; not help acting as he did
; that is, if his icil/ could
&quot; not have helped
it&quot; it is important to note that from
this remarkable deliverance Mr Mill should seem to con
sider that the man is one thing and his icill another,
with some stirring of a separate life in it, whereby what96 MR JOHN STUART MILL
the man is unable to accomplish, the icdl of the man
may. This is in effect somewhat as if we said that a
feat which a man had failed to do, giving him his whole
body to it, he was likely to achieve with his leg.
This notion of a distinction between the man and his
will seems to us a very helpless one ; and it is obvious
to us to recognise in it one main source of the contu
sions which have hitherto clouded the discussion of a
subject not in itself insusceptible of reduction to the
clearest logical issues. The will, conceived as other than
the ego itself in act, as something interpolated between
the ego and its act, is the merest metaphysical phantasm
that ever bred maggots of bewilderment in the brain ot
a philosopher entertaining
it. We defy any man who
will take the trouble to ascertain and define what he-
means by the u ill, to conceive and define it in the con
crete, otherwise than as the veritable man himself, opera
tive in his act, termed volition. It seems certain, at
least, no other definition can be given of it, which
would sanction our speaking of the Will as an agent
;
and plainly Mr Mill here so speaks of it. Now does
Mr Mill in this passage mean to identify the man and
his will? It would be to insult Mr Mill to suppose
this; for if so, what in effect do we find him writing?
&quot; Yes if he really could not help acting as he did
;
&quot;that is, if he could not have helped
it&quot; and with
equal pertinence he might have gone on to write
&quot; that
&quot;
is, if he could positively not have helped
it ; that is,ON FREEDOM. 9/
;
if he could positively not have helped it,&quot; and so over
some pages, which, however Mr Mill might, in writing,
have attributed importance to them, could really have
had very little, as merely reiterating idly the one first
exhaustive clause&quot; Yes if he really could not help
Now, as we cannot suppose a man like Mr Mill
capable of thus accumulating identical propositions, we
must suppose him to conceive of the Will as an active
entity, distinct from the activity of the man. One fancies
with some amusement the scorn too lofty to care to ex
press itself, with which Mr Mill would fim l such a view
seriously imputed to him. And seriously we do not of
course impute it to him, But then the question recurs
-What does Mr Mill mean? It may be he speaks of
the Will, as a mere mode of the man s activity; but if
so, again he speaks inaccurately; for plainly his lan
guage implies that the Will is not a mere mode, but an
agent.
&quot; If his it-ill could not ! &quot;if the Will be a mere
mode of the man s activity, how distinguish this from
the first simple
&quot; If lie could not?&quot; In the mere could
given at first, we have all that is meant in the n-ilL
afterwards given in explanation. On this ground, airain,
Mr Mill is convicted of accumulating clauses without
meaning. Thinking to illustrate easily is also a mode
of man s activity; and what should we say of a writer
capable of gravely delivering himself thus&quot; If he had
&quot;
only thought a little, before he acted that is, if his
&quot;
thinking had only thought a little ?
&quot; We should say9S MR JOHN STUART MILL
he was the sort of writer who had better not write at all,
and decline to further concern ourselves with him and
his speculations. And how a form of statement which
is obvious nonsense, when used of an intellectual mode
of activity, should become wisdom as used by Mr Mill in
regard of the voluntary mode, some ingenious gentleman
may perhaps be able to explain; but only a very thorough
going admirer of Mr Mill is likely to make the attempt.
What then the reader naturally may wish to know-
ran be Mr Mill s real meaning? And the answer is not
far to seek. By Will here, Mr Mill means Free-will
in virtue of which only, as we have shown, could a man
in any case &quot;have helped&quot; his act, as Mr Mill here
plainly implies that in most cases he could. Here, as
elsewhere, Mr Mill can only attain a seeming success
in his argument by filching a use of language in strict
ness only competent to his opponents. What, on
Mr Mill s principles, must be stated as the essential
distinction between a voluntary and an involuntary
act? Simply, we opine, that in the first we are con
scious as active ; in the other, not so. Any conscious
ness of power in the origination of the acts called voli
tions, Mr Mill expressly says he does not find in him
self; and if he did find such a consciousness, his
&quot;
Theory
&quot; of Causation,&quot; which with rigour excludes all nexus
between the cause and its effect, would compel him to
treat it as nugatory as &quot;a so-called consciousness&quot;
and
&quot; source of delusion
&quot;
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we have seen, for tacts of consciousness even before-
admitted as such, when, by some change in his point of
view, they are brought into conflict with his
&quot;
theory.&quot;
But others profess (and so far as we can interrogate aur-
selves we concur with them) to be conscious not only of
acts, but of the immanence in these of a power, or origi
native energy, as in some inexplicable way a con-
cause of them, along with their other motive causes,
not by any one denied
;
* and of tills it is that already
in the frame of language, which is shaped by primal
human instinct, and not by the subsequent conceits of
philosophers, the term will is used as a convenient
*
It has always been a favourite line of argument with Necessitarians
to represent the advocates of Freedom as denying Motives or Causes.
But whatever pertinence the argument may have had against previous
advocates of Freedom (and at one time it had at least a quasi perti
nence) t
&amp;gt; urge it against Sir W. H.miilton, or those who in some more
or less modified form adopt his views, is to he either mistaken or dis
ingenuous. Yet this we have seen Mr Mill do ; with the facts staring
him in the face that Hamilton asserts Free-will &quot;inconceivable,&quot; on a
ground of fact specially insisted on, that
&quot; the will is determined by
&quot;
motives,&quot; and throughout his &quot;Notes&quot; on Reid, is merciless to that
specially pet philosopher in his reasonings seeking to establish that the
Will may act
^ without a motive.&quot; Doubtless if we try to explain
Freedom, we shall inevitably find ourselves driven on some such sole
cism as this. But Hamilton docs not try to explain Freedom ; he tries
only to show that though clearly seen to be inexplicable, it is yet, as such,
to be believed. Wherefore, the denial of motives absurd in any one
would in him have been gratuitous absurdity; so that even if some
casual expressions could be cited, which might seem to convict him of
this, it would be either unfair or unintelligent to regard them as any
thing but mere inadvertencies.ioo MR JOHN STUART MILL
&amp;gt;tjnom/m. Nobody who does not in this sense use it has
any right to it at all in the argument. Certainly Mr
Mill has none ; tliis we undertake to prove ; and, as it
chances, the proof of it is easiest precisely at that central
point of the discussion, success at which against Mr Mill
must be held utterly decisive.
Mr Mill comments with some severity on Mr Mansel
for his &quot;mistake in thinking that the doctrine of the
&quot; causation of human actions is fatalism at all, or re-
sembles fatalism in any of its moral or intellectual
&quot; effects. To call it by that name,&quot; he says,
&quot;
is to
&quot; break down a fundamental distinction.&quot; It is our
hope some few of our readers have by this time begun
to surmise that this &quot;fundamental distinction&quot; exists
only in the minds of Mr Mill and such of his more
faithful disciples as will go with him anywhere on trust.
And if this has not already been made sufficiently obvi
ous, it may presently be made somewhat more so by
Mr Mill himself, when he proceeds to define the dis
tinctions of contrast between Fatalism and his own
doctrine.
&quot; Real Fatalism is,&quot; he says,
&quot; of two kinds
&quot; Pure or Asiatic Fatalism the Fatalism of the Guli-
u
pus,&quot; with which here we are noway concerned
and another kind thus described: &quot;The other kind,
&quot; Modified Fatalism, I will call it, holds that our actions
&quot; are determined by our will, our will by our desires,
&quot; and our desires by the joint influence of the motives*
* In the next page,
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presented to us and of our individual character
; but
&quot; that our character having been made lor UP, and not
&quot;
by UP, \ve are not responsible for it, nor for the actions
&quot;
it leads to, and should in vain attempt to alter them.&quot;
(Inasmuch as the notion of contingency clings to our
conception of the future should in vain have attempted
to alter them \vould perhaps be preferable ; but we need
not split hairs so impalpable.)
Now ////.v, \vc contend, is as close and accurate a
definition of Mr Mill s own real doctrine as could readily
be put in words. Mr Mill himself cannot see it so;
and he goes on to define, in contrast with it, the views
he imagines himself to hold. Surely, if fieri he can be
caught tripping, he must needs go down so heavily, thaf
his steadiest backers will see the sponge had best be
thrown up for bun.
&quot; The true doctrine of the Causation of human ac-
&quot; tions maintains, in opposition to both, that not only
&quot; our conduct, but our character, is in part* amenable
&quot; to th.c trill, that we can, iij employing the proper
clear and every way unexceptionable definition, we rather think, the
subject is indebted to Mr Mill, though it i.s pointed at by previous
writers, as in Hamilton s &quot;Mental Tendency,&quot;) by motives Mr Mill
here of course means &quot;objects of desire&quot; &quot;external motives,&quot; as Ju
lias elsewhere inaccurately called them.
* &quot; In
part.&quot; As Mr Mill has not cared to say in what part, it i-
almost needless at all to advert to this. The other influences glanced
at are, of course, those of circumstance, furnishing objects of &quot;desire
&quot; and- aversion
;&quot; but plainly these may be dismissed. Coleridge
-.
famous aphorism which has seemed to some so important
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&quot;
mecuis, improve our character ; in other words, we are
&quot; under an obligation to seek the improvement of our
&quot;
character.&quot;
Observations these highly edifying, doubtless, but, as
used by a Necessitarian, or unconditional Causationist,
conclusive of his mere bewilderment. Mr Mill could
not, if he tried it a hundred years, show that by
&quot; our
&quot; conduct is amenable to the will&quot; unless, indeed, it
be Freewill he means anvthino; more than that our
J O
conduct is in fact our conduct, a remark undoubtedly
true, but not philosophically profound. As to
&quot; our
&quot; character is amenable to the will,&quot; it refuses to be
come evident to us that, in so stating it, Mr Mill has
any meaning whatever; indeed it is evident that, as
a reasonable creature, he ought positively not to have
any. The character is amenable to a will, which Mr
Mill expressly maintains to be the mere creature and
slave of the character. It is a clever creature, it seems
as clever as the great Hegel* was and goes on creat-
ino- ftttpHMMM The &quot;wise child&quot; of the proverb seems ~
here a little outdone ; but in a child wise enough to
positively know its own father, it is perhaps an addi-
&quot; man makes the motive, not the motive the man&quot; a motive urgent
to one man being no motive to another though in strictness it takes
us no farther, takes us at least thus far, that it enables us with perfect
confidence to eliminate Mr Mill s &quot;in
part&quot; here.
* Hegel one of whose lectures to his students commenced thus :
&quot;
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tional point of wisdom to refrain from any frantic attempt
to pay him the return compliment of begetting him. In
the will, as a necessitated product of the character, there
can plainly be nothing which was not previously in the
character; as the character is, so must be the icill :
given an evil character, we can only have an evil will
;
and in this evil will, Mr Mill absolutely maintains a
power to determine itself to react on the character for
good. Mr Mill, it seems, is not the Necessitarian he
supposes himself, but a wild advocate of Freedom.
That
&quot; we can, by employing the proper means, im-
&quot;
prove our character/ may be fitly considered in the
light of this previous passage about volition :
&quot; Direct
&quot;
power over my volitions, I am conscious of none. I
&quot; can indeed influence my own volitions, but only as
&quot; as other people can influence my volitions, by employ-
&quot;
ing the appropriate means.&quot; How other people might
influence Mr Mill s volitions, we understand. If Mr
Mill were a bad boy, they might scourge him into
amendment, or bribe him to it with an apple-tart. If,
in this figure of a schoolboy, he should write as we here O -
find him doing, the scourging he would hardly escape.
For how, except as a free agent,
is Mr Mill to &quot;influ-
&quot; ence his own volitions?&quot; He is to do it by
&quot;the
&quot;
employment of appropriate means.&quot; But without
exercise of prior volitions, he will probably find it not
easy to employ these appropriate means; and as over
these prior volitions he has
&quot; no direct power,&quot; previousIO4
appropriate means must be employed by him
; and so
on as far as we please to carry it. How ever is Mr
Mill to get commenced with his operations upon him
self? He must go a good way back. He may go back
to his birth, if he pleases; we will even, on the larger
latitude suggested by Tristram Shandy, allow him some
few months farther. Again, u hat are the
&quot;
appropriate
&quot;means&quot; which Mr Mill proposes to employ? They
can be nothing, of course, but appropriate motives.
Such motives Mr Mill is therefore to furnish to him
self; and &quot;since motives are desires and aversions,&quot; it
is these he will have to provide. But the complex of de
sires and aversions, active and latent in the character,
is at any given moment a severely determined quantity;
so that unless he can freely originate the new desires and
aversions desiderated as
&quot;
appropriate,&quot; we see not how
the deuce he is to get them. Mr Mill, who in his
modesty was sceptical as to his
&quot; direct power over his
&quot;
volitions,&quot; in the matter of his desires and aversions
asserts for himself a power of spontaneous generation
unlimited. Again, as we before said, he is not the
Necessitarian he supposes himself, but a frantic advo
cate of Freedom.
Now, if Mr Mill, scouting Freedom, on the one hand,
yet shrinking from Fatalism, on the other, cannot state
his intermediate doctrine without comino; to such dread- O
ful grief as we see, the inference is scarce to be evaded
that there is no such via media as he would indicate, orOA
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at least that as yet he has failed to find it. And if Mi-
Mill has, up to this date, hccn unsuccessful in finding it,
we may fairly set aside as a remote one the chance of his
success lureufter. Wherefore, the alternative pressed
upon him is, whether he will logically go on to Fatalism
with all &quot;its moral and intellectual effects.&quot; or wow-Wi-
2
cally retreat to Freedom ? Non-logically, we say, not
-&quot;/-logically ; tor without any compromise of his locfic
whatever might he said of his consistency this line of
retreat lies open to him. In order to make it available,
Mr Mill has simply to admit, that as human reason is
not necessarily the measure of all things and Mr Mill
in the frankest way would admit this there may be
questions which more or less transcend loirie, and accept
the surmise of his whilome antagonists, that of such
questions this concerning Freedom is one. And in per
fect consistency with his own principles, Mr Mill mi&amp;lt;iht
elect to do this. The Will, as we before said, cannot in
any concrete* sense be otherwise defined than as the e&amp;lt;*o
itself in act, the veritable /;rrvo//r/ of the man. And has
* Of course, if we chose to define the Will in some more abstract
way, as a mode, function, or the like, ami having done so, are careful
never to use the word save severely as so defined, to this there can be
no objection But it would probably be found that on these rigorous
terms, we should never in this dispute hear mention of the \Vill at all.
And perhaps were there never more to be mention of it, some needless
confusions might be avoided in the future stages of the controversy not
unlikely to last with the world as to whether or no there be in man-
not, let us say, a Will of any kind, but a Free force an ability to act
otherwise than as he does act.106 MR JOHN STUART MILL
Mr Mill, with his little plummet line of logic, so sounded
&quot;the abysmal deeps of personality&quot;
* as to be able to
announce with assurance that they have yielded him
their ultimate secret? Mr Mill himself makes no such
pretension. Face to face with the Ego he admits him
self, as all men must do, in the presence of an inscrut
able mystery. His attitude assumed to this mystery is
not one of any such awe, as that of some other thinkers
or dreamers, as he would prefer to call them who find
in it the type and guarantee of a mystery more high and
sacred. Rather, he seems to regard the Ego more or less
in the light of a I orc, in its declining to come and be
included under the forms of his
&quot;
Logical System.&quot;
And along with this natural and excusable disgust,
there is almost perhaps to be read in him a trace of quite
ingenuous surprise at this contumacy on the part of the
Ego this stupid unreasonable Egotism, as it were, and
utter disregard of the claims of accurate thought. Ne
vertheless, though his Logic can give no account of it,
Mr Mill admits or as good as admits the Ego ; which
is really to be recognised in so great a Logician as a trait
of honourable candour. Apart from its positive value,
as this may finally be determined, Mr Mill s application
of what he calls the
&quot;
Psychological Method&quot; to the
* &quot; God, before whom ever lie bare
The abysmal deeps of
Personality.&quot;
TENNYSON S Palace ofArt.
Vide Arthur Hallam : &quot;God with whom alone rest the abysmal
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phenomena of Matter and Mind, will probably by com
petent judges be ranked as by far the most important
contribution to Mental Science which has tor many
years solicited attention. Postulating
&quot; the human mind
&quot; as
capable&quot; or Sensation, Expectation, and (we ven
ture to add) Memory, as of this last the necessary cor
relate* postulating, that is, the human creature, as
Shakespeare defines it, &quot;looking before and after,&quot; Mr
Mill proceeds to construct for it an ideal world with
what amount of positive success we could not undertake
to say. Mr Mill s ideal world seems a very good ideal
world; we cannot see any great objection to it, except
the frivolous and stupid one advanced against others of
its class, that it is not the least like the real world. But,
admitting its entire excellence, as the postulated human
creature, invariably on its advent, finds a world ready
madef to its hand, we fear it may not sufficiently appre
ciate the pains here taken by Mr Mill to find it an ideal
outfit. Having thus constructed an ideal world of mat-
* Of course, in expecting, we must expect something, the elements of
which at least are given in our previous experience ; to expect nothing
is plainly not to expect at all
; our most fine-spun vacuous shadow of
the future involves some shadowy dream of the past.
t To be candid about it, this is just what Mr Mill denies. His no
tion is that the human creature weaves its world for itself pretty much
as it does its breeches. Perhaps it might also be maintained that pre
vious to weaving its breeches, it weaves its own legs to be covered by
them ; but meantime Mr Mill does not quite see his way to this. I lie
reader will excuse these levities.
&quot; The end and the beginning vex,&quot; so
that they tempt one at times to indulge in such.io8 MR JOHN STUART MILL
tcr, Mr Mill with equal ingenuity proceeds to fashion
one of Mind
; but after having done so quite to his own
satisfaction, he finds he has made a slight omission. In
his ideal world of Mind, he has forgotten to include the
Ego; and this pestilent Ego, it seems, when he remem
bers and seeks to include it, is found contumacious and
intractable. With its
&quot;
mystic faculties of Hope and
&quot;
Memory,&quot; (to quote Mr Carlyle, who, with little Me
taphysical aptitude, has vivid Metaphysical insights,*)
involving as they do the
&quot;
paradox of something which
&quot;
is only a series of feelings, aware of itself as a series,&quot;
the Ego is too much for Mr Mill, and has to be included
strictly on its own terms as wholly to thought
&quot; inex-
&quot;
plicable.&quot; It can scarce escape the attention of even
a careless reader of Mr Mill, that this E&amp;lt;TO with its O
awkward gifts of Memory and Expectation- which
turns up as an
&quot;
Inexplicable&quot; at the close of his specu
lation, is the very postulate from which, as we saw, it
proceeds. Whether a speculation which assumes as its
necessary postulate an Inexplicable, can truly be held to
explain anything whatever, we are not here concerned
* Mr Carlyle did not always despise Metaphysics as he now does,
and his earlier Essays include a good deal of exposition of the doctrines
of German philosophy. This at the time had its value ; but looked
into now, much of it seems jejune enough as the product of a mind so
powerful, seriously directed to such studies. On the whole, perhaps Mr
Carlyle did wisely at once for himself and his readers, when, deserting
this field for ever, he went forth on his grand crusade against the gene
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to inquire. But Mr Mill s admissions as regards the E&amp;lt;ro
seem pertinent to our present purpose. In presence of the
EO-Q \ve are




fact&quot; which yet we are compelled,
as such, to
&quot;
accept.&quot; Now, if Mr Mill can only be pre
vailed upon to go along with us in identifying the Will
with the Ego,
it is plain our dispute with him is narrowing
itself. And to this identification he is almost committed
in his every way unhappy
&quot;
Yes, if he could not help
acting as he did; that is, if his will could not have helped
it,&quot;which either means that) or nothing. But, discarding
the word Will altogether, if the Ego
is admitted, as \\e
see it, an utterly mysterious entity, may we not logically
surmise in it properties more or less mysterious
? Would




Eo;o may, for aught we know, be a
complex of some fifty or five hundred inexplicable attri
butes. The claim to be allowed the assumption for it of
only one little attribute of Freedom, admitted wholly
&quot;
inexplicable,&quot; seems, therefore, an entirely modest one.
And it may well seem, also, a reasonable one, if only by
assuming this attribute we can rationally continue to
believe in the validity of our moral nature. That our
logical faculty rejects it can surely this // being given
in the affirmative be no good reason that ice should.
Even were the human intelligence a mightier matter
than it is. man is not simply an intelligence; the mere
instincts of sense apart, which he shares with the brutc&amp;gt;no
beneath him, the intellect on which he so piques him
self, as the instrument of his vaunted science, is really
the paltriest of his possessions ; inextricably interworked
with it he has beautiful emotions and affections; in
destructible yearnings attached to these which oversoar
the mists of time; passions in which, when the mortal
taint in them is deepest, some heavenly longing yet
lingers; hopes which from their own ashes recreate
themselves, and vaster dreams, prophetic to him of ful
filments of unknown desire
; and, central to this whole
mystic apparatus of spirit, the keystone as it were, of
the arch, which keeps it all from flux and ruin, there is
given him in consciousness a system of moral beliefs,
and what has well been called &quot;an infinite law of
duty.&quot;
If in order to conceive of this as a reality, and not a
mere deceptive dream, he must postulate as real the
Freedom which he also finds in consciousness and that
he must we have abundantly shown we confess we see
not on what grounds any Logic not wildly arrogant can
refuse to concede his postulate. The moral Conscious
ness not less than the Logical one being admitted as a
valid fact of human Nature, by what right can this last
deny to it the assumption (supposing
it were a mere
assumption, and not really a datum of consciousness)
which is needed to constitue its validity? By no right
which does not involve in its exercise a denial of that
validity, and a claim on the part of the logical con
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which the Moral consciousness might with precisely
the same right retaliate as against the Logical. But,
happily, we need not thus set these different parts of our
nature perpetually together by the ears; having con
vinced ourselves that each authentically is an authorita
tive factor of our complex being, we may accept the
authority of Loth, believing in Necessity as all-including
on the one hand, in Freedom as mysteriously limiting
it
on the other. To deny so plain a deduction of the in
tellect as the first would be to
&quot;
put out the eyes of our
&quot; mind
;
&quot; but not the less is it allowed us to hold fast to
the other as an implication of our moral consciousness.
That we cannot logically reconcile these beliefs, accepted
each on the evidence which seems appropriate to it, is
really no proof of the necessary falsity of either, but
simply, as before we said, one more illustrative instance
of the limitation of our logical faculty. That proposi
tions which, as our intelligence
is now constituted,
obstinately remain irreconcilable, may yet somehow, be
yond the sphere of that intelligence, admit of being recon
ciled, seems no such extravagant proposition. Moreover,
to say that Necessity, as determining human action,
cannot be harmonised in belief with Kree-will as in some
sense and measure* .^ //-determining it, is really no
* In some sense and measure. If \ve conceive of Freedom and
Necessity as mysteriously co-existing in the voluntary acts of rational
creatures, it is plain we can only so conceive of them in degrees and
variable proportions. It would be too palpable an outrage of reason112
more than to say that Free-will is a mystery, as which
it is expressly announced. We expressly announce the
Will a mystery, and necessarily so, as one with the in
scrutable human personality, by Mr Mill
&quot;
accepted,&quot;
as we saw, while admitted wholly
&quot;
inexplicable.&quot; And
does Mr Mill really consider that in utterly mysterious
and inexplicable entities everything should be plain sail
ing tor him ? Should Mr Mill care at this date to take
up with Freedom, there seems nothing to prevent his
doing so, and keeping his Causationism also. But this
he is not likely to think of; wherefore, as his search for a
via media has sufficiently been proved abortive, the only
to say that a man driven by a strong motive is in his act as free as he
who is the subject of a weaker one. On the other hand, to say that a
starving wretch is no more necessitated to eat than a man who sits
down to supper after dining heartily an hour or two before, is the same
thing stated froln the other side. That he is no more necessitated,
speculatively, we must assert ; for, as we have abundantly seen, it is
the clearest deduction from the law of Causation, as applied to them,
that, in relation to Sets induced, the most absolutely tyrannous motive is
precisely as the most absolutely trivial one, each being the sufficient
determining cause of an effect inevitable as determined. But, practi
cally, it is on all hands recognised that a strong motive necessitates,
and thus excuses action, as a weaker one does not. We must thus
conceive Necessity and P reedom to coinhere in human action, as varia-
able quantities reciprocally limiting each other ; so that, whilst every
action is in some strict sense necessitated, it is still in some such sense
free, as permits us to ascribe to it a moral quality. This is, of course,
to logic absurd ; but, as a rough-working conception of a mystery be
yond logic, the trustful acceptance of which is indispensable to a rational
belief at once in the results of science, and the validity of our moral
nature, perhaps it may pass for the nonce.ON FREEDOM. 113
alternative left him is a plunge into the abyss of Fatalism,
with
&quot;
all its moral and intellectual effects.&quot;
As to the moral effects of Fatalism, they have inci
dentally been noted, on their speculative side, in the
discussion which had for its object the exhibition of Mr
Mill s Causationism as onlv distinguished from that * O
doctrine by certain unmeaning refinements. That a
Fatalist can only continue to believe in the reality of
moral distinctions, at the expense of his logical con
sistency, it would be waste of time to try to prove fur
ther. In any scheme of thorouo-h-&amp;lt;r ino; Causationism, C; CJ O
Necessity, or Fate the distinctions are merely verbal,
save only as in the word Fate, a positive extinction of
Freedom by a hostile power seems asserted, as in tin-
two others it needs not, as we saw, be held to be
Morality,
it still considered to exist, can only be re
cognised as an illusion. The Moral judgments which
attribute merit or demerit to conduct, whether in our
selves or others, must be only so much hallucination :
and however they may still usefully for a time continue
to delude the vulgar, can plainly have no place in tin-
creed of an advanced speculative intelligence. When
a young woman, without having qualified herself in
the legal manner, has inadvertently added an item to




is not so properly a charitable
concession to feminine frailty, as the dictate of an en
-
lightened philosophy ; and when, finding her babe in-ii4 MR JOHN STUART MILL
convenient, she incontinently plucks its head off, this is
simply one little misfortune the more for her. A Palmer,
a Rush, or a Pritchard is no more an object of legitimate
moral indignation, than Howard or Mrs Fry of an in
telligent moral approval. The relations of their actions
to utility, of course, remain; on which ground of dis
tinction we may properly encourage the one class of
persons, and discourage the other by hanging them as
good riddance, and some hint of a warning to a public,
.supposed to be amenable to motive. But moral dis
tinction there is none ; and as far as any desert in the
matter may go, to canonise a Howard when dead is no
more a rational proceeding than it would have been to
hang him whilst living, or than it would now be to
canonise Rush. These results are curious ; but they are
logically involved in a system in which Freedom denied
every human action is conceived of as simply the last
link in a chain of pre-arranged causational sequences,
and so not possibly to have been altered or evaded on
any easier terms than a rupture and re-arrangement of
the whole vast chain from the beginning. With such a
conception, inasmuch as it may include the fear of Pun
ishment, as one motive among others, responsibility simple
may consist; but with Moral Responsibility in man, which
implies good and evil desert in conduct, as the subject of
praise and blame, of righteous reward and punishment,
it is plainly and for ever incompatible. But we need
teareely so iterate a statement already sufficiently enforced.ON FREEDOM. 115
It may be said, however, on the analogy by ourselves
suggested, that admitting our moral beliefs illusory, this
mode of conceiving the matter is a mere curiosity of
speculation, like the whim of the idealist in his denial of
the existence of matter, and could never any more than
that be fruitful of practical inconvenience. Idealists
comport themselves precisely as others
; no more than a
Natural Realist does your Idealist plunge over precipices,
or (when sober) try absurd conclusions with lamp-posts.
The inference is reasonable, it may be said, that people
would analogously respect their moral beliefs in practice
though they might speculatively have come to reject
them. There is perhaps a certain distinction fairly to be
noted between the two cases. The idealist, as we un
derstand the matter, cannot in any accurate sense be said
to deny the existence of an objective external world
; he-
denies it as the sceptic atheist so called is said (by
certain persons in pulpits) to deny the existence of a God;
he says that the proof of it is deficient, that on a critical
analysis of the so-called
&quot; natural belief&quot; he does not
find it amount to proof. But that there cannot possibly
be a real external world to which his &quot;ideas&quot; may be
conformed, the utmost hardihood of idealism will per
haps scarce go the length of asserting. On the other
hand, the argument from Necessity, in regard of our
moral beliefs, amounts to a positive rational negation of
them, not merely to a sceptical questioning as to the
nature and sufficiency of the proof. Shorn of the attri-ii6 MR JOHN STUART MILL
bute of Freedom, and subjected to a blind law of Causa
tion, man cannot possibly bd a moral agent, and morality
must be for him an illusion.
&quot; Roll d round in earth s diurnal course
With rocks and stones and trees,
and acting under laws as inexorable, and as utterly be-
vond his control as those by which he is thus sped round
in space, no more than to a rock, a stone, or a tree, can
\ve rationally attribute to him moral qualities, the subjects
of praise or blame. Dismissing this distinction, which,
even if admitted and perhaps there are idealists sturdy
enough to dispute
its validity has plainly no very great
relevance, there are other distinctions between the cases,
which seem somewhat more to the purpose. The
idealist, unless also a madman, is under no temptation
to run against walls and lamp-posts in the interest of
his pet theory. This, he is already convinced by what
Mr Mill would call
&quot; a complete induction from ex-
&quot;
perience,&quot; though pretty as a speculation, breaks down
in its reduction to practice the penalties sure to be
exacted by the wall in his butting his head upon it
(supposing him wild enough to dream of such a thing)
being very sharp and immediate. The physical world
allows us no liberties taken with it. But with the moral
world considerable more licence is permitted us
; we are
happy
if daily we do not with full purpose run up against
some part of it ; and we are under hourly temptation to
do so, despite of the modified penalties exacted. It seemsON FREEDOM. H;
plain that to decisively announce, and in some sort be
lieve it an illusion, might by so much increase this
temptation, already too strong for the best of us, even
whilst revering
it as a reality. On which ground of dis
tinction it would be utterly absurd to reason on the
analogy of the harmless idealism of the Berkelcian that
this Moral idealism, so to call it, would not be found
in practice to issue in baneful results. We are sure Mr
Mill at least would not so reason. In his moral recoil
from what he dreads as the deadly result of Fatalism, it
is obvious to recognise the ground of the indecision which
here we have seen clouding an intelligence, elsewhere
so clear, trenchant, and conclusive. Repeatedly in his
&quot;
Logic
&quot; we find him admitting the
&quot;
depressing effect
&quot; of the fatalist doctrine,&quot; and deploring as &quot;humiliat-
&quot;
ing to pride and paralysing to desire of excellence,&quot;
the too frequent, and as he tries to show with such
success as we have seen utterly mistaken identification of
this with his &quot;true Doctrine of Causation.&quot; Nay, so sharp
is his sense of these tendencies, that the doctrine of Free
dom, though holding
it baseless as a dream, he admits
to
&quot; have given to its adherents a practical feeling, much
&quot; nearer to the truth than has generally existed in the
&quot; minds of necessarians,&quot; and to have
&quot; fostered a
&quot;
stronger spirit of self-culture
&quot; than the opinions to
which it is opposed. The candour of these admissions
is admirable, but of course they come easy to Mr Mill,
xvho is really, as we have seen though without as yet,iiS MR JOHN STUART MILL
being aware of it himself a very ardent advocate of the
doctrine whose praises he thus celebrates. Now, if
Fatalism is admitted to induce these negative results of
depression, &c., even in minds (from this point of view
it is that Mr Mill writes) which do not press it to its
logical result as abolishing moral distinctions, it seems
plain that in minds which clearly see it to issue in this,
it might readily enough be developed into dire forms of
positive evil. And no man who reasons with the least
strictness can fail to evolve for himself this result of
the doctrine; having done which, he can only, on the
ground of logic, regard our current Moralities as a form
of superstition, useful, perhaps as the Christian religion
is admitted still to have its uses by many who for them
selves will have none of it but not otherwise entitled to
the respect of an advanced emancipated intelligence. Of
the practical issues we had proposed to treat at some
length. First, as to how such an intellectually emanci
pated person would be likely to comport himself in a
world of the yet unemancipated ; and again, into what
sort of world, a world wholly emancipated might in some
little time be developed, it might be not without interest
to inquire. But the inquiry would be rather more diffi
cult and intricate than we can fancy it might seem to
the perfectly &quot;well-constituted mind,&quot; and, in any case, is
perhaps a too merely curious one to be worth taking any
great pains with. Moreover, the subject, in its very
nature, is dreadfully beset with respectable moral andON FREEDOM. IK,
religious platitudes; and, unawares, one might find one s-
self with a deep air of wisdom promulgating such, as the
latest important
&quot;
discoveries&quot; in this particular field of
thought. As it seems, on the whole, desirable to avoid
this, a swift confused outline must suffice.
Precisely according to the decisiveness with which we
recognise moral ideas as illusions, it is plain we get rid of
them asmotives. Suppose this decisiveness complete; thi
&quot; internal sanctions
&quot;
of conduct are made away with
conscience no longer exists, to




remain, but not quite as they
were. That important section of them which rests on
the moral approval or disapproval of our fellow-men has,
of course, evaporated it has absolutely, so to speak,
evaporated in the emancipated world relatively in
the emancipated individual on the obvious ground of
the extinction in him of the special sympathy. Also,
in the emancipated world, the other remaining
&quot; ex
ternal sanctions&quot; might come to be much more lan
guidly enforced than as now they are, in virtue of
a deadly moral indifference, which even in the sup
posed disappearance of all virtue would be nearly
sure to proclaim itself the virtue of charity. Briefly,
the emancipated world would be simply the world
as it now is, reduced to its basest beggarly elements
;
a world in which fear on the one hand, and appe
tite of some kind on the other, would be the sole-
admitted motive forces
; the Brute world, in fact, whichI2O
Mr Mill, as we saw, in his argument substantiating
Justice, tried to pass
oft&quot; upon us as the Moral one. A
world this, as it seems to us, with some dearth of noble
emotion in it in which only a brute could care to live,
and in which, if a man were supposed capable of living, the
desperate devouring desire of his soul in every instant of
his existence would be to turn Armstrong guns upon it;
a world, in a word, in which, if any men chanced to
linger, the brutes would be sure to hang them, on such
excellent grounds of &quot;Justice&quot; as we have seen Mr
Mill enunciate. To concern ourselves with the possible
or probable doings of such a world would be to
&quot; con-
&quot; sider it&quot; very much &quot;too curiously.&quot; But would or
could such a world be on the hypothesis evolved ? Un
questionably, we think it would, time sufficient being
given. As to the amount of time needed, one would
not choose to be specific. Suppose man originally a




gets into his head somehow, (how, it
would be plainly unscientific to ask,) constitutes Society,
and in course of some thousands of years brings it
to what we see
; it would be stupid to think that, sup
pose again the
&quot; moral idea
&quot; withdrawn presto, the
human world it had constituted would on the instant
lapse back into the Brute one. But instantly the
tendency to so degrade itself would begin to operate in
the world, and give him time how much we decline-
to specify our faith in man is fixed that he wouldOJV FREEDOM. 121
succeed in reproducing the real original Gorilla, so as
even to satisfy the strictest scientific requirements of the
Professor Huxley of the period.
Now this tendertcy in the species, as supposed, is al!
that a cautious person will permit himself to announce
in the individual unfortunate enough, in taking up with
Air Mill s doctrine, to be a holder logician than he. It
is a tendency, of course, which might in various ways he
counteracted
; and in all but very desperate eases is sure
to be indefinitely counteracted in at least one way. The
hypothesis on which we were reasoning may happily, on
the whole, be regarded as practically an impossible one.
In Mr Mill s remark (ride
&quot;
Logic&quot;)
&quot; A fatalist bc-
&quot;
lieves, or half believes, (for nobody is a consistent
&quot;
fatalist,) that,&quot; See., there is a ground of cheer and
reassurance. But how comes it that nobody can be a
consistent fatalist ? Had we asked Mr Mill this ques
tion when he wrote as above, his reply would have rung
out silver-clear : Because of the
&quot;feeling of moral Frce-
&quot; dom we are conscious of.&quot; Were we now to put him
the question, no doubt Mr Mill could answer, but not,
perhaps, in his
to&amp;gt;/c, so quite like a silver bell. The bell
would be found in the interim to have somehow or other




in his Fatalism, it is be




in Freedom. But if a man is at
all to believe in Freedom, he had better go in for it122 MR JOHN STUART MILL
entire, pretty much as it is wiser in a waterman to keep
the two oars to his boat, than to pitch one of them
overboard, and painfully scull it with the other. To
conclude of this tendency to moral deterioration involved
in even the most merely speculative denial of Moral Free
dom, let us cite the deliberate judgment of a man, whose
clear title to be heard in such a matter Mr Mill will per
haps not care to deny. We find it thus written by
Fichte : *
&quot; The influence which this Philosophy, (Kant s,) par-
&quot;
ticularly the ethical part of it, has had upon my whole
&quot;
system of thought, the revolution which it has effected
&quot; in my mind, is not to be conceived. To you especially
&quot;
I owe the declaration that I now believe with my
&quot; whole heart mfree will, and see that under this sup-
&quot;
position alone can duty, virtue, and Morality have
&quot;
any existence. From the opposite proposition of the
&quot;
Necessity of all human actions must flow the most in-
&quot;
jurious consequences to society; and it may, in fact,
&quot; in part be the source of the corrupt morals of the
&quot;
higher classes we so much hear of. Should any one
*
adopting
it remain virtuous, we must look for the
&quot; cause of his purity elsewhere than in the innocuousness
&quot;
of the doctrine. With many it is (the cause of ?) their
&quot; want of logical consequence in their actions.&quot; (Which
* As quoted by Mr Lewes in his &quot;Biographical History of Philo
sophy,&quot; a work in which, in a lucid, lively, and readable way, all
the information is condensed that the general reader need desire.ON FREEDOM. 123
last result, curiously enough, as held to be logically in
volved in the opposite opinion, is one of the ehie
considerations perpetually pressed on its adherents by
the advocates of the Doctrine of Necessity.)
And now, enough of Mr Mill on Freedom, on which
topic his success against the essential doctrine of Hamil
ton cannot be held great. As to how far he can truly
be held to succeed in his attack on the other main doc
trines of Hamilton, our knowledge of these at the source
is too cursory, and quite superficial to entitle us to form
an opinion. Mr Mill s polemic
is as pretty intellectual en
tertainment as any one could desire
; and the vein of de
ferential irony which pervades
it an irony so subtle and
skilfully veiled as to have passed with many of his readers
for a chivalrous refinement of courtesy, reveals a turn for
pleasantry in Mr Mill, which before we had not sus
pected, and which has even at times reminded us of that
soupQon of lurking humour which charms upon the page
of Hume. In his argument, unquestionably he often
attains a seeming success ; but in the chapter we have
been considering we have found that a seeming success
(and no part of his book has been more lauded than
this) may prove on a sharp examination to be very far
indeed from a real one. Moreover, we have seen hou
he seems to succeed by being at one time as incon
sistent with himself as he tries to prove Hamilton ; at
another, by misrepresenting the doctrine of the man lie
is trying to confute. We seem to have heard tell of a124
gentleman who, in attempting an assassination, effected a
felo-de-se ; also of an ecclesiastical dignitary of the seven
teenth century who, having confidently announced to the
world that
&quot; the fame of Milton had gone out in a
&quot;
stink,&quot; solely in virtue of that feat now lives in the
human memory. It would be odd if it were finally ad
judged that in reward of his latest performance, only
such an unenviable immortality as this could be pro
phesied for Mr Mill. But unless he has elsewhere been
happier than here we have found him, this result seems
really on the cards. Let us in candour, however, admit
that, taken on this topic of Freedom, Mr Mill is taken
at a disadvantage, and even an unfair disadvantage, if an
inference of his failure elsewhere is any way severely
pressed. For suppose the case we have tried to make out
admitted thoroughly established. What does this prove
against Mr Mill ? Simply that he could not succeed in
an impossible attempt. His doctrine, consistently rea
soned out, is a purely Fatalistic one in its essence an
unconditional moral scepticism and he will for ever in
vain attempt to combine with it the morals of Freedom.
Thoughts go free, we hope ; and we do not use the ugly
word scepticism in the least in malam partern. Had Mr
Mill plainly set forth his moral system as such, we should
rather have respected his speculative hardihood and severe
intellectual integrity, than have felt called upon to mete
out to him any word of orthodox reprobation. (When
Mr Mill, in a remarkable and much admired passage of
his book (p. 103), says decisively,
&quot; to hell I will
go&quot;ON FREEDOM. 125
be it far from us to answer Go then ! though we O
can fancy that to not a few pious minds it might
seem that, by some such curt rejoinder, the whole
demands of the case were satisfied.) As it is, we
reverse-wise consider that his resolute though pathetically
h&amp;lt; pi-less clinging to accepted belief exalts him as the
moral creature which in strictness he has no right to
consider himself, far more than his lack of utter specu
lative fearlessness can be held to discredit him as a
thinker. We take leave of Mr Mill on this topic of
Freedom with a great deal of the admiration and respect





(If our so called consciousness (before having decided,
&quot; of being able to decide either way) is not borne out by
&quot;
experience, it is a delusion; it has no title to credence
&quot; but as an interpretation of experience ; and if it is a
&quot;
false interpretation, it must give way.)&quot;
On a reconsideration of his argument, we see reason
to think that, in our remarks on this passage, Mr Mill s
meaning
is misapprehended. He is probably incapable
of the absurdity imputed to him, of alleging in the
singular instance of a man s acting in one way, a con
tradiction by experience of his previous consciousness ot
a power to have acted in cither of tu o ways. What he
really means would seem to be that the supposition of126 MR JOHN STUART MILL
any power in him to act, except in the one determined
way, is conclusively negatived by that
&quot;
complete induc-
&quot; tion from experience,&quot; elaborately set forth some pages
before, which exhibits in human actions a uniformity of
sequence, as complete as that which we find, or not find
ing, assume as certain, in all other phenomena,
&quot; This
&quot;
argument, from experience,&quot; Mr Mill says,
&quot; Sir W.
&quot; Hamilton passes unnoticed.&quot; As, according to his
own statement,
&quot; consciousness is not prophetic,&quot; and
Mr Mill s argument did not chance to be before Sir W.
Hamilton, it is perhaps to be excused in him that he did
not take any notice of it.* And if it had been before him,
* The attempt at a point here is wretched. Of course Hamilton had
this argument of Mr Mill s before him. He had it before him in
Hume, to whom, indeed, Mr Mill is indebted for all his reasonings on
this subject, which do not chance to involve him in blunder. And in
fact it might be interesting to show, as one readily enough might, how
reasonings which were competent to Hume, as incompetent to Mr
Mill, have become in his use of them blunders. Any one who, not
having Hume to his hand, chances to have a Shelley, will find in the
note to &quot;Queen Mab&quot; on &quot;Necessity,&quot; a very succinct and skilful
redaction out of Hume, which at every point touches Mr Mill s argu
ment. He will also find in Shelley what he will not either in Mr Mill
or in Hume, a pretty sharp appreciation of the results of the doctrine,
as &quot;changing the established notions of morality,&quot; and, to say nothing
of its
&quot;
utterly destroying religion,&quot; leaving &quot;the word desert^ in its
&quot;
present sense, utterly without a meaning.&quot; As to Hume s perform
ance, admirable in much, it is perhaps in nothing so particularly so as
in its dexterous cool evasion of the real or human difficulty. He brings
himself full in front of it, sees keenly as he shows in one casual word




himself&quot; accordingly, effects a theological diversion.ON FREEDOM. 127
probably he might have thought it required no notice.
When, admitting the will determined by motives, he
decisively announced that, on that ground,
&quot; we can
&quot; never in thought escape determination and Neces-
&quot;
sity,&quot; Hamilton would probably have considered he had
granted to its fullest extent the crushing logical force of
the argument derived from experience, however in its
statement it might be varied. And undoubtedly the argu
ment is on its own ground irresistible. But it seems to
us Mr Mill, as he here applies it, has moved it from its
own ground to another, on which, on his own principles,
it is self-convicted of futility.
&quot; A complete induction
&quot; from experience&quot; is indeed conclusive, as against any
&quot;
interpretation of experience&quot; which is not &quot;a complete
&quot;
induction,&quot; and satisfactorily proves it a
&quot; false inter-
&quot;
pretation which must give way.&quot; But is our con
sciousness, or
&quot; so-called consciousness, &quot;previous to act,




&quot; of our subsequent
&quot;
experi-
&quot;ence&quot; that of the two we shall choose one ? This





vengeance. Yet it seems to us Mr Mill must mean
this; certain it is, at least, he cannot mean any
thing to be held in the least more sensible. For of
what possible &quot;experience&quot; can this &quot;consciousness&quot;




&quot; The sole ex
perience which a man can ever have is that he has
chosen one of two things. And how he could ever128
&quot;
interpret&quot; this plain, unmistakable, and most simtole
fact of conscious experience, into an assurance that
he was able to chose the other of the two things,
we confess we fail to understand. It would be quite as
intelligible that he should interpret the experience of
having done the one thing into a consciousness that he
had done the other; indeed, it would be much more so.
To say that we
&quot;interpret&quot; our experience of having
done one thing into a consciousness of ability to have
done another, seems about as wild inaccuracy as it is
possible to put in words. We admit, that in the text
we stupidly misunderstood Mr Mill
; but it is pleasant
to find him here on an equally fine line of mistake.
Nothing can be more obvious than that the conscious
ness of our ability to have chosen otherwise, must ori
ginate outside of the
&quot;
experience
&quot; that we actually




experience&quot; seems almost a joke on Mr Mill s part.
It is a consciousness, so-called consciousness or convic
tion name it as you will arising outside of experience,
and conflicting
it may be, with
&quot; a complete induction
&quot; of experience,&quot; but which this &quot;complete induction
&quot;
cannot be allowed, even at the behest of Mr Mill, so
summarily to make away with as a so-styled
&quot; false
&quot;
interpretation.&quot; For, in fact, it is pretty plainly no
such absurd
&quot;
interpretation,&quot; but a consciousness, and a
consciousness not merely
&quot;so called,&quot; but one incapable of
being accounted for except as primitive and underived.ON FREEDOM.
I2()
Mr Mill has remarked, as we saw, on the difficulty
attending all inquiry as to primitive consciousness, in
volved in our inability to trace the mental processes of
infants. But almost so soon as children begin to speak
intelligently, significant hints may be caught from them;
and it is not a little curious that the earliest utterances
of these small philosophers are in favour of Mr Mill s
doctrine of Necessity. Everyone in the least familiar
with children must have noticed how readily for acts
which were plainly voluntary and this in obvious pas
sionate t-ojia fides the little trembling excuse of
&quot;
I
u could not help it
&quot;
leaps to the lips of the diminu
tive malefactor of the nursery. It is not without some
light sense of awe, mingled with that of amusement.
that one thus hears




pipe out its first small pitiful appeal. The
force and obviousness of the argument, derived from
the experienced sequences of impulse and act, receive*
here the strongest illustration of which it seems capable
for the feeling of the little creature plainly is that
its will was overborne, and that so it
&quot; could not help
&quot;*
doing as it did. Mr Mill might be inclined to suppose
this a case in which out of the mouth of a babe is per
fected the wisdom of a great Causationist philosopher ;
but the true and resistless inference from it is really the
* In the infancy of the race, so to put it, we find in language an
analogy of this, in the primitive meaning of the words, passion, uflec
tion, cScc. For passive at page 17, of course passions should be read.
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other way. For except for some living instinct of
Freedom in the child, borne down for the instant by a
fact of tyrannous experience, how comes it that, as
reason and self-knowledge are developed, the child be
comes incapable of offering such an excuse ; and this,




&quot; which first suggested
it ? How, if
the
&quot; collective experience of life,&quot; as Mr Mill alleges,
gives evidence dead the other way, comes the child to
acquire the notion of Freedom, and to feel that it
&quot;could have helped&quot; its every action? How the
child apart would Mr Mill explain the origination of
this idea of Freedom, and the fact that, having origin
ated, it holds its own so pertinaciously
? His pet
implement of Psychological analysis Experience and
Inseparable Association seems likely to fail him here,




gives evidence in favour of Necessity.
The idea must, therefore, be fx^ra-experiential ; and
except as an original datum of Consciousness, no
account is to be had of it. And if this were found to
be so, and Freedom as an original datum were thus
established, Mr Mill from his present point of view
would be bound to accept it as truth. That Mr Mill,
on seeing such a thing forced upon him by his present
point of view, would change it and instantly take up
with some other, seems merely a matter of course.
Probably we should find him returning to the positionON FREEDOM. ,
7&amp;gt;
we saw him take up in his
&quot;
Logic,&quot; and telling us that
though, somehow or other, for a time he had lost his
consciousness of Freedom, he had now been so fortunate
as to recover it, but that, as for the matter in hand, it




sistent with the truth of the contrary Theory.
And again, the validity of a datum of Conscionsiuss
being anew forced upon him, nothing seems more cer
tain than this that anew he would lose his Conscious
ness of Freedom, and label it a &quot;so-called Consciousness,&quot;
having
&quot; no title to credence, except as an interpretation
&quot; of the experience
&quot;
which in its clearly and for ever
crying




as clearly and for ever crying
&quot;
Yes.&quot;
Mr Mill s one fixed principle in the matter plainly is,
that Consciousness is to be held valid or ///-valid, pre
cisely as it may seem to suit the needs of his invaluable
Doctrine of Necessity.AN OCCASIONAL DISCOURSE ON
SAUERTEIG.
BY SMELFUNGUS.DISCOURSE ON SAUERTEIG.
HAVE readers perhaps heard of a certain Herr Professor
Sauerteig
? and, if so, what in the fiend s name is their
thought of him? Truly, a surprising Herr! of whom,
and the abstruse ways of him, one knows not rightly
what to think
; strangest agonistic product of a time,
surely all too prolific of strangest Gorgons and Chimeras.
More singular Gorgon than this Sauerteig the sun does
not probably now see. Gorgon of a hitherto unex
ampled figure on some sides of him lovely enough, on
other sides not so lovely a terror and perplexity to
himself at times, as we rather fear, and surely much a
puzzle to poor bewildered persons sedulously eyeing
him through this and the other pair of critic spectacles ;
and earnest, if they could only manage it, to be delivered
of some reasonable word concerning him. We can say
of this Sauerteig, with some confidence, whatever else
s to be said of him, that for one thing he has the in-
dubitablest eye inexpressibly important organ, out of
which are the issues of life and is resolute to glare136 DISCOURSE ON SAUERTEIG.
withal, rather more than is perhaps needful, to the terror
of the more timorous class of persons. Eye, perhaps on
the whole, comparable to that of the great Mirabeau
himself, and which Sauerteig is sedulous to employ
otherwise than the great Mirabeau did in mere winking
overmuch at pretty women. Ye heavens ! Mirabeau !
unparalleled hero-figure! great, greatest
! with eye which
obstinately would so wink
; except for one, August the
physically strong, Saxon man of some energy, to this
hour seeking his fellow in one indispensable department
of human industry
! Most indubitably this Sauerteig
has an eye unhappily only one and that all too con
centrated-intense ; stuck also, as we observe, hopelessly
into his occiput, intent on the far ages mainly, and his
own posterior conformations and sitting parts. Sitting
parts really rather of the lovely type
! Alas ! what, if
too lovely
? all too ideal-aspiring, heroic ? good to be
casually glanced at from time to time ; to be constantly
and sedulously inspected perhaps not quite so good
effect of such sedulous inspection not unlikely to be
mere wild rage and disgust, with all sitting parts con
structed on a less ideal pattern. Of sitting parts of the
Sauerteig ideal-heroic species, too close self-inspection
may be perilous. For the nature of Ideals is peculiar.
To discourse at large here of Ideals, and their divine
meanings and uses, might lead us far probably into
very deep regions indeed, whither the British reader
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disinclination to follow. Sufficient, perhaps, in this
place, to suggest, that Ideals are of the nature of cm
and other stimulant, and behove to be temperately taken.
He who cannot take his Ideal temperately shall be
severely admonished, and solicited totally to abstain
therefrom. Dissipated deep sunk wretches, got dead
drunk on their Ideals hero or other stasmering on all
our pavements, wallowing obscene in our gutters, stag
gering up again therefrom to do mere foul battery and
assault on the lieges, (&quot; O ye enchanted apes! flunkeys!
owls ! ostriches !
&quot; other the like foul battery and libel)
such poor deep sunk mortals we adjudge to be flat
nuisances, who, sinking to soft sleep in the gutters, may
chance to awake in the police offices. Ideals, alas !
chief and even sole blessing of man here below ! capable,
by excessive unwise use of them, of becoming a consi
derable curse to him, curse as of fire-gin, and, in fact,
the very devil himself. Into the hapless soul of some
hitherto eupeptic, comfortably feeding man, let there but
suddenly find its way some
&quot; divine idea of a pork chop,&quot;
all actual attainable pork is at once fallen hideous,
accurst to him. Beside his &quot;divine idea&quot; of it, con
tinually beaming, glaring in upon him, very splendour
out of heaven, no pork attainable in mere earthly
markets is like to be found satisfactory. On this and
the other excellent, highly sufficient, succulent pork
chop, he will, with the upturned nose of him, sniff mere
hero-scorn and disgust. With such a man, as \ve com-138 DISCOURSE ON SAUERTEIG.
pute, the poor pork butchers are like to have hard times
of it
; obvious that the activity of such a man must with
some rapidity reduce itself to sheer wild cursing of the
pork butchers. To the butchers decidedly unpleasing;
(ugly customer this I vilipending so our wholesome
succulent-sufficient pork chops) and for the poor mortal
himself, who must live on pork, surely much a misfor
tune. Poor mortal likely, we take it, to find himself in
no long time somewhat scant of fat upon the ribs of
him; growing lean upon his &quot;divine idea;&quot; mortal not
unlikely to starve, we fear. Surely a quite unwise im
practicable kind of mortal. Palpably diseased unclean
pork, deleterious, mere semblance and putrescence of
pork, its Ideal all too fatally rotted out of it, no man or
Sauerteig shall by this writer be called upon to devour.
Stick pork and putridity, foul, ?i?2 ideal, the ideal all
rotted away of it, all men and Sauerteigs shall be called
upon by this writer, and even unutterably shrieked upon,
to exterminate, conflagrate, sweep swiftly under hatches,
and, by all prompt effective methods, abolish from the
face of a God s earth, not, as we perceive, in the soul
and inmost fact of it, constructed upon putrid principles.
To decline carrion, and curse and even violently throttle
the foul wretch, vending it for human food, thou, O
Sauerteig, doest well. But to curse likewise at sound
meat offered thee, meat not pure ideal, yet supportably
so, succulent- sufficient, capable of being wholesomely
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entrails ! this, O Sauertcig,
is not so well, is / // of thee,
we perceive, O Sauertcig
! The poor Sauerteig, with
that one eye of his, eye all too concentrated-intense,
stuck strangely into the back of his head, too sedu
lously superintending the far ages in the light of
his own ideal, superfine hero-formations, finds no pork
of the present era in the very least to his mind
; no
cut of it all, alas! will satisfy the ravening soul of
a Sauerteig gone wild with his
&quot; divine idea.&quot; This
and the other pork chop of the present day, excel
lent succulent-sufficient, considering itself doubtless to
be jirst chop, the Sauerteig will condescend to inspect
and apply his profound philosophic nose to; will con
front with his &quot;divine idea,&quot; wildly denounce it as a
sham chop, mere semblance, flunkey, and futility of a
chop, and presently, with much imprecation, hurl it
back at the head of the pork-butcher. The unhappy
Sauerteig
! getting rather scant of fat upon the ribs of
him, we fear; his &quot;divine idea&quot; not nutritive. Fora
Sauerteig earnest-fastidious after this fashion, what re
mains, but that, subsisting himself on a severe minimum
of the sham, mere semblant pork of an accursed
&quot; swindler
century,&quot; he betake himself to the centuries
old-devout, heroic, whilst pork yet veritably icas, and
ascertain what chops may lie for him in that direction.
Chops galore in that direction, and of primest heroic
quality; veracious; actual substance of meat in them,
not semblance and putrid lie merely. This and the140 DISCOURSE ON SAUERTEIG.
other middle age, or other historic piece of properest
hero-pork, Sauerteig will, from time to time, produce,
exhibit, and infinitely jubilate and glory over, making
uiicivilest comparisons. This chop, alas! however, an
all too hungry Sauerteig cannot unhappily eat, the
&quot; hollow Eternities
&quot;
having been beforehand with




centuries since. The all too voracious Eternities ! rapa
cious ! by reason of whose too prompt forestalling of
Sauerteig, our hero-chop can only now be sniffed from
afar, divine aromas of it, like airs from Araby the blest,
coming to us, wafted through the dim times and spaces,
with what slight solace may lie in them for the hungry
Sauerteig soul. Superficially it might be judged, that,
in this matter, Sauerteig may have ground to complain
of these sharp-set procedures of the Eternities, so exceed
ingly rapacious beforehand, devouring his chops away
from him in this rather severe manner. Intrinsically,
however, one perceives that solely by its leing so de
voured all away from him a century or two ago, does
his chop become radiant, divine-aromatic for him. A
chop, the severe actual of which cannot now be got at,
the Eternities having ravened it up some time since,
will be highly convenient for a Sauerteig gone wild with
his &quot;divine idea.&quot; Such chop it is so much more easy
to cook than the actual foul impracticable chop of a
present swindler century. To cook, O Sauerteig-Soyer,
with thine own
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late M. Soycr himself, really a poor artist compared
with thee in this of the culinary historic. Si/ck chop
is
got partially into the fair region of &quot;the possible;&quot; the
Possible, to which the Sauerteig hero-Ideal will briskly
proceed to &quot;wed itself;&quot; hero-Ideal most brisk-effective,
active, which, once well wedded to the Possible, will
speedily contrive with the Possible strange new births of
heroism to bless the world Hero Oliver, considered to
be hitherto our supreme feat in the cookery line Hero
Abbot, Samson the name of him, also a culinary per
formance of some merit Hero Mirabeau with his r?/r,
winking overmuch at pretty women, a questionable
figure, but genuine; exceedingly genuine, O Sauerteig,
probably as genuine a blackguard as the planet has seen
for some centuries other miscellany of hero figures,
foul scoundrels mostly, cleverly done into heroism by
applications of our &quot;patent inimitable sauce pi(]iiantc&quot;
Truly, as we said, the Sauerteig hero-Ideal, brisk-
effective, active, getting alongside of the Possible, will
speedily bless the world with strange new births of
heroism. Or, speaking under our former figure (pretty
nigh as well ridden to death now as if Sauerteig himself
had been astride of it
; a Sauerteig, who, once well
mount him on a metaphor, may be backed to cross a
country with it) was there ever an artist like Sauerteig
for the cooking of historical pork chops
? Late M. Soyer
himself, we think, distinctly an inferior artist. Thou
singular Sauerteig-Soyer
! unsurpassed among men,1 42 DISCOURSE ON SA UER TEIG.
unsurpassable in this of the culinary historic. Artist
really in the high sense; these mere fond imaginations
of meat of his, all so wonderfully concreted, visualised,
in the conceptive-creative head of him : very actually
seeming to live for us in the singular cookery books
and histories, actually, and almost as if they could be
eaten.
A singular Sauerteig-Soyer, taken in the actual fact,
girt with his cook aprons and unutterable culinary
wrappages, brandishing his hero-gridirons, and infinitely
manipulating with his sauce piquante and imaginary
middle age pork chops, may perhaps be a figure like
few, worth glancing at a little in an occasional way.
Latest culinary preparation of Sauerteig, long expected,
hungered for, here before us at last, in two stout suffi
cient volumes, published at the rate of one pound
sterling per volume (somewhat severe, O Sauerteig)
!
may perhaps be worth glancing at in an occasional
way. Culinary preparation purporting to be of a certain
Grimwold, high-shining heroic baronial figure, of the
old King John and Richard eras ;
&quot; much deserving to be
&quot; known
; hitherto not much known
; alas ! much mis-
&quot; known as yet, the very little that we know of him.&quot;
Poor glimpses of him here and there revealed for us in
Monk Chronicle of one Jocelinus de Brakelonda; re-
vealer also of a certain Abbot Samson, of whom readers
have heard. Which Grimwold, a singular Sauerteig-
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rate of one pound per volume (severe
! O Soyer and
Sauerteig)
! With slight prelude, and jargoning of the
understood sort : hero-hood ! earnest soul ! noble life !
other the like ineffable cants and jargonings, most per
emptorily not to be here inflicted on poor innocent
readers, Sauerteig, in a really rather clever, by no means
quite inartistic way, will treat us as a u het, in the first
instance, to some life-image and visual presentment of
his hero-Grimwold. Presentment passably well clone
in the approved Sauerteig manner.
&quot;
Stalwart, hi^h
&quot; hero figure ; steel figure on occasion ; mostly in some
&quot;
dubious, uncertain wrappages of buff or the like jer-
&quot;
kins, and other middle age ware
; somewhat grim-
&quot; trenchant in the looks of him
; nose massive, (raldc
grossum et eminentem, Monk dialect of Jocelinus,) of
&quot;
type, as I perceive, high Norman
; eyes gleaming out,
&quot;
clear-menacing, from under the black bush brows,
&quot;
highly capable of glaring, if need be, and like enough
&quot; to find need now and then ; a clear decisiveness of
&quot;
soul, veracity, earnest valour, looking out from the
&quot; whole man, and breathing from every lineament of
&quot;
him; a highly sufficient man and ruler of men, as
&quot; the outcome of him will shortly convince us.&quot; With
much to the like purpose, such as some of us may have
seen before. A bit of historic portraiture not without
merit in its way ; slight, not inartistic preliminary
cookery of Grimvvold, and whetting of the reader s
appetite for him. Judge of our blank bewilderment of144 DISCOURSE ON SAUERTEIG.
mind,- when, turning the page briskly to a new chapter,
anxious to make further acquaintance with this interest
ing hero-figure, we find ourselves discussing with Sauer-
teig what in the fiend s name does a gentle reader
suppose
? Adam and fig leaves, we may venture to sur
mise in a modest way, is not what most readers would
suppose. By the eternities ! O reader, no other
;
Adam and fig leaves, fall of man
; thence downwards
by a very slow coach indeed, through Noah, (certain
domesticities, incidents here, treated with a free humour,
amusing enough, but questionable in these demure
times,) Noah ! infinite other dreary patriarchs ; Hebrew
eras; old Roman, old Greek eras; still on, on, till
finally we find ourselves, wandering lost creatures, (our
high Grimwold, as should seem, gone from us, too
probably for ever,) wandering, wandering in thick inex
tricable jungles of Wends, Kurfursts, Margraves, and
the like dolefullest
&quot;
ghosts of defunct bodies
;&quot; still
passionately seeking for a Grimwold, and, alas ! finding
none ; no thrice-accursed Wend or Kurfurst of them all
able to afford us the least hint of our Grimwold. Ye
heavens ! it is quite too bad ; our hero-Grimwold, in
whom we really had an interest, and disbursed two
pounds to get news of him a little, rapt away from us
so ; and served up to us here, instead of him, mere dis
interred carrion of Wends, Kurfursts, Margraves, dole
ful creatures, of interest now to no soul, extinct, unavail
able; available to thee, O Sauerteig! for making ofDISCOURSE ON SAUERTEIG. 14?
thing called book, at somewhat a severe figure ; other
wise for ever ////available, uninteresting; sole poor in
terest we could have with them, to get them swiftly
shovelled underground again if we could, not without
deep execration. Disinterred carrion, O Saucrteie
! of
mere Kurfursts and the like; plain carrion, actively in
sulting the nostril, to which -no cookery could reconcile
us. Palpable carrion, O Sauerteig
! at the somewhat
severe rate of one pound per volume down for it ! plu-
nomenon which, even in a
&quot; swindler
century,&quot; may be
calculated to excite remark. Of a Sauerteig, who, ad
vertising his hero Grimwold to us, finds it needful, after
one glimpse given of him, to retire upon
&quot; Adam and
&quot;fig leaves;&quot; and thence, with extremest tedium,
through nameless imbroglios of universal Human His
tory and stupidity, to work downward toward his Grim-
wold, thus much may be said at least, that he has hit
upon a novelty in historical method. .Be the praise of
originality in the matter, likewise of some audacity, no
wise denied to Sauerteig!
&quot;
Igdrasil, the Life-tree!&quot;
shnekest thou, O Sauerteig? as partly we seem to hear
thee shriek; &quot;Igdrasil! and how it all gnat s, ami,
&quot;
through all times and branchings of it, is ever mysteri-
&quot;
ously one! how the present in every fibre of it dois,
&quot;
in most real irrefragable way, rest upon and reiat(
&quot;
itself to all fibres of the past; some understanding of
&quot; the past, out of which it flowers and rises, necessarv in
&quot; order to any wise understanding of the present, Sic.,146 DISCOURSE ON SAUERTEIG.
&quot;
&c.&quot; Reflections, O Sauerteig, scientifically satisfac
tory to us from of old, yet somewhat, it should seem, of
the barren species ; on their own essentially rather poor
basis satisfactory ; distinctly not satisfactory to us, bosh
to us, balderdash, as regards this present matter; the just
rage of us, desperately seeking our Grimwold, (having
paid our poor two pounds for him,) seeking, seeking
through wastes of mere Wends, Kurfursts tearing our
way through the thorny jungles lacerating our poor
souls and limbs there, not to be appeased, O Sauerteig
!
by twaddling these poor cants and Igdrasils at us. On
the whole, to dismiss this sad Kurfurst business, one
feels much inclined, on the head of it, supposing such
feat achievable, to kick Sauerteig as, to some extent,
a sham and imposition, and desire him to refund
some proportion of the moneys too plainly filched
from us.
Praise be to the upper powers, however, if nowise to a
robber Sauerteig, making us
&quot; stand and deliver
&quot;
in this
rather unprincipled manner ; by valour, and human
patience, exercise of hero-endurance and faculty to dare
and do, one does at last contrive with much difficulty
and not without tattered breeches, and thorns sticking
in the temper of him to tear himself, lacerate himself
clear of the Kurfurst jungles, and Jind his hero Grim-
wold again. Pray Heaven only, that, once well
found again, he prove worth the finding; a hero of
moderate respectability, whom, without utter loss of
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with. Having of old experience of Saucrtcig and his
unutterable hero-procedures and cookeries, \ve are not
without grave doubts will be shy meantime of striking
up intimacy with this Grimwold, on the mere intro
duction of a Sauerteig, rather given to consort with
scoundrelly persons. A Grimwold who looks rather
dubious to us
; certificate of character from other than
Sauerteig highly essential before admitting him to undue
intimacy. Sauerteig indeed, nothing doubting,
&amp;lt;rirt with
his cook aprons, infinitely manipulating with his hero-
gridirons, and due
&quot; inimitable sauce plquante&quot; cooks
busily, with vigour even unusual in him.
&quot;
Right stuff
&quot; of properest hero-porkhood here
&quot;
iterates the singu
lar Sauerteig-Soyer, cooking; with ever the other dex
terous touch of the &quot;inimitable piquante
;&quot; doubtless
will give him time dish up his questionable Grimwold
for us in form truly surprising; prove his Grimwold to
be very God in fact, whom let all the peoples worship, or
verily it shall be worse for them. Easy for us mean
while, using our eye in the matter eye other than the
Sauerteig eye, held therefore by Sauerteig to be wo-eye,
but ghastly eye-socket merely, with spectacles, to see




that Grimwold is not the thing at all
; is bv no means O * J
much of a God; is rather the reverse of that; and, in
fact, to be emphatic about it, as ugly an authentic pro
duct of the pit as ever was spued up out of it. For one
thing, foully given up to drink
; evermore going about,
with some quarter cask or so, of mead, or other lire-fluid148 DISCOURSE ON SAUERTEIG.
of these epochs, fermenting mere madness in the foul
1
belly of him. For six months at a time goes to bed* in
his jack-boots will rush about at midnight
&quot;
like a per-
&quot; turbed ghost ;&quot; and, torch in hand, essay to roast in her
bed a high Bertha, his spouse luckily too drunk to
manage
it. Shrieks, at times &quot;wildly staring/ that
&quot;
something
is haunting him,&quot; as indeed is plainly the
case. Blue devils are haunting him, blue and very
aggravated ; gross brute, in fact, seldom to be met with
except in mad paroxysm of fiercest delirium tremens.
(&quot; Royaller soul,&quot; says Sauerteig once,
&quot; I scarce any-
u where find record of.&quot; Not in my whole extensive
miscellany of hero-scoundrels? in a sense we can well
believe it.) In which high hero-mood, a model Grim-
wold had the misfortune one fine spring morning f to
murder his grandmother, Katie (Katte?) the poor old
name of her hanging^ with his own hands, that vener
able ancient gentlewoman ; details of the hero-feat
obscure, as culpably admitted by Jocelinus; hero-feat
itself happily quite indubitable.
Murder of grandmother, O Sauerteig
! not a doubt of
it; plainly set down there in Jocelinus, unhappily with
out detail. Singular hero-feat, which Sauerteig, person
in all matters of fact of even exemplary rigour and ver
acity, will nowise try to suppress will state quite frankly,
gently cooking the while
; consenting a little to deplore
* Vol. ii. page 281, for this and the other detail,
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even, in order that he may cook, may softly insinuate
cookeries. On the whole, Sauerteig will skim lightly
over such awkward bit of hero business, treating
it in an
easy way, not without comic touches. To judge by the
Sauerteig cookery of it, it might seem that the murder
of one s grandmother was a commonplace sort of occur
rence; eccentricity of &quot;the grim man,&quot; regretable, not
quite defensible perhaps, and yet allowances to be made
for it; which blockheads, with no eye for the heroic,
will be so good as to refrain from over much shrieking
at.
&quot; Not unlamentable,&quot; says Sauerteig, dismissing the
subject,
&quot; but was not the hero-soul clouded ? the great
&quot;
fact of existence grown for the time too great to it,
&quot;
whence, as we saw in our hero Olivers, hero John-
&quot;
sons, poor poet Cowpers, and the like, black hypochon-
&quot;
drias, and wretched diseased insanity? Drunk ! ()
Sauerteig-Soyer
! cooking here somewhat too highly ;
the &quot;inimitable&quot; laid on this time really a little too
thick. Drunk ! O Sauerteig;
! for some six weeks at a o
time, the all too royal soul that he is, going to bed in
his jack-boots ; whence, as we have seen in many another
loose fish, &quot;hauntings&quot; of him by devils of the blue
species, sheer mad rage of delirium tremens, and our poor
old grandmother to go for it.
Of hero Gnmwold in liquor, readers are now in a
position to judge. Sober, when by rarest accident you
can catch him so, we perceive him to be intrinsically
much the same ruffian
; the excitement of him indeed1 50 DISCOURSE ON SA UER TRIG.
less; will now, instead of transcendant exploit upon
grandmamma, content himself with discharging across
the table, at Grimwold junior likely lad of parts, age
twelve or thereby a soup tureen, of copious middle-age
dimensions, slightly fracturing the skull of likely lad ;
Medicus luckily at hand to cooper it somehow* together
again. Hero performance greatly admired by Sauerteig,
who will proceed to do poeans in praise of it; Sauerteig
much enamoured of the
&quot; clear decisiveness, clear steady
&quot;
insight, manfulness, and, on the whole, veracity,&quot;
evinced by such a procedure, and will ever and again
congratulate the young Grimwold,
&quot; blest as surely too
&quot; few are in so serving his apprenticeship to a noble
&quot;
Hero-Father.&quot; Grimwold junior, used to it like the
eels, his skull fractured every second day or so, will dis
play, as we perceive, if not gratitude, yet stoicism in the
business, and receive his soup tureen with composure
which might otherwise surprise us. On the whole, as
the reader sees, a hero, too surely of the gross ruffianly
type, this Grimwold, and man after Sauerteig^s own




needed. On the intellectual side of him a dull block ;
mass of mere stupidity and dull brute unreason, not
even, as sheer unreason, able to give decent account of
itself; in the Sauerteig cookery dialect,
&quot; man of genius,
&quot;
strangely inarticulate, dumb ; the deep veracious insight
* Vols. i and 2 Nearly anywhere you choose to open, when clear
of the Kurfurst jungles.DISCOURSE ON SA UER TEIG, 1 5
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&quot; of him struggling in vain to articulate itself, except by
&quot;
soup tureens and the like; poet without speech, who
&quot; will polish his stanza by such practical methods as lie
&quot;
ready to him
; the soup tureen always ready.&quot;
For readers interested in this hero Grimwold, and
wishing to know more of him and his highly peculiar
&quot; mode of existence,&quot; we extract from Sauerteig, passage
of some length. Grimwold, in great force in it, as will
be seen, developing himself in several ways; as family
man, and, likewise, in wider capacity of Hero Governor,
&quot;
guiding the dim populations, and, by all wise valiant
&quot;
methods, teaching, inciting, and even, if need be, co-
&quot;
ercins: and compelling them to soar heavenwards ; in
&quot; whom, and his heroic methods and procedures, didactic
&quot;
meanings may lie for us.&quot; The chapter is of much
interest, and labelled by Sauerteig,
HEN-ROOST WARE POULTRY !
&quot; Dead waste of night, and under all night-caps in the
&quot; Grimwold household, foolishest dreams in progress ;
&quot;
suddenly there rises from the Grimwold hen-roost,
&quot;
poultry yard, dire pother of the feathered tribes ; un-
&quot; utterable multitudinous screeching of alarmed fowls,
&quot;
startling the starry silences to some extent, and under
&quot; more than one night-cap, cognisant of it, giving rise
&quot; to speculation enough. Foul vulpes, as we guess, at
&quot; work there
; with such result as the shuddering dawn1 5 2 DISCOURSE ON SA UER TEIG.
&quot;
will reveal. Huge ravage of the Grimwold hen-roost,
&quot;and Cochin-china decimations! Woe of woes ! un-
&quot;
speakable
! sacred immense bubbly-jock, succulent fowl
&quot; of the turkey species, fattening carefully this while back
&quot; for our high carnivals, festivities, it too rapt away from
&quot;
us, and will solace the coarse entrails of foul human
&quot;
vulpes unworthy of it ! Whereat let the reader of the
&quot; more imaginative turn figure forth to himself as he
&quot;
can, the rage of a hero Grimwold, and perhaps a little
&quot; come short of it. A Grimwold nowise indifferent to
&quot;
his victuals; with a good hero-twist of his own; a
&quot; sound healthy animalism *(Similichkeit} the basis of
&quot;
him, as of most other men I have known worth much
&quot;
in this God s world
; to whom sacred bubbly-jock is
&quot; most sacred, the hero-rage at loss of him proportionate.
&quot;
Imprecation heaven-high on the part of our hero
&quot; Grimwold ! Miserable human vulpes (man of business,
&quot; as we should now phrase it) who hast done this foul
&quot;
thing, per os Dei, shalt thou not die hideously tortured
&quot; for it ? The passion of the heroic man is terrible to
&quot;
behold, apoplectic. Beautiful beloved Bertha, indis-
&quot;
erectly seeking to assuage him a little, is handsomely
&quot; served out for it
; is knocked down out of hand
;
Goethe Poet so called of the Germans ; supremely great figure to
me in old literary dilletante days and infanthood ; now in mature years
getting to look somewhat of a small figure ; his Fausts and the like,
once thought to be great and the greatest, now seen to be fiddle merely;
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&quot; knocked down, as surely she deserves no less, intcr-
&quot;
fering in that feminine-indiscreet manner and after,
&quot;
by a Hero-Grimwold with iron boots on, severely
&quot; kicked in the epigastric regions, beloved Bertha, at
&quot; the time, in a slightly interesting condition. Is con-
&quot;
clusively knocked down, kicked in the epigastric re-
&quot;
gions boots very iron-efficacious; snivelling a little
&quot;
in the unutterable offensive feminine manner, is told,
&quot; in voice clangorous-stentorian, reverberating from the
&quot;
domes, to hold her noise, or a worse thing shall
&quot;
befall her; holds it; picks herself up as she may.
&quot;
copiously bleeding,
I observe, merely however from the
&quot; nose
; with last little sob convulsive-stifled, curtsies
&quot;
submissive, in stately antique graceful fashion
; and
&quot;
sweeps off to her interior privacies, there to do medita-
&quot; tions appropriate, and what little poulticings may be
&quot;
necessary. A man with the true hero-stuff&quot; in him
&quot;
this, as I perceive! not to be trifled with, idly inter-
&quot; fered with
; a right stroke in him when needed, to cut
&quot; short all that sort of thing ; the swift decisive valour of
&quot;
whom, on this and the other occasion, may amaze us,
&quot;
may in many ways have silent didactic meanings for
&quot; us. Few things in a hero Grimwold have been more
&quot; notable to me than this due suppression of his woman-
&quot;
kind, a feat so unspeakably difficult. Man of Genius,
&quot; as I always say, strangely inarticulate; dumb Poet; a
&quot;
high family Ideal in the heart of him, jc/iic/i, in such
! rude imperfect methods as he ready to him, he must154 DISCOURSE ON SAUERTEIG.
&quot; evermore struggle to express ; Poet in a very real and
&quot;
genuine sense, who will polish his domestic stanza, as
&quot; we see, perhaps in a somewhat effective manner.
&quot;
Truly, a most efficient Captain and ruler of men ! Of
&quot; men and of women, O beautiful, beloved Bertha !
&quot;
copiously bleeding, as we saw, merely however from
&quot; the nose. Of women ; a feat so unspeakably difficult,
&quot; even Heroes at times not adequate to it. The sly sluts
&quot; that they are ! quasi-submissive, all too insidious-subtle;
&quot; old serpent himself in his best days not perhaps to any
&quot;
very great extent subtler, insidiouser
; winding us round
&quot; the fingers of them, as if we were worsted from the
&quot; wool shop
f Not to Piccolomini then, dearest ? No
&quot; in male thunders No ! and even thrice and eternally
&quot; No! Very well, my own ! quite so ! of course, Dar-
&quot;
ling
! ! you ought to know best; making, O heavens !
&quot; distinctest osculatory effort at him. Osculations in
&quot;
progress here, audible, exceedingly nauseous to think
&quot; of ; ardencies, amatory movements osculatory and
&quot; other ; conjugalities, infinite unutterable coo-cooings,
&quot; not here to be minutely specified; and thereafter, as
&quot; one could well foresee, ringing of bell, and John
M Thomas despatched to get opera tickets for us. Alas !
&quot; the quasi-submissive, Dalilah-ish, all too insidious-
&quot; subtle ! very Heroes at times not adequate to them !
&quot; Are we men then, O wretched mooncalf, being oscu-
&quot; lated upon there, in a way very nauseous indeed to me !
&quot; with authentic hair upon the cheeks of us, with someDISCOURSE ON SA UER TEIG. 1 5 5
&quot; force of God-given Freedom in the souls of us ? or
&quot; mooncalves merely, with rings set in the silly noses of
&quot;
us, to be led hither and thither withal ? For thee, O
&quot;
osculatory mooncalf! I perceive that in this Grimwold,
&quot; there may lie much silent monition. A Grimwold,
&quot; once for all, whom no insidiousest Bertha-Dalilah will
&quot; be adequate to lead by the nosej to wind round her
&quot;
finger like worsted, and, as if he were wool from the
&quot;
wool-stapler, unutterably card and spin. Consider
&quot; him a little, O mooncalf!
&quot;
(Not to too impertinently interrupt Sauerteig here,
might it not be asked whether, on the Sauerteig notions
of heroism, it is necessary to remit the mooncalf so far
back as the middle asje Grimwold for his lesson ? Even O
m the present deep-sunk accursed swindler century, are
there not still some lingerings of heroism
&quot;
adequate,&quot; as
he puts it, to these high feats, which he all so lovingly cele
brates ?
&quot; Great men have been among us,&quot; and, praise
be to the upper powers
! still are, and shall not yet
a while, O Sauerteig! utterly cease from out the land.
Did not we, in Times newspaper of day now passing,
take note of one Tim Mooney, hero-soul of Irish origin,
dumb poet, doubtless, in his way too, who,
&quot;
polishing
&quot; his domestic stanza
&quot;
(with poker) by methods as
seemed to us nowise greatly inferior to those of Grim
wold himself, methods perhaps even to be recognised as
superior, could the higher artistic details unhappily,




&quot; have been well
looked into, seen into, was, by horse-hair persons,
wholly without eye for the heroic, sentenced to
&quot; two
&quot;
years of penal servitude,&quot; as payment in full of his
heroism ? The unhappy Hero-Mooney
! fallen, like
Sauerteig, on
&quot; an age too late/ age of mere valet-
hood, unable to appreciate heroes ! Would Sauerteig
diligently consider this Mooney, and others of the like,
actually now extant among us, though hitherto over
looked by Sauerteig
? for really there is much matter in
them. A Sauerteig, we fear, deficient in the due breadth
of view; a Sauerteig, most erudite-informed, deep in
German, and much other fool s lingo, yet plainly un
read in the Police reports. Would Sauerteig but
address himself a little to these, and, considering the
nobleness which still lingers with us, strive, in some
reasonable loving manner, to adjust himself to the world
which he hitherto merely flouts at. Doubt it not, O
Sauerteig! pluck but thine eye out of thine occiput,
plant it in the shining forehead of thee, and look ! the
hero-hood thou so worshippest in thy Grimwold, lo
you! it is even here, here before us in the Pol ice reports.
Would Sauerteig but see fit to betake himself with
vigour to the new line of study here suggested, whereof,
by due aid of the
&quot;
patent inimitable
&quot; much might really
be made what, if even in two or four stout sufficient
volumes, at the easy rate of one pound per vol., some
&quot;
life and times of Tim Mooney/ or the like, true proseDISCOURSE ON SA UER TEIG. \ 5 7
epic of the present era, for which \vc have been waiting
this while back ? And now enough of our interrup
tions, impertinences, and back, with Sauerteig to Grini-
wold and his high &quot;ware poultry&quot; businesses.)
&quot; Bertha-interferences disposed of, summarily smit-
&quot; ten aside, as we saw, and a beloved Bertha herself
&quot;
swept off to her interior privacies to do poulticings
&quot; and meditations at pleasure, remains that a Uero-
&quot; Gnmwold with all speed do judgment on foul robber
&quot;
vitlpes, and, in some practical impressive manner,
&quot;
preach abroad to the dim populations, the divine
&quot;
messages and ware poultrys/ struggling in the fire-
&quot; heart of him. And here one bethinks him of the
&quot;
judicious Mrs Glass, and her first catch your hare.
&quot; To catch thy ritlpes, O Grimwold
; t/iat, I perceive,
&quot;
will be the first nowise most easy part of the business.
&quot; A vulpeSf as it proves, most sly-vulpine, and as good
&quot; as declining; to be caught. Not a trace to be had of O C;
&quot;
vu/pcs. Whole scoundrel populations for miles about
&quot;
swept together by swift methods and severest scrutiny
&quot;
going forward
; with next to no result whatever, ru/pe*
&quot;
quite steadily declining to be caught. I ulpcs for
&quot; certain here, but the problem of catching him a stiff
&quot;
one; as at last appears to a Grimwold, awfully impre-
&quot;
eating the while per on Dei and the like, a quite blank
&quot; and hopeless one. Let justice ie done, the deepest
divine instinct of the hero soul ; and, lo now ! justice
&quot;
is slipping through our fingers and threatening not t&amp;lt;&amp;gt;1 5 8 DISCOURSE ON SA UER TEIG.
&quot;
get done. Intolerable to a hero Grimwold, in the
&quot;
deep heart of him silently revolving methods. Sudden
&quot;
it strikes him, very beam upon him out of heaven
&quot;
itself, irradiating the grim visage, shooting out from
&quot; the fire-eyes of him. A gleam of sure insight, sure
&quot;
steady glance into the fact, and practicality of the
&quot;
matter, which probably may prove surprising to vvell-
&quot;
regulated constitutional minds of these periods. Pulpes,
&quot; on the one hand, steadily declining to be caught ;
&quot; God s justice, on the other, sternly demanding to be
u done upon him
; what reconcilement is there can
&quot; there be ? For thee, O well-regulated, red-tapish in-
&quot; dividual ! for thee, in such case, there is none, neither
&quot; can there be. But a middle age hero Grimwold is of
&quot; other stuff than thou. Of this universal miscellany of
&quot;
scoundrels, (some hundred or two,) certain this at
&quot;
least, that foul vulpes whom we seek is one. Swift,
&quot;
then, from this miscellany of scoundrels, riddle me out
&quot; some score or so, and, look you, knaves ! be quick
&quot; about it, or . By swift method of lot, as I per-
u
ceive, straightway the thing is done ; satisfactorily
&quot; riddled out from the general ragged mass, stand twenty
&quot;
ragged losels apart there, not looking much as if they
&quot; liked it. These, then, decides our Grimwold, with
&quot;
triumph in the grim eyes of him
; be these, then, our
&quot; foul vulpes. These, at stroke of dawn to-morrow,
&quot;
solemnly, the Gods looking at us we will, on one
&quot; sufficient oak-bough, satisfactorily throttle and hang,DISCOURSE ON SAUERTEIG. 159
&quot; and so conclude the business. Let justice le done ;
&quot; our divine message of Ware poultry preached
&quot; abroad to these dim populations, perhaps with some
&quot;
little emphasis. Really a person this with the sound
&quot;stuff&quot; of the matter in him, I perceive; man who
&quot;
actually sees ; and, seeing what to do, will promptly
&quot; do it, and no mistake
; an original kind of man, and
&quot; withal quick-witted-inventive ; his device of hanging
&quot;
twenty scoundrels on chance of getting at his one
&quot;
vulpes, not perhaps likely to occur to every one
; man,
&quot; above all, who plainly has
* swallowed all formulas/
&quot; in a way infinitely cheering and satisfactory to me.
&quot;
And, O brothers ! the gods message for ever present
&quot; in the old-devout heart of him ; present, as in these
&quot;
times, new-zmdevout, we cannot even conceive of it
&quot; Let justice be done this, as I do perceive,
is a
&quot;
thing, in these sad days, much worth meditating.
&quot; Let justice be done surely authentic-divine, and
&quot;
summary of all divine messages whatever to us! be
&quot; done ; if not absolutely, accurately, and finally, then
&quot;
approximately, by such methods as may lie to hand,
&quot; of lot or the like ; all human methods, be it observed,
u
being in the nature of them approximate. Constitu-
&quot; tional methods now much vaunted, in vogue, accredited
M
considerably more approximate than these rude-vera-
M cious promptitudes of Grimwold, I suspect ; no poor
&quot; mortal ever now throttled at the Old Bailey, but some
&quot;
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&quot; much worshipped by other flunkies, intrinsically de-
&quot; serves it better; flunkey whom I, with these itching
&quot;
hands, if only such blessedness could be granted me on
&quot;
earth, with grimmest gusto would throttle. Progress/
&quot;
hitherto, as I compute, for all our hallelujahs heaven -
&quot;
high about it, not very great in this direction. End-
&quot;
less considerations pressing on us here shall, for the
&quot;
present, be postponed ; let justice le done, and high
&quot;
solemnity in progress engrossing our entire attention.
&quot;




Gay dawn, dewy-bright, and up with it, alert to do
&quot; the pretty bit of work cut out for him our high hero
&quot;
Grimwold, stern joy in the visage of him grim-im-
&quot;
placable. Up with it, also, probably with somewhat
&quot;
less joy in them, twenty poor doomed scoundrels,
&quot; whose singular last-Night thoughts, could we but
&quot; know them, as we cannot, might be preferable to
&quot; those of Dr Young. Ranged there, under their suffi-
&quot; cient oak-bough, sufficient hemp about the poor neck?
&quot; of them, and overhead on our sufficient oak-bough,
&quot;
pulleys, or the like, most sufficient. Murder-tackle
&quot;
surely rude enough, shocking to the scientific soul of
&quot;
Calcraft, with its superfine patent drop, but perhaps
&quot;
may do the business. Gay dawn, dewy-bright ; for
&quot; lo you
! how now, in the far Orient, the great sun,
&quot;
punctual, like a strong man to run his race, comes up
&quot; in struggling fire ! quelling the clouds and night-DISCOURSE ON SAUERTEIG. i6r
&quot;
shadows, shooting level on the green earth his victor-
&quot;
shafts and floods of yellow radiance
; the leaves moist-
&quot;
shimmering, and the dews upon the tender herb struck
&quot;
all into soft fevers with it. Thrilling the wide air,
&quot;
infinite small twitter and piping of glad birds, seclu-
&quot;
lous, with gratefullest twitterings, pipings, to welcome
&quot; in the new day; ragged losels, to extent of twenty,
&quot; about to die, looking out into all this, listening to it
&quot;
all, too surely for the last time, with feelings of some
little peculiarity perhaps. Feelings, thoughts, doubt-
&quot;
less, in their way, peculiar enough, which, on the
:&amp;lt;
whole, one would not object to see into a little.
;&amp;lt;
Frightful is it, O losels ? certes, most frightful
! And
&quot;
yet, what if intrinsically even more strange than frijrht-
&quot;
ful
; the frightful ness, in nature s mercy to us, strangely
&quot; absorbed into the strangeness of it. Alas, poor losels !
&quot; dim blockheads, who cannot, even here on the grim
&quot;
edge of it, get rightly to lelicve they are to die T ()
&quot; heavens! is it not all some black foul dream and un-
*
reality, from which we may momently wake up again?
Losels, much puzzled, as I perceive, not in the least able
&quot; to make it all out
; on which, poor ground of stupidity,
&quot; and dim brute bewilderment of mind, they can credit-
&quot;
ably enough get through with it, dying to a man game,
&quot; as we phrase it in our current speech. As, in fact,
&quot;
nearly all mortals can, when it comes to that
; existino
&quot;
they know not whither, for most part, with diu&amp;gt;i
&quot;
stupidity and stolidity. Losels now just on the verge1 62 DISCOURSE ON SA UER TEIG.
&quot; of it, and last noose in final course of adjustment, sud-
&quot;
denly, from the shuddering mass of onlookers, rush
&quot;
shrieking maternities to extent of five ; shrieking, in-
&quot;
finitely ululating, after the unutterable manner of
&quot;
maternity in such sad case; cleaving with wild cries
&quot; of them the sacred morning silences. Our children!
&quot; O heavens ! our poor children ! seems bet yesterday
&quot;
they were babes upon the proud, glad breasts of us,
&quot;
soft-sucking all sorrow away from them ; and now
&quot; O heavens ! We will pardon to poor maternities, in
&quot; such sad case, some little amounts of ululation. One
&quot;
poor maternity in particular, ululating high above all
&quot;
others, dashes frantically down at feet of our hero
&quot; Grimwold, and will clutch for dear pity at the knees
&quot; of him, still wildly ululating. Foster-mother of the
&quot; Rhadamanthine man, and on that head will shriek
&quot;sufficiently. Her Wat! her poor Wat! her little
&quot; Wat, who was dandled on her knees with Grimwold,
&quot; and sucked milk from the same breasts with him ! and
&quot; now the dear life to be strangled out of him so ; and
&quot; can a high Grimwold do it ? will her own Grimwold,
&quot; that once was, have the dead stone heart? To such
&quot; effect ululates and pothers piteous a poor frantic foster-
&quot;
mother, clutching passionate at the knees of the grim
&quot; man. A Rhadamanthine kind of man, inexorable as
&quot; the just Gods are, desperately set upon his will here,
&quot; and now, in the carrying of it out, pestered with more
&quot; feminine interferences. Which thing a hero Grim-DISCOURSE aV SA UER TRIG. \ 63
wold, intent upon Ware poultry and Let justice
/&amp;lt;
done ! will nowise in the least tolerate. Lifting his
&quot;
great boot therefore boot most iron-efficacious, as
&quot; a beloved Bertha knows a stout sufficient Griimvokl
&quot;
conclusively spurns from him a foster-mother, ululat-
ing now too excessively; smites her down senseless to
&quot; the sward there very Rhadamanthine indeed and
&quot;
instantly, at signal given, twenty poor figures rush up
&quot; towards the serene spaces, and, under their sufficient
oak-bough, may kick and contort themselves at plea-
&quot;
sure, each according to his whim and private notion ot
it. Singular dance upon nothing sro msr on here in
&quot; the summer dawn, the opening heavens smiling down
&quot;
upon it; singular! picturesque enough
! lively! natur-
&quot;
ally each poor losel having his whim of it with
&quot; much convulsed variety of step; highly curious to la
&quot; looked at, curious, and very edifying. Hideous !
&quot; shriekest thou, O blockhead? Grinding of human
&quot; hearts under millstones ! other the like shrieking and
&quot;
fatuity. Hideous! yea truly! as the doings of thi
&quot; Gods are, which are also much other than hideous.
&quot; Terrible we will call it
; grim-tragic, which will also
&quot;
mean, well considered, grim-beautiful, and afar or!
&quot;
Benign, Verily, let justice if done our \Varc
&quot;
poultrys and divine messages preached abroad even
&quot;
so, surely with sufficient emphasis. Truly a most
&quot; stern man ! Rhadamanthine-inexorable ; with Bcrset -
&quot;
kir rage in him, nearly to all extents; yet, with soft1 64 DISCOURSE ON SAUERTEIG.
&quot; wells of pity withal, deep down in the rude rock heart
&quot; of him; the soft quality of mercy when permissible,
&quot; as hitherto it clearly could not be nowise omitted in
&quot; the making of him, as instantly falls to be illustrated.
&quot; For lo ! now ! our score of losels, set to dance upon
&quot;
nothing there, with lively varieties in the step of them,
&quot; seem shortly as if they tired of it ; wax less and less
&quot;
lively, as is natural ; one by one, at length wholly
&quot; strike work, and hang there satisfactorily danced dourn,
&quot; defunct. One most obstinate-lively losel Foster-
&quot; brother Wat, as I rather think having danced down
&quot;
all the rest, still obstinately keeps dancing. The all
&quot; too lively Wat ! the singular contortings, steps of him
&quot; for a time curious-amusing, now fast becoming afflic-
&quot; tive
; poor Wat, who deserved a little, getting plainly
&quot; now too much of it ; yet lively, and, unless we stop
&quot;
him, will go on to give himself more. On the whole,
&quot; will not a Grimwold, stern, but, with wells of pity
&quot;
deep down in him, show mercy upon poor Wat noiv
&quot;when, perhaps, it may be permissible? Surely a
&quot; Grimwold will show mercy, who has funds of softness
&quot; in him withal. Wherefore, at signal again given, up
&quot; the great oak trunk, alert as cat at it, goes swarming
&quot; a deft functionary ; deftly ascends
; swiftly and deftly
&quot; runs out on the sufficient oak-bough, swiftly and
&quot;
deftly, by rope, descends on poor Wat, still lively
&quot; there ; and there, on the poor struggling shoulders of
&quot;
him, Grimwold humming him tune for it, will per-DISCOURSE ON SAUERTEIG. 165
&quot; form some sufficient fandango. Neck bones of Wat,
&quot;
says Jocelinus, audibly cracking under his operations.
&quot;
Cracking! we thank thec for the word, O Jocelinus,
&quot; veracious human chronicler with cars/ Whereby
&quot;
poor Wat presently, his sore sorrows now over, will
&quot; also strike work and hang quiet like the other nine-
&quot;
teen, satisfactorily danced down and defunct. Due
&quot;
contortings for Wat, since it must be so, but not un-
&quot; due
; for the raggedest losel of them all not ////due !
&quot; Let justice le done! most sure, certain; yet also
&quot;
surely, when permissible, let mercy temper justice
!
&quot; Due contortings for \\ at, not ////due; for a poor
&quot; Foster-brother whom we love, surely never ////due.
&quot; The tenderness, the fine pity of it in so grim a man as
&quot; this is, has seemed to me, I do confess, most beautiful,
&quot;
idyllic-touching. A Grimwold surely, who has bowels
&quot; in him, though not moving them on slight occasions.
&quot; On the whole, can it seem other to us, than that
&quot; this Grimwold, energetically hanging his losels here,
&quot;
let blockheads shriek as they will of it, is doing a
&quot; manful and cheering feat under the sun ? A hero
&quot; Grimwold who, in these sad deep sunk times of juries
&quot;
declining to convict should be very didactic indeed
&quot; for us in this special department of things. .Juries
&quot;
declining to convict ! O heavens ! was ever in this
&quot; God s world the like thing before heard of? Of .such
&quot;
juries, what in the Gods name is an earnest soul to
&quot;
say or think? juries which strike one DUMB as with1 66 DISCOURSE ON SAUERTEIG.
&quot; awe and a certain panic terror. Hideous summary
&quot; and concrete of all practical human baseness, dastard
&quot;
falsities, and stupidities whatever. Heaven send them
&quot;
only a Grimwold to he didactic to them by his prompt
&quot; method of the hemp rope and sufficient oak bough.
&quot;
He, as I do perceive, would be the right one to reform
&quot; such singular juries for us
; he, and no other.&quot;
Of which highly peculiar
&quot;
utterances,&quot; what is to be
said except that Hero-Worship, too deep consideration
of our own sublime sitting parts, and pursuit of one
particular class of ideals, will be exceedingly apt, like
misery, to
&quot;
bring us acquainted with strange bed-
&quot;
fellows.&quot; Really a hero Grimwold this to whom we
must decline to bow the knee. Not an idol for our
money this at all. With respect to reasons of dissent,
of civilly declining to bow, needless, too obviously, to
talk to Sauerteig. Sauerteig at this time of day got
clearly beyond being talked to. A Sauerteig, who,
plain Brute being presented to him, will forthwith
label him &quot;Baresark,&quot; and consider he has done the
business; has as good as sprinkled holy water over
him and consecrated him to all time; such a Sauerteig
is plainly a hopeless case, and need not greatly be
talked to. Else might not one feel disposed to inter
rogate Sauerteig a little on the head of his murderous
savage and ruffian, /tight Grimwold ; Hero-Governor,
whom Sauerteig so infinitely admires, teaching his dim
populations to soar heavenward twenty at a time, asDISCOURSE ON SAUERTEIG. 167
\ve saw. As instance, not to press the case of Bertha
(his
irife, and no doubt deserving all she got and
more) was his treatment of his poor foster-mother
really quite Christian and humane ? of foster-brother
Wat, on whom he showed such singular /&amp;gt;&amp;gt;//// ?
Rhadamanthus ! responds Sauerte
;
g, curt-taciturn ;
Junius Brutus! No word further from Sauerteig,
except perhaps,
if you
still keep pressing him,
&quot; Owl !
&quot;ostrich! idiot! wholly without eye for the heroic!
Acrain, it misrht be asked, admitting
all methods of
justice approximate hitherto, was not the Grimwold
method here a little too merely approximate? Did it
not perhaps occur to Sauerteig, that these twenty
poor losels, whose &quot;convulsed variety of
.-,-/&amp;lt;/;&quot; seems so




the Sauerteig will echo, not without
surprise, contempt ; and, perhaps, proceed sardonically
&quot; Who then h innocent ? O j)altry wretch ! art
&quot;thou innocent? and if we now summarily clutched
&quot;
thce, and, by swift Grimwold methods, throttled the
&quot; foul soul out of thce, wouldst thou then be getting
&quot; other than the God s justice, and authentically /////
&quot; deserts ?
&quot; What to say of a Sauerteig capable of such
an argnmcniinn ad limmnem as this? A Sauerteig
who need not be talked to; who may as well without
interference be left to go his own strange courses, and
proceed upon his worship of Brutes bv the method of
labelling them Baresarks. Of his high hero Grimwold,168 DISCOURSB ON SA UER TEIG.
though we, for our small part, must utterly decline
the worship of him, be much joy to Sauerteig! A
Sauerteig who to show what lengths he will go his
Grimwold, by much mead and the like, exploding at
length upon him in mere spontaneous combustions, will
lovingly linger over the oleaginous-obscene deposits of
him, not without questionable allusion to Elijah and
fire-chariots.
Further specimens of Sauerteig we should like to
give at some length, but, alas ! must not. His unparal
leled chapter, for instance, entitled, &quot;Flea Hunt
Divine Significance of Fact&quot; could it prove other than
most interesting? How a high Grimwold once at dead
midnight, hero-snoring beside his beloved Bertha, dimly
became conscious of sensations most itchy-uneasy on
the haunch of him; flea or other vivacious insect of
democratic tendencies having invaded that region, and
proceeded to extract his life-fluids. How a high Grim
wold woke up ; swore a little, per os Dei his favourite
if not sole piece of piety scratched the afflicted part,
and sulkily re-addressed himself to his slumbers. How
it would not in the least do; flea still most vivacious-
annoying, diligently extracting the life-fluids; haunch
still most itchy-uneasy; till at length an infuriated
Grimwold will fairly dash out of bed imprecating
heaven-high, and with much sounding of gongs, rush
ing of terrified lackeys with torches, (mostly in a state
of entire nudity,) and other the like tumult, proceed toDISCOURSE ON SAUERTEIG. 169
hunt his flea ; beloved Bertha, in her singular night
gear shivering observant the while. How, tor a space
of two hours, he hunts fierce-assiduous, desperate to




extinguishable Flea Hunt,&quot; says Sauerteig,
&quot; that ever
&quot;
perhaps transacted itself on this God s earth
;
&quot; hunts
and evermore hunts, and finds, to his much rage and
grief, that flea, like vulpes on a previous occasion, once
for all, will not be caught uncertain to this hour
whether after all it were Flea or Bug. All this, told in O *
the vivid Sauerteig manner, with graphic touch and clue
vigour of presentment, readers might have found in
teresting. Nay, if Sauerteig is to be believed in the
matter, there is in it didactic meaning of the deeper
sort. &quot;Hugest, &c., Flea Hunt,&quot; says Sauerteig,
&quot; that ever perhaps transacted itself on this God *
&quot; earth ; which, on the deep ground that it veritably
&quot; did so transact itself there, is precious and for ever a
&quot;
possession to me. Infinite is the significance of J act,
&quot; of reality. Consider it, O reader; this thing actually
&quot; was; was, and very literally is now, and cannot for
&quot; ever cease to be ; a portion of the God s fact which
&quot; liveth and endureth for ever. A Grimwold scratching
; his haunch there, tumultuously hunting his flea there,
&quot;
is great;
is memorable to me; on the deep ground
&quot; that the high man actually did it. Demonstrable, O
&quot;
reader, scientifically certain, that this very sentence I
&quot; now write is, in the turn of it, twist of it, determined,i;o DISCOURSE ON SAUERTEIG.
&quot;
influenced, in infinitesimal incalculable, most name-
&quot;
less yet withal most real methods, by a Grimwold
&quot;
scratching his haunch there, in that extinct old cen-
&quot;
tury of time.&quot; We may be permitted to observe
here, that if the main function of Grimwold scratching,
be to determine the twist of the singular Sauerteig sen
tences, the world does not perhaps on that head owe
any very deep debt of gratitude to Grimwold.
&quot; Flea
&quot; or
bug,&quot; proceeds the singular Sauerteig,
&quot;
point
&quot; much laboured by Dryasdust, the dim doleful creature
&quot; that he is ! with next to no result whatever for us.
Flea or bug
? question of some depth of import ;
&quot; hecatombs of human creatures burnt, martyred, mas-
&quot; sacred to all extents, for questions, as I do perceive,
&quot;
intrinsically much more trivial; question which .&quot;
It is not, perhaps, highly essential to follow Sauerteig in
the interesting discussion which ensues discussion in
which Sauerteig displays his usual erudition and ability,
and flouting at ineffectual Dryasdust as he goes, con
clusively establishes for all men, that once for all it was
flea and by no means Bug, as heretical persons have
contended. In which important additional certainty,
and piece of the actual God s fact, may lie many mean
ings for a Sauerteig. A Sauerteig on this question offact,
its divine significance and relation to thing called fiction,
not always quite easy to be made out; a little hallu
cinated or so, perhaps ; not altogether in his right mind.
Of singular chapter, entitled
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in which Saucrtcig proposes to hcuig the universal British
people, (a company of foreign artists being engaged for
the occasion,) and
&quot;
.-&amp;gt;o reform it in perhaps a sufficiently
&quot; radical manner&quot; a hero-ruler, adequate to that high
feat, being, at present, the one thing needed nothing
here to be remarked, except that it has suggested to us a
few, perhaps rather pertinent, observations, which \ve
take leave to entitle
HOROSCOPE.
Much meditating Sauerteig this long while, and the
strange ways he is going, one wonders where he will get
to in the long run what the deuce is in the end to be
come of him ? It is the curse, as we perceive, of this
Sauerteig hitherto, that it has not lain to his hand to do
heroisms, but only to unutterably shriek and write about
them
; course, as Sauerteig himself well knows, leading
too frightfully nowhither. For Sauerteig, much dissatis
fied, deeply diseased mortal, profoundly Wertherish to
this hour, we observe, surprising as some may think it ;
a whole fierce Werthcr and monster brood gnawing,
gnawing at his poor inwards, though the right Spartan
manhood of him be nowise now minded to shriek thereof;
Werther come back upon us in very singular figure, hav
ing decisively cut the poor sentimental and personal con
cern, and gone with a will into the hero-business; with
such difference, therefore, in the aspect and practical1 72 DISCOURSE ON SA UER TEIG.
outcome of him, as the different conditions will imply ;
man who will for ever fiercely curse, and hurl wild scorn
at Werther, in token that he can never get wholly rid of
him. For such a Sauerteig, what medicament save in
work, actual hero-business to be done, not endlessly
shrieked and written about ? Work ! which might actu
ally be found for Sauerteig, and very much to his mind
too. A high Hero-Calcraft, sole possible hero figure,
and victorious doer in these sad times, of whom Sauer
teig is in a sense the spiritual complement; Hero-Cal
craft being now far spent, fordone with long life of
arduous heroisms, the nerve of him much gone, as was
seen in his sad bungle of the Bousfield business
;
* seems
nowise unneedful we look about us for a fit Hero-suc
cessor of him. And does not a Sauerteig stand ready to
snatch the rope from the failing hand, and victoriously
* This implied slur upon the character and efficiency of an eminent
public functionary must now in mere fairness be withdrawn. Mr Cal-
craft has since, by some years of splendid professional success, entirely
re-established his previous high character as a hangman ; and the little
difficulty which occurred with Mr Bousfield is now only remembered as
one of those critical instances in which a great man has unaccountably
been found beneath himself ; like Napoleon on the field of Borodino,
or Mr John Stuart Mill in his reasonings concerning Moral Liberty.
One of Mr Calcraft s very latest efforts his despatch of the unfortunate
Dr Pritchard the writer, as present in an official capacity, had occa
sion to inspect very closely ; and it seemed to him the work of a mas
ter-genius in his art. Without meaning to disparage the admitted
genius of Mr Carlyle, he is by no means quite sure that that gentleman
had he undertaken to &quot;abolish the scoundrel&quot; would have done it
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bear it forward ? Would the Woods and Forests perhaps
look to it? they, or Downing Street, or whoso may hold
in hand the high appointment
? A Sauerteig once well
installed therein, duly provided with rope, and set to
abolish our scoundrels tor us, had we not then, for once
at least, most authentically, the
&quot;
right man in the ricrht
&quot;
plage?&quot; How would a Hero-Sauerteig go with his
whole soul into the work, and emulate the Grimwolds
whom he worships
! How nicely would he handle his
criminal, &quot;using him as if he loved him !&quot; With how
grim a gusto, yet tenderly, politely withal, would he
manipulate about the throat of his scoundrel
; delicately
trim the noose, give trimmest last touch to the night
cap, and proceed consummately to turn him ojf, a most
finished and completed piece of art. A Sauerteig by
whom it would almost be a happiness to be hanged ; to
whom surely no sufferer of proper feeling, principle,
cx)uld grudge his little perquisite of the body clothes.
To the public, the services of a Hero-Sauerteig would
be priceless. And to Sauerteig himself now doing the
Hero-work, not merely shrieking and writing about, and
about, and about it surely the spiritual benefit would
be much. A Sauerteig no longer isolated ; haughtily,
angrily aloof, as now ; but more and more a man among
men; who, by steady sedulous hanging of his fellow-
creatures, would more and more humanly reconcile him
self to them, recognise his brotherhood with all men.
Here, we do perceive, lies the true final hero-field for174 DISCOURSE ON SA UER TRIG.
Sauerteig. Will Downing Street, when the vacancy
occurs, be good enough to look very strictly to it ?
Of Sauerteig why further? Of his Hero-business
mere cookery, and &quot;the patent inimitable&quot; nine-tenths
of it we have already seen enough perhaps. Of his
&quot; earnest soul,&quot;
&quot; noble life/ and the like, what should
fall to be said, except that, for souls perhaps in a small
way earnest-noble, but not dreadfully intent upon being
so, conscious of being so, it is really afflictive, and in fact
grown to be one of the main nuisances of life in these
sad times. Seems to us the
&quot; Divine meanings of
&quot; Silence
&quot;
might be nowhere more obvious to Sauerteig
than in this of the Earnest-noble. The Earnest-noble,
shrieking itself at us from the housetops, is questionable,
suspect to us. To shriek upon the housetops, O Sauer
teig, really such a very easy matter; sufficient lungs of
leather, we perceive, sole gift requisite for that exploit.
In Heaven s name, O Sauerteig, be earnest ! be noble !
to quite infinite extents, if thou wilt, that being thy par
ticular whim of it; be; and let it altogether suffice to
thee
; and the less said about it the better perhaps.
Of Igdrasil, the Life-tree again, and the highly pecu
liar relations of Sauerteig therewith, much might readily
be said, the Time-spirits and Printer s Devils permitting.
Relations surely most peculiar! On the whole, nothing
can exceed the respect of Sauerteig for his Igdrasil ;
Igdrasil, which, at times, he will also lovingly denomi
nate &quot;the All
;&quot; or Awl is it perhaps? supreme creativeDISCOURSE ON SA UER TEIG. \ 7 5
cobbler s implement (strictly without cobbler) wherewith
our great World-boot shall fashion itself and be fashioned.
Igdrasil, plus mere Grimwolds and other the like foul
Fetishes, as more and more becomes obvious, sole objects
of worship, and entire spiritual furniture of the man,
wherewith he will front the roaring eternities, immen
sities. On the whole, deepest respect, reverence for his
Igdrasil ; and yet, curiously enough withal, deep settled
discontent, with an Igdrasil growing surely of late on
palpably erroneous methods. A not quite wise Igdrasil,
to whom Sauerteig plainly considers himself competent
to give hints, wrinkles, putting Igdrasil up to a thing or
two; Igdrasil whom an earnest Sauerteig will evermore
correct, instruct, and teach, with really exemplary pains,
the important lesson
; how to grow. Not the thing at all
this, as I compute, O Igdrasil! growing now, by these
sad unexampled methods, mere new shoots, which are
next to no good at all to us. New shoots not the thing
at all, and will never do. The real thing for thee, O
Igdrasil
! to resuscitate the dead Iranches of thee
; this
or the other dead branch, Hero-governor or the like,
rotting at the tree-root there, the old women picking it
for firewood; that, above all, O Igdrasil, must thou
resuscitate, re-inweave begging
it back from the old
women or an Igdrasil got into bad latitudes, I rather
fear. Even so unutterably jargons Sauerteig, scolding,
flouting at his Igdrasil. and reallv, with fierce pains, D ^ rf
teaching
it how to grow. By venerable understoodi;6 DISCOURSE ON SAUERTEIG.
methods, O Igdrasil
! which I, Sauerteig, will prescribe
to thee. Igdrasil, meanwhile, grows steadily, and no
doubt having its methods as of old it had, heeds little
what even a Sauerteig may think of them. In heaven s
pame, O Sauerteig, let it grow. A Sauerteig, diligently
worshipping his Igdrasil, yet evermore taking to task his
Igdrasil, cursing at his Igdrasil, and really with fierce
pains teaching it how to grow, is surely an amazing
spectacle for us.
Amazing; not uninstructive, significant; the Sauer
teig attitude here more or less typical perhaps of some
dark disunion, unreconcilement, conditioning the whole
activity of the man. Man, to this hour, as we perceive,
never wholly at one with himself, let him shriek and




him, properly a kind of Nay ; Nay, with wild, shriek
ing, despairing protest against itself; clutching out in
search of Yea in perhaps somewhat a blind manner,
catching mere Grimwolds, Igdrasils. Yea, much worth
speaking of, conclusively not to be got at, it should
seem, on the questionable Sauerteig terms. Phantasms
of Yea to be got at merely; wretched illusory sem
blances of it; wholly unsatisfying spectres of Igdrasil,
Grimwold, and the like
; wherewith the earnest soul, in
deep just dissatisfaction withal, shrieks wildly that it is
satisfied. Shrieks, and evermore shrieks
; and much
writhing, as in chronic agony and exasperation, satis
factorily testifies so, to what a pinnacle of superiorDISCOURSE ON SA UER TEIG. 1 77
&quot; blessedness
&quot;






marily kicked overboard as unworthy of us. Happiness
a quite too despicable matter, unworthy the considera
tion of a Sauerteig ; (who withal, perhaps, like another,
might scream with a sufficient cramp in the belly of
him.) Attitude superficially heroic
; not wholly with
out its plausibilities, deceptive nobilities, and airs of the
high old Stoic species.
&quot;
Happiness unworthy of a
&quot;
Sauerteig,&quot; looking to be exceeding great, and ob
viously so considering itself, seen to be other than quite
great ; to be more or less only sham great ; even so far
as it is great, to be questionable, heathenish ; rcconstitu-
tion on a higher plain of that very detestable Egoism,
which it brags to have cast out on a lower one. Egoism,
as we suspect, in some more or less damnable and deadly
form of it, the inevitable outcome of Igdrasil ; the Ego
of which Igdrasil
is an implicit suppression and outrage,
avenging itself even so. On the whole, we surmise this
Igdrasil, or Awl, to be a Hum for any good we are
like to get of it. Horror of heart and loneliness crush
ing and weary sadness, the grief which consumes and
kills ! That, we take it, is about the net result of
Igdrasil to souls with any deep funds of natural religios
ity in them
; result, from which here and there a strenu
ous Sauerteig will with toil of heart contrive to escape;
and realise for himself, on his oicn strength, surely a right
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manner of existence
; an indomitable sort of Sauerteig,
who will contrive in some grim-noble form to live, where
weaker souls might sink and die, stifled in the nameless
quagmires. An Igdrasil satisfactory to the intellect,
deadly to the souls of men
; good as intellectual concep
tion, otherwise not quite so good ; constituted into wor-
shipable entity, found to be a cruel and ghastly idol,
crushing out, as under merc less Juggernaut wheels, the
hearts and lives of its worshippers. An Igdrasil, on the
intellectual side, seen to be satisfactory ; seen also, on
the other, or moral and emotional side, imperatively to
demand, for its reconcilement to the ineradicable instincts
of men, recognition of some other and complementary
element. Element, we suspect, quite other than the
mere Fetish-Grimwold one; element, let us admit, in
these most uncomfortably, tragically illuminated Epochs,
not quite so easy to be got at, as might seem to our be
nighted Grandmothers. Sauerteig and the religious
question
! O heavens ! would not an entire and pro
longed Discourse, of quite other than the all too occa
sional kind, be needed for the least elucidation of so
deep and perplexed a topic
?
On the whole, for this Sauerteig, though at times we
may do a poor snigger at him, killing our dull hour that
way, we can have nothing but comparative respect;
Sauerteig, though much an oddity in his way, always a
high and shining figure for us. Man indeed, whom
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wise men, according to their wisdom, will be shy ot
trying to instruct. Man who indeed at times will wildly
overlook much, yet who often, as from casual light-
gleams, points of insight, a right reader of the cookery
books may discern, sees somewhat more than he will
seem to see: who, if looking to be dullard a little now O
and then, has doubtless his deep reasons for it; whom
this and the other pert person, with his
&quot; scientific con-
&quot;
ception of human history,&quot; may profitably pass without
meddling with. Not easy, we suspect, in any of the
intellectual provinces to suggest what should be news to
Sauerteig, taking quietly account of much which he
wildly should seem to ignore. A Sauerteig, who, the
whim striking him, will ofttimes pluck the eye out of his
occiput, plant
it in the shining forehead of him, and look
with really much depth and decisiveness into this and
the other matter; will most pertinently now sec; and
anon, the other whim striking him, will wildly, wilfully,
not see, and, snatching the unfortunate eye, stick it.
wildly into his occiput again. Truly a wild man and a
wilful
; luminous- tenebrific, sagacious-inept, to an extent
not hitherto seen among mortals perhaps; man contro-
vertible to nearly all extents, yet, on the whole, \\hom
sagest persons of the discreetcr sort will be shy of trying
to instruct. O Sauerteig, high-absurd mortal that thou
art! endless are the whims of thee, the humours of thee,
the ground and lofty tumblings and oddities. Which of
us all, inspecting the parts of thee, the curiosities quaint-1 80 DISCOURSE ON SA UER TEIG.
absurd of thee, but continually will he, nill he, and if
not with thee, then at thee, must go upon the broad
grin
! At the lowest, an amusing Sauerteig
! Live
Sauerteig! and when next he &quot;rides abroad&quot; on his
Prose Pegasus, with surely the remarkablest paces ever
exhibited Jby animal, &quot;may we be there to
see,&quot; even
at that huge extortionary figure of one Pound per
vol. for the spectacle. As a master of curious horseman
ship, we consider him much beyond Gilpin. And now
summarily an end of Sauerteig, and of these our all too
occasional discoursings concerning him.
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